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                                                     ABSTRACT 
The activities of the Boko Haram insurgent group have drawn significant and 
tremendous attention and scrutiny, and this is looking increasingly likely to continue 
unabated, bearing in mind the in-fighting which has broken out inside the umbrella of 
the insurgent jihadists, and posing convoluted challenges with the death of Abubakar 
Shekau, the leader of the Boko Haram faction.  This thesis is interesting because it is 
considering the activities of the revolutionary group from the outlook or standpoint of 
Human Rights, an aspect that appears not to have drawn attention proportional to its 
significance. Majority of the existing studies on the subject considered the security 
dimensions, with minority concentrating on the impacts of the insurgency on domestic 
and regional economy. Without doubt, the savagery and viciousness of the group, 
were paramount and ostensible in all the studies, however, a very minority of the 
studies, at least yet, have addressed the subject at an in-depth or profound human 
rights breadth. In the light of this lacuna in literature, therefore, this thesis addresses a 
huge gap in literature.  
 
The activities of the Boko Haram insurgents have adversely affected the national 
security in Nigeria for over a decade. Boko Haram's operations have been ongoing 
with much sophistication, leading to loss of lives, property, and peaceful coexistence in 
Nigeria and its neighbouring states, particularly in Chad and Cameroon. International 
law has responded to the fight against terrorism through the United Nations Charter 
and a series of international law instruments. International human rights instruments 
have also been brought to the fore in the fight against the insurgency's continuous rise. 
The Nigerian government has employed policy strategies and legal frameworks such as 
the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and 2013 and numerous countermeasures directed 
at addressing the insurgency of Boko Haram. Human rights appeared to be implicated 
in the process, either in the form of failure to protect citizens from Boko Haram 
operations or violations of human rights in the course of the implementation of 
measures to check insurgencies.  
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The thesis addresses the counter terrorism strategy engaged against Boko Haram 
through the optic of human rights law, as well as international law connected with 
counterterrorism. Human rights are addressed in a binary form, in the sense that the 
thesis addresses human rights violations perpetrated by Boko Haram, a designated 
terrorist organisation, as well as human rights concerns that emanates from the 
Nigerian government efforts to deal with the organisation. This thesis makes an 
original contribution to academic studies through applying the law in the specific 
context of Nigeria. 
 
Through the doctrinal method and policy-oriented approach, the thesis investigated the 
measures put in place by the government to implement the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 on counterterrorism. Thus, by the doctrine of erga omnes, states are 
obligated to protect human rights by preventing the spread of insurgency. Therefore, 
the thesis investigated the rights that are violated in the course of activities of terrorists; 
and how the government has used the law to address the challenges of the spread of 
the activities of Boko Haram. It gave an analysis of the extent to which Nigeria's 
counterterrorism strategies complies with the provisions of the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373, international instruments on human rights, and Sections 33-46 of the 
1999 Constitution on human rights. Therefore, the thesis proffered proposals on how 
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                                              CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is examining human rights violations perpetrated by a group Jama’atu 
Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’ Awati Wal Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram, designated as 
a terrorist organization, as well as human rights violations committed by the Nigerian 
State as it attempts to respond to and/or contain the activities of this group. According 
to the Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria’s Security Tracker nearly 350, 000 people 
have been killed in Northeast Nigeria since 2009, 3 million estimated number of 
displaced people in the Lake Chad Basin, and more than 310, 000 estimated number of 
Nigerian refugees1 In a recent UNDP Report released with Nigeria’s Ministry of 
Finance on Thursday, 24 June 2021, the United Nations Development Programme 
said that the Northeast Nigeria’s conflict with Islamist insurgencies had killed nearly 
350,000 people as of the end of 20202 Paul Carsten of Reuters commented that 
Nigeria’s war with Islamist insurgencies Boko Haram and Islamic State’s West Africa 
Province has spawned one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with millions of 
people dependent on aid3 The Nigerian government has launched an unprecedented 
counterterrorism strategies, security assaults and campaigns characterized by civilian 
casualties resulting in egregious violations of human rights in order to contain the 
activities of Boko Haram. 
 
 The Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, also referred to as Boko Haram, 
raises human rights violation concerns going by their activities and the efforts of the 
Nigerian government to employ the law and counterterrorism strategies to deal with 
the situation. Nigeria has been experiencing terrorist attacks over time perpetrated by 
Boko Haram, resulting in countless loss of lives and property. The intensification of the 




3 Paul Carsten of Reuters Thursday, 24 June 2021 10:09 GMT 
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community considering measures that should be employed to fight the menace of Boko 
Haram. Nigeria and the neighbouring States of Chad, Niger and Cameroon have 
experienced series of attacks. Boko Haram has been labeled a terrorist group, with the 
US State Department designating it a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2013.4 
The Nigerian government has employed various countermeasures to address the 
exacerbation of the Boko Haram insurgency using the police, military, and joint 
operations with the affected countries in Africa such as Chad and Cameroun 
respectively.5  
Human rights appeared to have been implicated in the current state of affairs, which 
will need to be examined. Firstly, the group's activities have adversely affected the 
human rights of the citizens of Nigeria, forcing the Nigerian government to exercise its 
duty to protect the rights of the citizens.6 Secondly, if not executed in compliance with 
international standards and practices, the counterterrorism strategy could result in 
infringement of human rights and international humanitarian law.7 Thus the doctrine 
of er ga omnes principle obligates States to protect human rights.8 The continuous 
growth of the activities of terrorists in Nigeria necessitates that adequate measures 
must be put in place to ensure that the rights of the citizens are guaranteed.9 Due to the 
technicalities that can conceivably arise in human interactions, there are instances 
where generally-accepted human rights principles are not followed. If such principles 
are not followed, this eventually results in violation of human rights. A violation of 
human rights is an abuse of rights. Furthermore, once there is an abuse of human 
rights provisions (nationally or internationally), a breach of the right suffices. The 
issues emanating from the emergence of the Boko Haram group and their activities 
 
4 Office of the Spokesperson for the U.S. Dept. of State, Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and 
Ansaru (13 November 2013), http://www.state.gov/rl palprs/ps/2013/11/217509.htm, accessed 12 
January 2021. 
5 Lynn L Taylor, ‘Boko Haram Terrorism: Reaching Across International Boundaries to Aid Nigeria in 
the Humanitarian Crisis’ (2014) 21 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 1-24, 10. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ogunnaike O Taiwo, ‘Two is Better than One: Systemic Integration of International Humanitarian 
Law and International Human Rights Law to Boko Haram Conflict’ (2018) 33(3) American University 
International Law Review 637, 637-666. 
8 Ardit Memeti, ‘The Concept of Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law’ (2013) 14 New 
Balkan Politics (2013) 31-47. 
9 Damilola S Olawuyi, ‘Terrorism, Armed Conflict and the Nigerian Child: Legal Framework for Child 
Rights Enforcement in Nigeria’ (2015) 13 The Nigerian Juridical Review 1, 1-24. 
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within Nigeria and neighbouring countries have serious human rights implications, 
which must not be swept under the carpet. This has become an issue for consideration, 
bearing in mind the inhuman treatment meted out by members of the Boko Haram 
insurgents on innocent civilians and the role of Nigerian government law enforcement 
agents' ruthless and brutal actions in counteracting the activities of Boko Haram 
terrorists. 
Therefore, the fight against terrorism must comply with the rules of engagement in 
international law and must not be seen to be in contravention. The UN Charter is a 
binding instrument in Nigeria and the UN Security Council, being an organ of the UN, 
has powers to make resolutions, of which the subject-matter of terrorism has attracted 
a great deal of attention as shown in the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 that 
requires States to develop and implement arrangements for counterterrorism. It will be 
appropriate that the spread of terrorism is addressed and contained, and the victims of 
the act of terror get justice through the courts in Nigeria by bringing criminal 
prosecutions against perpetrators of such under the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and 
2013. This thesis will therefore investigate the rights that are violated in the course of 
the activities of terrorists and how the government has effectively used the law to 
address the challenges of the spread of the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. It will 
examine whether the violations of these rights are being redressed and whether 
restitutions are given to the victims of the activities of Boko Haram terrorists in 
Nigeria.  
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
1.1.1 The Impact of the Colonialism on the on the Legal and Political Landscape in the 
Context of the Emergence of Boko Haram   
In considering the social context and the legal measures for counterterrorism in 
Nigeria, it is important to set out the background of the political and legal contexts 
pertaining to terrorism. Thus, in discussing this subject, it is vital to acknowledge that 
the longevity of military hegemony or dominance in Nigeria diminished or destroyed 
any vestige of building an established constitutional culture in Nigeria. This is mostly 
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because various initiatives aimed at drafting a constitution for Nigeria by the military 
were motivated by an overriding legitimization and perpetuation of military 
administration.10 The incessant and perennial military coup d’état did not chime with 
respecting the supreme position of the Constitution. In a democratic dispensation or 
government, there is the rule of law and the principle of constitutionalism. 
Nevertheless, each military takeover of government in Nigeria dissolves, suspends, and 
abrogates the pre-existing civilian democratic constitutional arrangement or order and 
superimpose or supplant it with military decrees which had no respect for the rule of 
law and principle of constitutionalism. 11 The military's language is to rule by fiat and 
diktat, which then derails Nigeria’s road or effort at constitutional development. The 
impact of military authoritarianism on Nigeria’s constitutional development is 
humoungous in the sense that as soon as the military assume political power, its 
decrees implement draconian ex-post-facto laws, keep the jurisdiction of the court in 
abeyance, and denies citizens and individuals of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.12  
Constitution-making in Nigeria has either been in the process of adoption or enactment 
by the British colonial administrators or the military administrations in Nigeria.13 From 
the 1963 arrangement when Nigeria officially became a member of the 
Commonwealth with the Queen of England as the ceremonial head of Nigeria and the 
metamorphosis of Nigeria into a Federal government, there is no gainsaying the fact 
that the civilians have not played any prominent role or part in the making of Nigeria’s 
Constitution. Nigeria has not imbibed a culture of living or operating or governing 
under the umbrella of a single constitution. Since Nigeria’s independence from British 
 
10 Olu Awofeso, ‘The of Military Transition Programmes to Democracy in Nigeria 1966-1999’ (2017) 
22(6) Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 1, 1-11. 
11 Patrick Bamgboye, ‘The Military Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria (1983-1999): A Critical 
Appraisal’ (2014) 23(5) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 2340-2344. 
12 Etim O Frank, Wilfred I Ukpere, ‘The Impact of Military Rule in Democracy in Nigeria’ (2012) 33(3)  
Journal of Social Science 235-292. 
13 Olamide Olanrewaju, History of Nigerian Constitutional Development 
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colonial rule, the country has had several unworkable constitutions.14 Nigeria’s journey 
in constitution drafting and making began in 1914 when the Southern and Northern 
Protectorates of Nigeria merged, and provinces were created from the two 
protectorates.15 What came out from this merger was the appointment of Lieutenant 
Governors to govern the provinces under Lord Frederick Lugard, who was the 
Governor-General. The Governor-General exercised both legislative and executive 
powers over the provinces of the North and enacted proclamations and orders assented 
to by the Queen of England.16 Following Lagos's annexation in 1861, the British 
administrators set up legislative and executive councils to support the Governor and by 
1906 spread the work of the Lagos legislative and executive council to the whole of 
Lagos province. The amalgamation of Nigeria was without consulting Nigerians, and 
Lord Lugard exercised arbitrary and unilateral constitutional powers. The colonial 
administrators' indirect rule system was solely to divide and rule the two protectorates 
with different intent and motives. For instance, the northern protectorate made laws 
through proclamation, whereas its counterpart of the south made its laws through 
legislation.17 This system, to them, was the most effortless style of administering the 
protectorates. Their desire to amalgamate the two protectorates created a deep and 
unending conflict in Nigeria. The British administrators forcefully amalgamated the 
northern and southern sides of the divide without considering the differences in 
culture, ethnic affiliation, and religious differences.18  They also deployed tactics of 
engaging Nigerian elites in their affairs. These elites only served the interest of their 
masters before considering and to some extent their fellow Nigerians.  This class of 
elites has been the problem of Nigeria since then.  
 
14 The Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue to the Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee 
‘Comments and viewpoints on the Nigerian Constitution’ 
http://www.waado.org/nigerian_scholars/.../constitution/viewconst1, accessed 12 January 2021.   
15 These Proclamations from the colonial office in London purported to unite the southern and 
northern protectorates of Nigeria into a single unit for administrative convenience. At that time, the 
north was unable to generate enough funds to maintain a separate administration. See JF Ajayi, 
‘National History in the Context of Decolonisation: The Nigerian Example’ in Erik Lonnroth, Karl 
Molin and Ragnar Bjork, Conceptions of National History (De Gruyter, 1994) 64-78. 
16 Kehinde M Mowoe, Constitutional Law in Nigeria (Malthouse Press, 2008) 2.  
17 I F Nicolson, The Administration of Nigeria, 1900-1960: Methods, and Myths (Clarendon Press, 
1969) 326 
18 Moses Ochonu, ‘The Roots of Nigeria’s Religious and Ethnic Conflict’, 




However, the 1914 Constitution was abrogated when Sir Hugh Clifford replaced Lord 
Lugard as the Governor of Nigeria in 1921. This gave birth to the Clifford Constitution 
of 1922. Sir Clifford, on the assumption of duty as Governor, discarded the indirect 
rule operated under the leadership of Lugard and proposed the first electoral system in 
Nigeria. With that starting point, systematically ushered in a new legislative council 
consisting of forty-six members with the Governor as the head.19 Thus, the executive 
council, whose membership consisted of only British, exerted control over the 
legislative council.  Sir Clifford abrogated both the Nigerian Council and the legislative 
council. The fact is that the colonial government imposed the Clifford and Lugard 
Constitutions in Nigeria.20 The two governors that assumed power after Clifford was 
Donald Cameroon and Bernard Boudilion, who did not impact Nigeria’s 
constitutional development.  
However, The Richards Constitution of 1945 was no different from the Lugard and 
Clifford Constitution. Nigerian nationalists hated this Constitution, and it succeeded in 
dividing Nigeria into three regions, which brought about regionalism into the Nigerian 
political system.21 However, Richard's Constitution introduced federalism in Nigeria's 
political system which was theoretical in outlook, and because of that structural 
inequality, unabatingly dominated the Nigerian political discourse of today. Some 
commentators believe that is one of the factors that hinders Nigeria’s development. 
The 1951 Macpherson Constitution consulted Nigerians to set up a Select Committee 
of the legislative council mandated to review the Constitution of 1946.22 The 1951 
constitution gave Nigeria some autonomy, and the House of Representatives was 
created consisting of one hundred and thirty-six members. The Governor nominated 
another twelve members to the same house. Unfortunately, the 1951 constitution 
 
19 Olamide Olanrewaju, ‘History of Nigerian Constitutional Development: 1963 Constitution, 1979 
Constitution, Independent Constitution, Lyttleton Constitution, Macpherson Constitution, Richard 
Constitution’,https://djetlawyer.com/history-nigerian-constitutional-development, accessed 12 
January 2021. 
20 Akindiyo Oladiran, ‘Democratizing and legitimizing Constitutional Making in Nigeria: A Focus on 
the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria’ (2014) 4(2) International Journal of Humanities and Social 
Sciences 205-211. 
21 Egbert Udo Udoma, History and the Law of the Constitution of Nigeria (Malthouse Press, 1994) 
49.   
22 EM Joye and K Igweike, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transition in the Contemporary World 
(Macmillan, 1982) 25.   
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collapsed after operating for two years.23 
The collapse of the 1951 constitution gave birth to the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954. 
This Constitution made Nigeria a federation of five regions consisting of Southern 
Cameroon, the Federal Territory of Lagos, Eastern, Northern, and Western regions. 
The independence constitution of 1960 led to Nigeria's independence, and in 1963 a 
proposal was published for the creation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria. This gave birth to the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 1
 
October 1963.24 A 
President was appointed for Nigeria, who became Head of State and exercised the 
quasi-executive power of a President. Because of the general tribal and ethnic 
disaffection of the various regions in Nigeria, mainly due to dissatisfaction with 
colonial rule, a political crisis erupted in almost all regions of Nigeria This made the 
process of governance in Nigeria impracticable and ungovernable.25 Despite adopting a 
democratic system before the military intervention, lack the political cohesion to 
develop a national identity. This unpalatable state of affairs invited the military 
dictatorship back to power. This led to the first coup d’etat on 15
th 
January 1966.26 
This coup led to the loss of many civilian lives as well as political leaders. With the 
inception of the military, the armed forces took over the administration of the country. 
The Republican Constitution exercised no authority at all, which rendered the council 
of ministers unconstitutional. Because the military had stripped the council of ministers 
of its powers, the military now in charge of government promulgated Decrees 1 and 3 
of 1966. It also altered and suspended the Constitution under the Constitution 
(Suspension and Modification) No 1 of 1966.27 The military suspended the regional 
and executive parliament. This military government tried to introduce constitutional 
changes by setting up panels and bodies to study the factors working against national 




25 IE Sagay, ‘Setting the Agenda for Constitutional Development in Nigeria’ in Center for Democracy 
and Development, Strengthening Nigeria’s Constitution for Sustainable Democracy (Center for 
Democracy and Development, 1999) 14. 
26 Umaru Saidu Zamare and Usman Ahmed Karofi, ‘National Unity: A Catalyst for Sustainable 
Development in Nigeria’ (2015) 5(8) Journal of Developing Countries Studies 86, 86-89. 
27 PA Oluyede and  DO Aihe, Cases and Materials on Constitutional law in Nigeria  (eds.) 509   
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following a second coup d’état which brought this arrangement abruptly to a halt.28 
Coup d’état became the order of the day.  
Similarly, there was a coup d’etat on 29 July 1966 and 29
 
July 1975.29 The effort at 
constitution-making in Nigeria was enhanced when the military set up a Constituent 
Assembly to draft a new constitution for Nigeria. This was set up under Decree No. 50 
of 1977, and the Supreme Military Council constituted a constituent assembly 
consisting of 203 elected members drawn from various states of the country and twenty 
other members, and chaired by Sir Udo Udoma.30 The constituent assembly made 
recommendations, and the supreme military council approved the Constituent 
Assembly's recommendations by promulgating the 1979 Constitution into law, and the 
supreme military council inserted into the Constitution specific provisions, which the 
constituent assembly did not deliberate on.31 The military manipulated and tampered 
with the 1979 constitution, and too much power was vested in the federal government. 
This allowed the federal government to exercise authoritarian power because of the 
individual sections' which the military surreptitiously inserted into the Constitution.  
This development led to the allocation of excess power to the federal government, and 
a different constitution which was not approved and accepted by the majority of 
Nigerians was passed into law as the 1979 constitution of Nigeria. The 1979 
Constitution was a manifestation of military dictatorship and authoritarianism, and 
this impacted heavily on Nigeria’s political system.  
The military struck again in 1983 and suspended the 1979 Constitution, and Major-
General Muhammadu Buhari ousted the civilian administration of President Shehu 
Shagari on 31
 
December 1983.32 There was another coup in 1985, which toppled 
Muhammadu Buhari's regime and brought in General Ibrahim Babangida to power as 
military President. Babangida promised to relinquish power in 1989. Babangida 
instituted the political bureau in 1986 and tasked it to make recommendations for a 
 
28 Ibid at 13.   
29 Ibid. 
30  Mowoe, at 7   
31 FT Abioye, ‘Constitution-making, Legitimacy and Rule of Law: A Comparative Analysis’ (2011) 
44(1) Journal to Comparative & International Law of Southern Africa 59-79, 71.  
32 Nikki Tobi, ‘The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change in the Context of the 1999 Constitution’ in IA 
Ayua, DA Guobadia and AO Adekunle,  (eds.) Issues in the 1999 Constitution (NIALS 2000) 24.  
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new constitution.33 The supreme military council set up a constitution review 
committee entitled Transition to civil rule Decree 1987, tasked with reviewing the 1979 
constitution based on the recommendations of the political bureau. What you notice 
from the political bureau's recommendations was a manifestation of the military's 
influence under the Nigerian Constitution and the frustration of every attempt and 
effort to bequeath to Nigeria a single constitutional document that Nigerians can call a 
constitution. The political bureau failed to effect any change(s) into the 1979 
constitution, and the annulment of the June 12, 1993, election meant that the 1989 
constitution did not see the light of the day. 
The cancellation of the June 12 elections brought about nationwide protests and 
demonstrations and calamities across the country and forced president Babangida to 
hand over power to the Interim Government presided by Chief Ernest Shonekan.34 The 
Interim Government of Chief Ernest Shonekan was overthrown by General Sani 
Abacha and suspended every constitutional arrangement made by General Babangida. 
General Abacha promulgated Decree No 1 1994, and a constitutional commission was 
instituted tasked with organizing a constitutional conference. After Abacha died in 
1998, a return to constitutional democracy began with General Abdusallam Abubakar, 
who succeeded Abacha. He constituted under the auspices of the Provisional ruling 
council a constitution debate on the Draft Constitution. This led to the 1999 
Constitution, and the 1999 Constitution was promulgated into law on May 5, 1999.35 
After that, Nigeria became a democratic state under Obasanjo, who promised to 
institutionalise democracy and checkmate the excesses of military rule and uphold 
human rights and fundamental freedom. It is not wrong to say that the 1999 
Constitution was a constitution made without the consent of Nigerians and was a 
recycled Constitution, which did not rectify the problems of the 1979 constitution. 
However, it can be said that the military was the only centralised institution when 
Nigeria became an independent state and usually operate as an autonomous body that 




35 Tobi, 25.   
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rights and fundamental freedom was not their priority. Giving the current state of 
human rights in the country, it becomes imperative that this study will examine human 
rights violations arising from the operations of Boko Haram and the approach 
employed by Nigeria to address the insurgencies. Fundamentally, Nigeria is a 
democratic country governed by a well-defined Constitution (“Grund Norm”). For 
example, Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as 
Amended) explicitly defines the ambits of “the constitutional right to a fair hearing” 
within a court of law or tribunal established by law. Concisely, the Constitution 
provides for the fair trial of an accused person (in this instance, a perpetrator or suspect 
of a crime). This encapsulates two major Latin principles of fair hearing, which are: 
"audi alteram partem" meaning "hear the other party" and "nemo judex in causa sua" 
meaning "no one should be a judge in his own case". Under no ideal circumstance 
must these principles be jettisoned, majorly because they provide an avenue for law 
and order and for justice to be attained. 
1.1.2 The Nigerian Constitutional Challenges in the Context of the Fight against Boko 
Haram  
As an independent state for nearly six decades, the military has ruled Nigeria for a 
period of 29 years. Following its return to constitutional democracy in 1999, it adopted 
a presidential system of government founded on the 1999 constitution.36 The military 
oligarchs designed the Constitution in collaboration with their few civilian cronies 
through unpopular processes determined to perpetuate themselves in power.37 
Constitutional manipulations and crises in Nigeria started in the early years of 
Nigeria’s independence when the then leaders conspicuously copied the British 
governance system.38 Although the military coup thwarted the development, as a result 
of the election crisis, followed by the civil war, and since then, the military regime has 
been ruling until 1999. However, following the uninterrupted and sustained democratic 
structure from 1999 to date, the country witnessed an acute constitutional crisis in 2010 
 
36 Ibid. 10 
37 J Ihonvbere, ‘How to Make an Undemocratic Constitution: Nigeria’s Example, Arguing What Civil 
Society Participation in Constitutional Making is Critical to the Relevance, Effectiveness and 




when the then President was inconspicuously out of the country to seek medical 
attention. Given this obnoxious incident, the country was almost plunged into anarchy 
because of the vacuum which the President's absence created, as the latter did not 
transfer power to his deputy. Nigeria had series of constitutions following successive 
military regimes' success with different interests, aims, and objectives.   
However, the development of constitutional changes started in 1963 and subsequently 
followed in 1979. The fundamental question that comes to mind is, on what authority 
has the military government made these constitutions? Because in the process of 
framing the Constitution, cognizance must be given to the citizens' viewpoint and the 
appropriate avenue to express such opinions was through the sovereign national 
constitutional conference. Moreover, that was not observed under the military because 
there was no freedom to express such opinion. Nigeria’s 1979 constitution section 1 
(2), which is also the same section in the 1999 constitution, contained that  
“The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group 
of persons take control of the government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except under 
the provisions of this constitution.”39 
In the light of the foregoing provision, a military regime by its nature is 
unconstitutional and not recognised in any society in its entirety. Whenever military 
takeover, suspension, and modification of the Constitution becomes their first task and 
usually accompanied by Suspension and Modification Decree.40 Those provisions that 
were not suspended were mostly modified, subject to the “suspension and 
modification” decree to incorporate the military whims and caprices. This practice has 
been sustained in Nigeria. The military uses ouster clauses to formulate their 
ephemeral laws whereby no individual will challenge such laws, and in reality, violates 
the principles of the rule of law and the fundamental freedom of citizens.41  Therefore, 
it is not wrong to say that a substantial part of the past and existing Constitution of 
Nigeria were military coded documents. 
 
39 Ibid, 10 
40 DA Ijalaye, ‘Coup d’etat and the Nigerian Constitutions’ (1997) 1 Nigerian Journal of Public Law 




In light of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that military regimes undermined the 
Nigerian Constitution's supremacy and constitutionalism. The basic tenets of 
constitutionalism are giving absolute freedom to citizens and ensuring that it proffers 
political solution using the Constitution or the rule of law visible through democratic 
processes. The principle of constitutionalism recognises a popular government that can 
only be visible through a democratic setting.42 The Constitution empowers the 
authority to check the excesses of its subject. On this subject matter, Montesquieu 
contends that the government must protect the citizenry against any harm, so also 
checking the excesses of the citizenry lies with authority.43 Because to him, once an 
individual is vested with power, he is liable to abuse it.44 Preventing such abuses by 
individuals necessitated the principle of separation of power, which serves as the 
cornerstone for the smooth running of constitutional government.45 Therefore, it can be 
observed from the above standpoint that military authoritarianism in Nigeria had 
succeeded in overthrowing the democratic structures, which are recognised as a 
legitimate means to govern society.    
It is important to briefly discuss this Constitutional historical formation before focusing 
on the principle of separation of power under its provision. Historically, this 
Constitution rooted its origin during General Abacha's authoritarian regime when he 
sought to transition from military dictatorship to civilian democracy in 1995. In 1995 
Abacha’s government formed a National Constitutional Conference where 
representatives from a different side of the divide converged and discussed how Nigeria 
should adopt a democratic system. In so doing, the delegates considered framing the 
Constitution that hinged on people’s beliefs, norms, customs, and traditions.46  
 
 
42 Victor T Le Vine, ‘The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa (1997) 35(2) The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 181-206. 
43 Media Development Association and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, ‘History of Constitution-
making in Kenya (2012), http:www.kas.de>welcome, accessed 12 January 2021.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.   
46 See ‘Abacha’s 1995 National Constitutional Conference’, 
http://www.nairaland.com/977832/abachas-national-constitutional-conference-1994-95, accessed 
12 January 2021. 
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Sadly, as some may say, Abacha died in the middle of the exercise. General 
Abdulsalam Abubakar became the Head of State by being the most senior military 
officer. He then continued to transition to a democratic system that gave birth to the 
present system under the 1999 constitution. The process of framing the Constitution 
was not adhered to, as it was done contrary to the norms, beliefs, traditions, and 
customs of the people of Nigeria because their views were not taken into account. 
Those that were saddled with the task were not the chosen ones by their constituents 
but rather the elites close to the authority.   
 
However, many observers believed that the existing Constitution is nothing but a 
document that contained a series of errors and nullity47 and vehemently condemned in 
its entirety. Some also argued that the 1979 constitution is the same as the 1999 
constitution with just limited modifications.48 For instance, the separation of power 
under the 1999 constitution remains similar to that of the 1979 constitution. 
 
Besides, Nigeria as a state of political independence has had a series of unending 
communal and ethnoreligious conflict for a long time in history. More particularly 
after the return to democratic rule with the coming into force of the 1999 Constitution, 
conflicts such as Odi in Bayelsa 1999, Kaduna ethnocultural and political crisis 2000, 
Jos religious crisis 2001, Zaki Biam crisis 2001, Niger Delta crisis that has been there 
for more than two decades, as well as the current feud between the herdsmen and 
farmers in north-central Nigeria. All these conflicts emanate largely as a result of 
leadership failure in all sectors of governance, and that signifies that Nigeria would one 
 
47 See for e.g. Nwabueze’s interview in Vanguard Newspaper on 22 March 2013 where he said: 
Quite frankly, there are many flaws and many errors in the content of the constitution. So many 
errors and I as a person partly responsible because I was member of constitution drafting 
committee set up by the military in 1978. I was not only a member but chairman of one of the sub-
committees that produced chapter 2, the fundamental objectives and one of the cardinal flaws in the 
constitution is the concentration of power I the Centre. That is why I accept that I am partly 
responsible for that because at the time, late Chief Rotimi Williams, a close friend of mine and 
nearly everybody in the committee were so overwhelmed with this feeling, this patriotic feeling that 
we needed unity and the most effective way to achieve unity of the country is by having a very 
strong central government.  See ‘The mistake Rotimi Williams and I made about Nigeria’s 
Constitution’ (Vanguard Newspaper, 22 March 2013), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/....the-
mistake-rotimi-williams-and-i-made-about, accessed 12 January 2021. 
48 See Channels Hard Copy Programme aired on 22nd July, 2018.  
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day find itself in its present predicament. Against the backdrop of this antagonistic 
account, the present-day struggles trigger and reinforce divergent identities ethnic, 
political, economic and religious values.  The Struggle such as having control of the 
political and economic influence over one another intensifies the problems. For 
instance, what triggered the ethno religious crisis of southern Kaduna and Jos in 1991 
and 1994 was the creation of local government councils by the then military regime of 
Babangida. It is important to analyze this development in order to see how the conflict 
passed into communities’ memories and became a point of reference for the rejectionist 
Boko Haram in their violent struggle.  
Therefore, the essence of examination of the constitutional development and the state 
of the Nigerian Constitution is essential to this study to appreciate how the various 
arms of government are involved in addressing the insurgency of Boko Haram in the 
country. The legislative arm is responsible for law-making in the country. The 
executive arm implements the law, while the judicial arm is responsible for interpreting 
the law.  Thus, the law on terrorism, such as the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and 
the 2013 amendment, is the legislature's products, setting in place the measures to 
check terrorism. The executive arm is required to implement the measures in the law 
and other international instruments. Thus, setting up counterterrorism strategies, 
military sources, arrest, and prosecution of terrorists is the executive's role. On the 
other hand, the judiciary will interpret the relevant laws and human rights instruments 
and adjudicate on the trial, conviction, and sentencing of a terrorist.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
 
1. To identify the factors that led to the emergence of terrorism by Boko Haram in 
Nigeria 
 
2. To analyse the extent to which Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy complies 




3. To examine how Nigeria has been able to implement the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1373 in the actualisation of human rights; and 
4. To offer insights and suggestions on the Nigerian government's strategy that 




1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1. What are the factors that led to the emergence of terrorism by Boko Haram in 
Nigeria? 
 
2. To what extent has the Nigerian counterterrorism strategies conforms with the 
promotion and protection of human rights guaranteed in the Nigerian 
Constitution and other human rights instruments, or has Nigeria been able to 
implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 in the 
enforcement of human rights? 
 
3. How best can the Nigerian counterterrorism strategies be effectively 
implemented to support human rights protection? 
1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
In response to the opprobrious acts of Boko Haram, an act of the parliament was 
enacted by the two chambers of Nigeria’s National Assembly in 2011 and later 
amended in 2013. The act is known as the Terrorism Prevention Act. The act made 
explicit provisions of various crimes of terrorism and other related crimes and what can 
be dealt with according to the stipulated laws. The Act addressed prevention, 
prohibition, and combating terrorism and, principally, funding of terrorism and 
terrorism-related crimes. It also provides for the rigorous implementation of the 
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Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Convention on the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and defined penalties to anyone that 
violates the provisions of the act.49 The Act, however, has vague provisions affecting its 
effective implementation.  
 
Human rights violations arising from terrorism and counterterrorism has been a 
significant concern in Nigeria, thereby questioning the approach adopted in the 
existing legal framework on counterterrorism in Nigeria. Thus the activities of Boko 
Haram continues to challenge the realization of human rights as well as the effort of 
the government to address the menace. Therefore, scholars must inquire and 
investigate the extent of human rights violations by terrorists and government agents in 
their approach to counterterrorism. This study will examine the country's human rights 
law and international law instruments to analyze the extent of the existing violations. 
However, there is limited research in Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategies 
(NACTEST) and the acts of parliament that have to do with counterterrorism in 
Nigeria. Existing studies have not addressed Nigeria’s counterterrorism policies' 
achievements amidst continued destruction of lives and properties by the Islamic sect 
and violations of human rights in the specific contexts of the Nigerian Constitution. 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE 
STUDY  
 
1.5.1 Methods  
This research will utilise the law in context approach, which will involve the analyses 
of the relevant legal text, such as the domestic laws of Nigeria like the Constitution, 
international instruments relevant to terrorism as well as reports and literature that are 
relevant to the terrorist activities of Boko Haram and the human rights implications of 
the activities of terrorists and the response of the government. By implication, Nigeria 
 
49 Sneha Bhura, “Can Nigeria’s Anti-Terrorism Law Address the Boko Haram Threat?” Institute for 
Defense Studies and Analyses 
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must observe certain international norms in line with the UN Charter and other 
international law treaties that Nigeria is a State Party.  
Notable of these international treaties that can be examined in counterterrorism and 
other human rights treaties includes International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), African Charter on Human and Peoples Right, International 
Covenant of Socio-Economic and Cultural Rights. Moreover, the rights articulated in 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are well contained in the Nigerian 
Constitution in Chapter 4 on fundamental rights. Within the framework of Nigeria's 
Constitution, the right to access the court is allowed in the event of a breach of these 
rights. Thus Section 6 of the Constitution can be called into question by approaching 
the court in the course of the breach of these rights. The government can be compelled 
to exercise its duty to protect the citizens from violating these rights. Therefore, the 
research will draw its analysis from primary sources of law such as the Constitution of 
Nigeria as well as international treaties. Recourse will be made to secondary 
documents from the United Nations and other non-governmental organisations, to 
obtain facts on the activities of Boko Haram and its violations of human rights, an 
effort of the government on counterterrorism. The activities of Boko Haram and their 
operations will be discussed, followed by a review of the group's emergence as 
terrorists. Further review of human rights and the implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373 will be carried out vis-à-vis the operations of the terrorists and 
responses of the Nigerian government to counter and suppress the operations of Boko 
Haram. 
1.5.2 Theoretical Underpinnings: Policy Oriented Approach  
 
The policy-oriented approach is the framework that guided the conduct of this study. 
The policy-oriented approach's origin traced its root from the New Haven Academy of 
International Law in 1953 when Myers McDougal appeared on the stage to present a 
paper to students.50 The motive behind McDougal’s choice to deliver his lecture to 
 
50 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘A Pluralist Approach to International Law’ (2007) 32 The Yale Journal Of 
International Law 301, 301-329. 
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students was to criticise Kelsen’s normative approach to international law. The former 
contend that the latter’s role in the field of international law was remarkable, and as 
such is expected that his contribution towards policy commitments encapsulated 
within the procedures and rules of international law should be prodigious.51 McDougal 
further criticised Kelsen’s normative approach to international law, that as a legal jurist 
who specialised in interpretation and analyzing the underlying workings of 
international law, rules and procedure ought to have considered policy commitments 
than to oppose them. McDougal added that such a position placed Kelsen as an 
irresponsible legal jurist, and for that, depicting himself as an accomplished analyst of 
logical interconnections between different legal principles was elusive.52  
 
Regarding the policy-oriented approach, scholars consider the approach to be a single 
coherent approach to international law because all of the advocates of the New Haven 
School appear to have divergent opinions on the application of the approach. As one of 
the New Haven School advocates, Rosalyn Higgins has developed a peculiar model in 
international law by bringing forward an approach that can quickly address the 
underlying problems in the field of international law. Higgins's contribution to 
international law from the 1960s to date seems to focus mainly on the United Nations' 
role as an umbrella that designs international law and how the international 
community can effectively apply such laws. In one of her treatise “Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It,” Higgins asserts that international 
law is a series of norms that control states' affairs. Therefore, she contends that the 
setting and conceptualization of international law as a series of authoritative decisions 
should allow the frontline actors in the area of legal interpretation to take cognizance 
of the dynamic nature of the society and how international law can be applied.53  
 
Higgins challenges observers who perceived international law as just a mere set of 
rules; to her such consideration can underscore international law's objective and render 
 
51 M McDougal, ‘Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study’ (1956)  
Natural Law Forum 53-72, 54. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
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it ineffective. Higgins argues that international law is designed; it is a process that must 
involve consideration of the principles that underlie legal provisions.54 According to 
her, such provisions must include the capacity to respond to the dynamic nature of 
society. She believed that the concept of international law as designed could address 
any underlying problem emanating between states or individuals. Similarly, Higgins’s 
single coherent approach viewed international law as a self-contained system that does 
not require modifications of new rules to suit society's changing need whenever 
problem supervene. 
 
On a contrary opinion some international legal analysts see international law as rule-
based approach. To these adherents of international event, such views portrayed 
international law effective because the application of such rules by states should be 
impartial and any state that fails to apply the existing rules, would be dealt with by 
some hegemonic states within the umbrella of the UN. But however, Higgins objected 
to such views and asserted that if such rules are allowed to supervene, then 
international law has discarded the general sources of its law within the culture of 
international relations which would be easier to interpret and apply such laws.55 The 
understanding of Higgins perspective essentially means international law as it stands, 
cannot and should not rely on following rules only. Instead, the existing rules should 
be regarded as a key component of the international law function and not the only 
international law component.56  
 
Consequently, it is against this background. Higgins proposed a policy-oriented 
approach to international law, arguing that international law is a continuous 
authoritative decision-making process in which a decision-maker should be allowed to 
handle the complex nature of international law. Higgins declared that decision-makers 
use their authoritative positions as representatives of people. Any decision they arrive 







rather than a parochial normative approach that is believed to be unchanging.57 In this 
disposition, the decision-makers are not trying to change the existing international law 
rules. It is based on this Higgins draws her concept of a process-based approach to 
international law.  
 
However, considering the intricacies that decision-makers would find themselves when 
determining or formulating the rules, Higgins opted to detach her position from the 
rule-based approach by drawing the decision-makers' attention to distinguish between 
complementary rules in certain instances.58 She critically evaluates these circumstances 
by looking at the competing rules that would give viable and fulfilling justice. Higgins 
also contended that in international law, justice's achievement lies solemnly on how 
the decision-maker analyses and applies the necessary objectives that would lead to the 
deliverance of justice according to the peculiar nature of the situation. She went further 
by cautioning the decision-makers to understand that justice is a process that 
eliminates the barrier of the political and social context of the ongoing issue into 
consideration.59   
 
Viewing from this prism, Higgins asserts that the policy-oriented approach stands as a 
viable method of solving or analysing international law's core principles because it 
affords decision-makers various ways to apply when delivering justice. She outlined 
some instances to back her arguments. For instance, she disseminates the role of 
apostasy under Islamic law and its relationship with international law.60 It is 
imperative to find an interpretative concept on how such a conundrum could be 
resolved in this circumstance. Hence using a policy-based approach would avowedly 
respond to the challenge. The practice of such a concept largely supervened in the 
majority of Islamic States of the Middle East where if a person renounces his or her 
faith, a death penalty would be handed to such a fellow. Higgins have used this 
example by arguing that some scholars of international law have succinctly used the 
 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 




concept of apostasy under the Islamic law and maintained that because of the Islamic 
legal system in such states, international human rights was not applicable, and hence 
should not be applied to all states. These scholars further argue that the concept of 
international human rights as designed has not taken into account such aperture on 
whether human rights instruments could work in a particular region. Further, they 
maintained that if the human rights instrument is not uniform across the board, this 
position underscores international human rights law's general principles.61    
 
On a contrary view, Higgins rejected these scholars' perspectives arguing that 
international law does not rest on analysis of practices that violate it and the 
consequences of those violations.62 According to her, such analysis rests on the general 
practice of states that are party to a particular instrument. Higgins maintains that 
despite flouting social policies by some states in the Middle East on the concept of 
apostasy, to her under the rule-based approach such can be protected. Similarly, as 
contended by Higgins the policy-based rules can correct the flouted policies of such 
laws as apostasy. She went on to give an account of how the controversial conventions 
being utilised by scholars and commented that it is imperative to look at the socio-
religious backgrounds of some member states that were party to such conventions, for 
instance, Middle East states where the vast majority are of Islamic background.  
 
Furthermore, in arguing the veracity of the concept of a policy-oriented approach, 
Higgins opted to analyse the position of expropriation under such a concept. Higgins 
believed the concept of expropriation under international law has not adequately given 
protection to foreign multinational investments, especially in oil and gas as they face 
serious risk of expropriating their investments.63 This development happened in some 
oil producing states like Iran, Venezuela, and Libya. On this, she argues that in some 
countries under the general principles of international law, there is not a single law that 
permits the industrialised world to protect its corporation or intervene if a dispute 
arises. If such law was proffered under international law, it means states' 
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independence, especially the developing ones, will be severally threatened, which 
violates international law. On expropriation, she pointed out that investors should seek 
a worthy compensation of their investment and the overall earnings of anticipated 
deals once such happens.64 However, she alluded to the fact that getting compensation 
may be impossible mainly because there was no underlying law compelling states’ 
perpetration of such act.  
 
Correspondingly, she surmised that the absence of laws to cover corporations from 
state unlawfulness because of recognition of state's legal sovereignty under 
international law, hence the unlawful position of expropriation has no consequence on 
its status. So, even if an investor is seeking compensation, such corporation rights do 
not confer any remedy under any law.  
 
The peculiarity nature of the policy-oriented approach to international law presented 
itself as a viable rule-based approach to solving legal problem as such, this thesis will 
follow it proponent’s lead and analyses Nigeria counterterrorism strategy in the light of 
resolution 1373. This will allow the researcher to assess the underlying considerations 
that led to the adoption of the strategy. The approach would further enhance the 
capacity of the author in breaking down the latter resolution. It would also analyse the 
range of choices available to Nigeria and the United Nations Security Council. The 
quest to unravel the Nigerian Counterterrorism Strategy and Resolution 1373 will give 
the author more impetus by assessing the two choices' legality. The approach will 
essentially guide the author to discover how Nigeria’s counterterrorism connects to 
Resolution 1373 and how such approaches have protected the human rights of the 





CHAPTER TWO  
2.1 REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE  
 
Terrorism has generated an extensive analysis from scholars and researchers of various 
fields such as political science, international relations, criminal law, human rights law, 
and international humanitarian law. Scholars have responded to the development in 
the field of terrorism from divergent perspectives. However, international law has 
attracted a great deal of scholarship because the activities of terrorists have taken much 
of a global outlook in recent times. This has manifested in the fact that there is a 
growing network among terrorists receiving support from similar groups abroad. More 
so, the September 11 attack on the United States witnessed a new dimension in taking 
matters of terrorism seriously with the need for cooperation. 
 2.6.1 The Concept of Terrorism and the Labeling of Boko Haram as a Terrorist Group  
An attempt to define the concept of terrorism certainly puts oneself in a difficult 
situation mainly because the latter has become a controversial term in policymakers' 
and academics' eyes. The concept emerged during the French revolution under 
Jacobin's reign in 1793-9465, ascribed or known as “reign of terror.” In the late 
eighteenth century, the method of intimidating citizens was employed by most 
European States to prevent anarchy and ensuring that society-maintained peace and 
order. Hence the word terrorism was coined.66 It was also adopted as a tactic in 
strengthening political power by Russian anarchists in the 19th century. According to 
Rapoport, the Russian rebels alluded themselves against the term guerilla as often used 
in the 19th century to wage war against the state or commit a crime.67 After that, the 
concept was used by private groups and organizations as a method of unleashing 
mayhem to humanity. However, this notion has been wallowing for a long period 
 
65 A Ali, Combating Terrorism: Saudi Arabia’s Role in the War on Terror (Oxford University Press, 
2009) 3 
66 Ibid. 
67 David C Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Terrorism’, in Audrey Kurth, Cronin and James ML Ludes, 
Attacking Terrorism (Georgetown University Press, 2004) 51. 
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within states and the international community to arrive in finding an acceptable 
meaning to the concept.  
 
Definition of terrorism remains a massive task for the international community to 
address, particularly within the scope of international law. Scholars such as Higgins 
contend that there is no international crime of terrorism and, therefore, cannot be 
implied that terrorism is a crime against humanity.68 Higgins and other scholars' 
position on this subject matter is important because the concept has defied an 
acceptable definition. The difficulties in the definition allow other sub-field within the 
mainstream discipline of international law to address the crime of terrorism such as 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal 
law, and refugee law, which is referred as an inductive approach.69 Under this 
approach, Higgins observed that some scholars only defined certain acts of terrorism 
such as kidnapping, suicide bombing, hoaxes, and hostage-taking and others, but, not a 
broader definition of the concept.   
 
The verity so to say, that any literature on the concept starts by discerning the 
definitional quagmire is inevitable.70  Thus, the only unanimity amongst the 
policymakers and academics is that terrorism has no single accepted definition. 
Although, Bondi contends that lack of definition is deliberate by the United Nations 
since Resolution 137371 that redefines global politics after September 11 avoided the 
definition.72  
 
As observed that the phenomenal concept of terrorism remains the subject of debate 
within academics and international legal jurisprudence, it is indeed important to view 
former’s definitions and contributions to the existing literature in this field of endeavor. 
 
68 R Higgins and M Flory, Terrorism and International Law (Routledge Press, 2003) 15. 
69 U Sozubir, Conceptualizing the Definition of Terrorism in the light of Development in the Fields of 
Academics, History and Legislation (MA Thesis, Bilkent University 2005) 22.  
70 See  Ninian Stephen, ‘Toward a Definition of Terrorism’, in Coady and Michael P Okeafe (eds.), 
Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in the threatened World  (Melbourne University Press, 2002) 
1.  
71 Loretta Bondi, Legitimacy and Legality: Key Issues in the Fight against Terrorism (The Fund for 




Some have suggested that states should follow the definitions contained in the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism adopted 
under resolution 1276 and the definition under Resolution 1566 for reference as lots of 
elements in such definitions can help solve criminal acts of terrorism. Although acts of 
terrorism vary as such states deal with acts of terrorism differently.  
 
However, in his contribution to the field, Young contends that the international 
community must define terrorism because once is not clearly defined, the implication 
is so overwhelming. He argues that as a legal concept, its functions are not just a mere 
phrase for moral condemnation as it has been accepted as a legal term, should be 
accompanied by a legal definition.73 He further asserts that when states are crafting or 
framing the definition of terrorism, they should also take into cognisance both legal 
and justifiable reason of core international definition of the concept, although, his 
summary of the definitional concept does not wangle within the purview of customary 
international law.74 His view about the legal concept was in contrary to Higgins 
concept. Higgins opined that the concept of terrorism has no legal significance since it 
is a way of alluding to activities, and as such, the relevance of finding an acceptable 
meaning not necessary. She further contends that the concept of terrorism has not been 
regarded as a branch under international law. However, she does posit that states 
should continue to explore any existing mechanism under international law to address 
the crime of terrorism in their states. Higgins believed that the difficulties in definitions 
are objective and not just subjective.75 She maintained that the technical problems of 
definition are enormous.  
 
Furthermore, Randall observed that because of the negative connotation of terrorism, 
state actors, academics, and legal experts use the concept pejoratively and normatively 
 
73 Young defined terrorism thus: “The serious harming or killing of non-combatant civilians and 
damaging their property with a public use of carrying economic harm done for the purpose of 
intimidating a group of people or a population or to coerce government or international 
organization.” See Reuven Young, ‘Definition of Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal 
Concept in International Law and its Influence of Definition in Domestic Legislation’ (2006) 29 
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 23, 23-106. 
74 Ibid.  
75 R Higgins and M Flory, Terrorism and International Law (Routledge Press, 2003) 15. 
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as a moral judgment for crime, intrinsically immoral.76 Ben Saul contends that the 
rationale behind defining the concept of terrorism is that terrorism undermines 
individuals' cardinal rights, threatens the sovereignty of the state, and transits its 
venom to international borders. To him, this calls for an expeditious definition of the 
concept.77 He further notes; that lack of working definition is not just merely of 
conjectural interest because the phrase “terrorism” and “terrorists” have been legally 
buttressed after the September 11 event that culminated in the adoption of the UN 
Security Council resolution 1373 which, intensively captured and criminalised 
terrorism acts of any sorts. He, therefore, supports the crafting of an acceptable 
meaning of the concept.78 Dean and Alexander listed ten factors that would trigger 
future terrorism due to lack of working definition such as disagreement as to the causes 
of terrorism, regionalization of politics, and exploitation of media. He further asserts 
double standard of morality, the weak punishment of terrorists, complexities of 
modern societies, the high cost of security in democracies, violation of international 
law by, and promotion of, terrorism by some states, and loss of resolve by the 
government to take effective action against terrorism.79 Williams observed that if the 
concept of terrorism is not thoroughly defined, states' powers might exacerbate very 
far.80 English opined that since the concept cannot disappear in both the academic and 
policymaking world, it is, therefore, useful to retain our commitment to establishing a 
precise, coherent definition rather than merely jettisoning it.81 
 
However, Schmid notes that having a defined and comprehensive definition of 
terrorism by states will help maintain the principle of dual criminality. He further 
 
76 Randall D. Law Terrorism: A History (Polity Press, 2009) 2. 
77 B Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 7. 
78 Saul Ben defined Terrorism thus: “any serious violent criminal act intended to cause death or 
seriously bodily injury or to endanger life, including by acts against property where committed 
outside an armed conflict for a political, ideology, religious or ethnic purposes and for where 
intended to create extreme fear in a person, group, or the general public and seriously intimidate a 
population or part of a population unduly compel a government or an international organization to 
do or abstain from doing any act.” See Saul Ben, ‘Definition of Terrorism in the UN Security Council. 
1985-2004’ (2005) 4 Chinese Journal of International Law 141-166. 
79 Dean C Alexander and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism and Business. The Impact of September 11, 
2001 (Brill–Nijhoff, 2002) 195. 
80 Ben Golder and Williams George, ‘What is Terrorism-Problems of Legal Definition’ (2004) 27(2) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 270-295. 
81 R English, How to Respond to Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2009) 21. 
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stated: “It is widely agreed that international terrorism can only be fought by 
international cooperation, in the field of mutual legal assistance, one of the basic 
principles of judicial cooperation in general and extradition, in particular, is the 
principle of dual criminality an act must be a crime in both countries involved. If states 
disagree on whether an act constitutes terrorism, hence chances of interstate 
cooperation are diminished.”82 He also contends that lack of definition would 
systematically encourage future terrorism. This view was similarly shared by Ramiraj 
where he commended the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 by 
contending that “vertical dimension of the global anti-terrorism law.83 This means that a 
terrorist cannot escape justice irrespective of where the terrorist acts were committed, 
by and large, application of the universal jurisdiction would prevail. 
 
Similarly, Schmid argues that terrorism can barely be understood only regarding the 
violence perpetrated on the society, the other way of understanding it is through 
propaganda. Violence and propaganda, however, have much in common. Violence 
aims at behavior modification by coercion while Propaganda aimed at the same 
persuasion. His view regarding the propagandist way of unleashing mayhem to society 
can be adjudged with the modus operandi of Boko Haram acts in northern Nigeria. 
The sect had succeeded in adopting that approach and tactics for a very long time. In 
one instance, they claimed to have taken over the Nigerian army's security formation 
situated in the epicentre of the insurgency. They also claimed to have taken control of 
Maiduguri metropolis, which is the capital of Borno State.84 With such propaganda, 
they instill fear in the security forces that counter their nefarious acts much less of the 
vulnerable civilians that live within the community. However, this has veraciously 
attuned with what Richard observed that terrorism is concerned with communicating 
the message that would not otherwise be heard “were if not for violence.” Similarly,, 
this part of the chapter argues, that such tactics are to attract the general populace’s 
 
82 Alex Schmid, ‘Terrorism- The Definition Problem’ (2004) 36 Case of Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 375-420. 
83 Wondwossen D Kassa, ‘Rethinking the Definition of Consensus and the Would Have Been 
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attention and recruit vulnerable youths into their struggle, especially the restive youths 
whose government failed by all principles to shelter them due to pervasive corruption.  
 
In his contribution to the field, Richards posits that policymakers' inability to develop a 
precise definition of the concept has allowed actors and non-state actors to craft a 
definition of the concept in a manner that suits their interest.85 For instance, the US 
government in its effort to wage war against the terrorists, have had series of debates 
outside the shore of the United States to examine the implications of lack of agreed 
definition of the concept, and how especially, the states of the South Asian and Middle 
East regions react to the fight against terrorism.86 Richards also believed that finding a 
universal and acceptable meaning of terrorism remains elusive in the policymaking 
world and it also proved to be a problematic phenomenon even within the academic 
circle. He further maintained that debating so much in finding the definition of the 
concept within the academic community is tacitly splurged of time. According to him 
Schmid and Jongman have assiduously crafted various academic and policy-making 
definitions of the concept. 
 
Similarly, Crenshaw contends that after the September 11 event, terrorists 
demonstrated their capacity to threaten international peace and stability. On that note, 
they presumed that most of them working in the field thought that an agreed definition 
would accompany notorious acts, any discussion on the concept of terrorism.87 She 
also asserts that instead of the enemy's moral character, why not have a neutral 
definition of the concept that would generally capture all acts of terrorism.88  However, 
one essential point observed that the framers of the proposed definition of terrorism in 
both academic and policymaking circles failed to distinguish the difference between 
terrorist acts and other social vices, such as insurgency and others that supervene in the 
society. For instance, there has been unrest in the Niger-Delta region of the country for 
 
85).  Anthony Richards, ‘Conceptualizing Terrorism’ (2013) 37(3) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
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more than three decades in Nigeria, and this mainly because of the agitations of 
resource control by the oil-producing community. Ethnoreligious clashes between 
herdsmen and farmers’ and more of such crises have not been duly encapsulated and 
even if such vices were captured, remains controversial. Although, Crenshaw made a 
reasonable attempt to distinguish terrorism and other vices in her elucidation on 
Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) against the French.89 All these rhymes 
of violence give room or breed act of terrorism which policymakers tend to ignore. 
This raises the question: are these forms of violence not sufficient, and enough to 
create serious unrest within a state territory? Then if they can, why then policymakers 
not consider such acts as terrorism? 
However, the existing crises confronting Nigeria such as herdsmen and farmers tussles, 
fits the description of acts of terrorism encapsulated under the TPA. This crisis was 
initially seen as a local uprising between communities, but soon the herdsmen's modus 
operandi changes considerably as their acts transmogrify. The pragmatic shift in their 
tactics from trite to modern terrorism had advanced and confirmed that their acts need 
to be countered before it spread to the other parts of the country.  
 
Viewing from this prism, Carlos Marighela identified four potential targets that 
terrorists usually focus. (a) On their supporters amongst the general populace, to aspire 
and build morale (b), they tend to look at their support base to attract supporters and 
members (c) getting the attention of the international community to attract attention 
and to buy sympathy for their cause; (d) they easily identify their enemies in their base, 
to intimidate and instill fear amongst the targeted government institutions and or the 
general populace.90 The gruesome murder of more than 200 people in Kano Mosque in 
2011 and UN Building in Abuja 2012, exemplified Boko Haram’s psychological 
impact and its purpose of communicating a message.91 
 
 
89 Ibid. 21. 
90 John W. Williams, ‘Carlos Marighela: The Father of Urban Guerrilla Warfare’ (1989) 12(1) 
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91 See BBC News, ‘Abuja Attack: Car Bomb hits Nigeria UN Building’, 
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As acknowledged in different sections of the text, the complex nature of terrorism 
makes it difficult to adopt a single coherent definition, which could be due to the 
negative connotation of the term. The change of strategies and tactics by the terrorists 
has made it hard to agree unanimously. The definitional challenge is not only limited 
to decision makers, international legal commentators but academics as well. Various 
academic scholars crafted the concept based on the compelling circumstances of the 
terrorist acts, which partly revolved around political and social phenomena.  For 
instance, Hoffman contends that you will find different crafted meanings of the state 
departments or agencies' concept. In the United States, for example, four state agencies 
defined terrorism differently.92 Guelke unlike some scholars opposed the crafting of 
definition of the concept and criticises Schmid’s understanding of the concept for using 
the term violence in his definition. The former contends that the term violence is only 
characterised by the disapproved element and indicate illegitimate. He further notes 
that the term violence is associated with illegitimacy while ‘force’ is a representation of 
legitimacy.93 Erlenbusch queried the reliance of everyday speech, to her, introduced a 
moral judgment of terrorism as “ignoble” within the academic circle. She vehemently 
opposed the definition of terrorism pointing that is mostly centred on an 
“objectionable” term orchestrated by the venom of speeches that is in public domain 
which to some extent, denies commentators to give an objective and understandable 
definition. In a similar vein, Merari queries individuals and institutions that devote 
time and resources trying to craft or define terrorism. Searching for logic-based 
 
92 Schmid A, Terrorism-The Definitional Problem (36 Case Western Res. Journal of International Law, 2004) 
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definitions of the term that belongs to political and social science, especially with its 
negative connotation, is a waste of time.94  
 
The thesis has analyzed various scholarly definitions of terrorism; it will then evaluate 
Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy in the light of Resolution 1373. The latter 
resolution will be analyzed within the scope of Resolution 1566 to help explain the 
challenges the international community encountered in its efforts to come up with a 
working definition on the concept of terrorism and how States should respond to the 
crime of terrorism within their domestic legal statutes.  
 
As observed, the road in finding the acceptable definition of the concept of terrorism 
was quite winding and dilatory, in response to the international and domestic terrorism 
and efforts of countering the acts of terror by states, both the United Nations General 
Assembly and the Security Council have adopted a series of resolutions and 
conventions in that respect.95  Despite the resolutions and conventions not much has 
been achieved in the fight against terrorism because of the lack of clear understanding 
of the concept, although, the definition in resolution 1566 is binding on all member 
states. In 2004 United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1566 in which, it 
explicitly defined the concept of terrorism and hence, accepted as a working definition 
for member states. The adoption of resolution 1373 in 2001 was regarded as a turning 
point in the fight against terrorism because of its distinctive features.96 The 
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international character of the September 11 event, together with their extreme violence 
and the mass loss of life forced the international community and stated to reconsider 
the appropriate responses, and the resolution, unlike its predecessors, is binding on 
member states. After that, states adopted new and often sweeping counterterrorism 
legislation in that regard. In ensuring strict adherence to the mandate, the council 
created a monitoring committee known as the Counter-Terrorism Committee to follow 
up and corroborate in line with the provisions of the resolution. The effectiveness of 
the struggle against terrorism could only be possible once there is an understanding of 
the concept and consensus amongst the policy-making world and academics regarding 
the acceptable definition of terrorism.97 In the author's view, the rigmarole in this 
development is because the UN was not imperious towards the concept of terrorism 
from its inception as did by its predecessor the League of Nations. If the UN had 
committed itself in finding and agreeing to the definition of terrorism before the 
adoption of resolution 1566 in 2004, the definitional problem, would not have been a 
subject of debate. Before it came into existence, its predecessor the League of Nations 
through the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism made a 
plausible attempt to define terrorism but failed to get the requirement to be ratified.98 
At first glance, the issues of terrorism came to fore of the UNGA immediately after the 
Munich Olympic attack in 1972. Mockaitis notes: 
 
The UN has struggled for years to reach a consensus on a common 
definition of terrorism. Two issues consistently block consensus: 
inclusion of acts of terror by states and the insistence by the member 
states that any definition must distinguish between the acts of terrorists 
and those whom they consider as ‘freedom fighters.’ Many also 
expressed the justifiable concern that effort to combat terrorism may 
erode human rights that the organization has consistently fought to 
 
general public.” See Javier Ruperez, ‘The United Nations in the Fight against Terrorism’, 
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uphold. Faced with this seemingly insurmountable impasse, the 
organization continues to expand the legal framework for combating 
terrorism.99 
 
However, unlike the previous resolutions, that diffidently addressed specific acts of 
terrorism in a particular state, resolution 1373 comparatively laid a clear direction of 
combating acts of terror at a global level, which as stated above, Ramraj refers as 
“vertical dimension of the global anti-terrorism law.”100 The adoption of the Resolution 
emits high plausibility to the Security Council’s effort because the adoption would not 
be successful if it had gone through the treaty process of the General Assembly. Thus, 
UN High Panel on Threat Challenges and Change noted that lack of clear definition of 
the concept of terrorism stained the UN's image.101As observed by some scholars, 
domestic definition of the concept of terrorism should not be broad and large in 
contents to not conflict with the one contained in the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the definition under Resolution 1566. 
Scholars have queried this argument that it is a prerogative of the state to accept such 
definitions or not because it is not binding on states to adopt any definition in their 
domestic criminal legislation. Others contend that there is no valid recognizable 
definition adopted by the international community despite decrying the definitions as 
plausible. States have chosen to adopt a different process in defining the concept by 
their criminal laws. We could see that of all the UN Conventions that enunciated the 
concept of terrorism created a decade after the assassination of King Alexandra of 
Yugoslavia; it is only the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism that vehemently made an efficacious attempt to define the 
phenomenal concept of terrorism.  
Therefore, it is not wrong to say that finding an acceptable definition of the concept of 
terrorism is necessary on one hand because authority could hardly identify or 
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criminalise acts of terrorism if left as vague as it is. Having a clear legal definition, on 
the other hand, would give states the unambiguous basis of deterrence, retribution, 
retaliation102 and severe punishment for those who threaten peace and stability of 
states.      
Given the devastating causes and threats posed by the terrorists, the need for a holistic 
approach to counter the crime of terrorism calls for a sustained fight against it by the 
UN Security Council in fall 2001. After September 11 the Security Council adopted 
resolution 1373 and urges member states to react to the crime of terrorism with tough 
measures103 within the ambit of their domestic laws, but the Resolution avoided the 
definition of the concept.104 
 
However, regional organization such as the European Union defines terrorism as; 
“Offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously 
damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of 
seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or 
international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously 
destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or an international organization.105 
 
Therefore, looking at a broad array of definitions by these institutions, indicate that 
having a common understanding of the concept is not likely. The all-inclusive 
approach adopted by the UNSC allows states to proscribe acts of terrorism within their 
shores.106 With this opening, some of the hegemonic powers are of the view that crime 
of terrorism should exclude state actors, and limited only to the private actors, while 
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on the contrary, the south states maintain that both the former and the latter should be 
included.107 In a similar vein, another definitional issue that always ensues between the 
North and South is on some state security forces' activities, on whether it constitutes 
the acts of terror or not. 
 
Furthermore, within the security circle of any state, the term is categorised as 
“systematic use of violence with a strong motive to cause fear and personal insecurity 
amongst people to undermine the state's authority or achieve a political objective.108  
Elegab summarised the inability of decision-makers to have a consensual meaning of 
terrorism on the following reasons; (a) terrorism assumes different forms; even though 
it is often equated with political subversion, sometimes it is employed by governments, 
and it is utilised as a tool of syndicated crime; (b) the criteria used in defining terrorism 
is largely subjective because it is primarily based on political considerations; (c) most 
importantly, terrorism is provoked by a broad range of motives depending on the 
prevailing ideology and time.109 Some states' approach to dealing with internal crimes 
such as terrorism and militancy varies because of political intrigues revolved around. 
For instance, as indicated above that the Nigerian authority has not labeled the Niger-
Delta militancy as a terrorist organization, and this to some extent, is one of the 
impediments that underscored the work of the United Nations in tackling international 
terrorism. This organization posed a serious threat to the Nigeria government and the 
foreign multinational firms operating in that region for a long period. In the UN voting 
pattern, especially on terrorism, has always been characterised around realpolitik and 
alliances amongst the member states, and because of that reaching an agreement to 
have a consensual definition is not likely.110   
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2.6.2 Radical Islam and the Rise of Boko Haram  
The development that is of great significance relating to the emergence of the group is 
the Sokoto Caliphate's historical antecedence, as indicated above.111 In the early 19th 
century a loose collection of the emirates that comprise the Muslim-dominated states 
of northern Nigeria was established by Dan Fodio. The caliphate existed up to the 
early 20th century before it collapsed following the amalgamation of the northern and 
southern protectorates by the British colonial administration in 1914.112 In most of his 
preaching, Yusuf cites Dan Fodio’s versed and convincing knowledge of Islam.  
During its peaceful struggle, the group made use of legacy of the Islamic Kanen-Bornu 
Empire, which formed part of the Sokoto Caliphate.113 The impression by Boko Haram 
that western ideology is a legacy imposed as a result of colonialism needs to be resisted 
not only by the Muslim dominated states but including the adherents.114  
 
The style of da’wa employed by these contemporary scholars changed the narratives of 
Islamic propagation in northern Nigeria which does not seem to fit within the Sunni-
Izala doctrine.115  Dr. Abubakar Aminudeen is one of the renowned scholars of this 
school of thought; he is believed to contact universities in Medina and Makkah. He 
rejected the idea that he runs an organization because it was not the practice of 
Salafists' tradition. Also, one of the leading advocates of this group sheik Jafar Adam 
who was alleged to have been killed by Boko Haram rejectionists116 because he 
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112 Abubakar Babagana,  ‘Kanuri Complete’,  http://www.researchagte.net/publication/320004428, 
accessed 12 January 2021. 
113 Atta Barkindo, “Boko Haram: Ideology, Ethnicity and Identity” The Centre on Religion and 
Geopolitics, http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/boko-haram/boko-haram-ideology-ethnicity-and-
identity, accessed 12 January 2021. 
114 Amy Pate, ‘Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options: 
Report to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Department of Defense, and the Office of 
University Programs, Department of Homeland Security’ College Park MD: START, January 2014., 
www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_%20SMA-
AFRICOM_Boko%20Haram%20Deep%20Dive_Jan2015.pdf 
115 Roman Loimeier, ‘Patterns and Peculiarities of Islamic Reform in Africa’ (2003) 33(3) Journal of 
Religion in Africa 237-62. 
116 The reference to Boko Haram aa a rejectionist organization comes from the views expressed by a 
Nigerian writer Onuoha 2012, in the sense that Yusuf was a long-term Islamic activist, who propagated strict 
adherence to Islam and promoted a rejectionist or non-conformist group ideology. Rejectionist connotes 
that Boko Haram under Yusuf did not agree with the views of the government of the day. They challenged 
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vehemently opposed the teaching of Yusuf the then leader of Boko Haram, was an 
influential figure of the school. The group's growing influence pushed contemporary 
scholars of the western world to trace their trajectory with some institutions in the 
Arab world, specifically Saudi Arabic, that propagate Wahhabi/Salafi in Nigeria. 
Defending the generous funding of the organization by Saudi Arabia,117 one of the 
scholars contends that the level of poverty, the condition of the Islamic centers, and 
support for the clerics as well as the inhumane nature of the mosques across northern 
Nigeria, necessitated the intervention of Saudi Arabian universities in that regard.  
 
Consequently, we can see from the above narrative that these scholars are in sharp 
contrast regarding their teaching and understanding of the secular world with some 
ancient traditional Islamic scholars who inspired Boko Haram to take arms against the 
state. The fact remains that “Yan Medina” are conformists in their preaching but 
rejects violence as a style of communication or transmitting the message of Allah and 
the prophet as Boko Haram believes. In its preaching, the group encourages vulnerable 
youths to acquire both Islamic and western knowledge to salvation. Additionally, the 
above narration could be deduced that the existence of the pre- and post-independent 
Islamic organization movement in Nigeria has enhanced the tendencies and brought 
Boko Haram into the spotlight.  
In the light of the foregoing, the basis on which BH and other rejectionist organizations 
operate can be traced to the writings of Sayyid Qutb as far back in the 1940s and 
towards the twilight of the 1960s. Qutb developed his particular version of Islam and a 
particular model of where Islam was in history. Basically, what Qutb and other 
brotherhood writers who came before him did as found in his treatise in 1928 was on 
the understanding that the leadership of Egypt and Muslim dominated states all these 
leaders were not acting correctly or not real Muslims. Qutb has evolved with a school 
of thought that there should be the emergence of jihad to fight against “fake Muslims” 
 
everything governmental and were anti-government in their activities. See also Onuoha, F.C, The Audacity of 
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who are leaders in the Islamic world. He particularly emphasised that the new class of 
Muslim leaders should work towards creating Islamic states to ensure compliance with 
Sunnah's provisions. The idea that the leadership of Muslim world and secular leaders 
were not real Muslims at all, and you need to have some form of jihad whether 
through a violent or political protest was very fundamental to Qutb.   
 
Therefore, the imperative to revisit the governance styles in Muslim states and the 
leaders in politics should be cofronted because of the sins they commit. However, 
relying on this parochial doctrine, the violent rejectionists adopted and propagated 
their struggle against the states. Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram have declared on different 
fora that every Muslim must rise against any state that fails to adopt the laws of Allah 
and the teaching of the prophet Muhammad. But the violent rejectionists adopted a 
barbaric system that defies both the doctrine of Islam and secularism. Although not 
only the rejectionist organizations that have been inspired by Qubt, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran extol Qubt commitment to Islamist revolution and on that premise the 
government honored him by issuing a postage stamp showing him while he was in 
prison after been sentence to death by Nasser regime in 1966.  
 
2.6.3 Political, Economic and Social Impact of the Activities of Boko Haram  
 
Since the law in context approach is adopted for this study, appreciating the political, 
economic and social impact of the activities of Boko Haram will offer an avenue to 
assess the approach for addressing the menace as well as understanding the human 
rights implications of the activities and the measures in place for counter terrorism. 
The stable political system can only be possible once peace and tranquillity reigns. The 
notorious acts of Boko Haram and the slow response of the authority at the early stage 
has increased the fear and apprehension that terrorism is something that Nigerians may 
have to live with it.118 In as long as there is insecurity in any society, the government of 
such a state cannot discharge its constitutional duties to the citizens effectively. 
 
118 Perouse De Montclos, ‘Introduction’, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Boko Haram: 
Islamism, Politics, Security and the State of Nigeria (African Studies Centre 2015) 1-6. 
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Furthermore, this is mainly because the state's socio-economic development platform 
cannot reign without security. The threat posed by BH has led to the breakdown of law 
and order which seriously affected both government and private sector businesses. The 
responsibility of providing security of life and property lies with the government and 
hence, when such security is guaranteed, then have stable political and economic 
development.   
 
The impact of Boko Haram on the Nigerian economy is so tremendous. The image of 
Nigeria was largely dented internationally by social media. With that connotation, it 
prevented the international firm from doing business in Nigeria because of the 
Nigerian government's negative image at the international level. According to WIR, 
2013, there was a huge drop in foreign direct investment to the country from $8.9 
billion in 2011 to $7 billion in 2012.119 In ensuring that the business environment is 
conducive, states allocate huge capital in their annual budget to maintain peace and 
security of their countries which Nigeria has committed itself in that regard. Although, 
tacitly siphoned by some top security officers and their civilian cronies. This is evident 
in the ongoing presidential committee probing the procurement of military equipment. 
 
Since the beginning of Boko Haram activities in high propensity, the budgetary 
allocation of defence has increased substantially especially in 2014, it receives 
($6.25Billion) 2014 against $625 million in 2010.120 Apart from the allocation it 
receives, external borrowing in the form of military aid and the grant provided by 
states like the United States. For instance, the United States government has donated 
the whopping sum of $2.2 million to construct an infantry unit in Maiduguri and later 
donated $6.2 million to procure communication and surveillance equipment for 
counterterrorism.121 Human rights watch observed that more than 970 human capital 
has been lost emanating not because of war or natural disasters but from notorious acts 
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of Boko Haram “between” 2009-2012.122Apart from the number of people who died 
because of the conflict in the northeast, a mass exodus of settlers has also affected the 
region's economy and Nigeria.   
 
However, as outlined previously, in maintaining peace and security of the state, 
massive resources are committed, and in that regard, Borno state government is not left 
out regarding resources applied. For instance, in 2008-2011 the government committed 
approximately ($4,827,925)123 on security alone.  In a state where the atmosphere of 
insecurity worsens, occasioned by terrorism, such a state's budgetary allocation could 
be channeled to fight terrorism, whereas such fund could be used to develop other 
sectors of the economy. For instance, President Jonathan has sought the National 
Assembly’s approval to borrow $1 billion to tackle Boko Haram acts.124 Apart from the 
resource’s government is venturing into in countering terrorism, the disruption of 
business activities is something whose effect on the economy is overwhelming. At the 
peak of Boko Haram acts, President Jonathan was busy attending World Economic 
Forum harpooning for investors to the country, but some economic experts have 
queried such move that it was a waste of the Nigerian resources to attend the forum 
with a huge delegation.125 They contend that Nigeria's insecurity level would not allow 
any foreign investor to come and invest in the country. They believed that Boko 
Haram acts is not the only factor hindering foreign direct investment to the country, 
but lack of prudent utilization of the nation’s resources resulting from pervasive 
corruption sends a wrong signal to any serious investor to Nigeria.  
 
The activities of Boko Haram has led to a distortion of the existing economic patterns 
and structures, that is, what economists termed the impact of Boko Haram on the 
Nigerian economy. Before their emergence, Maiduguri’s Monday market used to be a 
commercial hub capital that hosts the neighboring states and traders from Cameroon, 
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Chad, and Niger.126 Because of the insecurity that engulfed the state, markets were 
closed for more than a month. This development has affected every sector of the 
economy; most commercial banks had to review their working hours from 9 am- 12 
against the normal operational hours from 8 am-4 pm. This, in turn, has made the 
local traders to stockpile their daily cash income in shops and houses. Realizing such 
loophole, the group resorted in shop breaking and burglaries, which gave rise to 
attacking banks and renowned companies that keep money in the office.127 Last year 
(2018) Nigeria’s army chief said the estimated impact of Borno Haram on the economy 
of the three states ravaged by the act was $274 Billion.128 According to him the impact 
on agricultural production alone was estimated at $3 Billion. 
 
Similarly, reacting to the impact of the conflict on the economy of the region, the 
former minister of information contends that “terrorism in places like Kano, which 
serves as the commercial nerve-centre of not only to the north but neighboring states 
such as Chad, Northern Cameroon, and the Niger Republic is destroying the northern 
economy. “He further opined that attack on Kano is so significant because the city has 
always been the commercial centre of Western Sudan for the past 500 years, even 
before the evolution of Nigeria. So, when you destabilise peace in Kano, you threaten 
the foundation of the economic and social well-being of the northern region.”129  
 
However, two heads of trade unions in Kano have confirmed the former minister’s 
assertion regarding the impact of Kano's insecurity. According to Onuoha130 who 
chaired the Iron and Steel Association in Kano says “the Iron and Steel market was 
known to be the largest in the entire West African sub-region apart from Lagos and 
Onitsha that compete with, but no longer maintain that status. Owing to the insecurity 
in the state the volume of trade has mostly declined because traders have stopped 
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coming to the market. The textile market in Kano used to be the largest in Africa, but 
the impact of Boko Haram's acts forced the market to be shut down. Also regretted the 
impact of Boko Haram on the economy of the northern region, Amachree131 a former 
President of the Association of Tourism Practitioners of Nigeria, commented that 
before the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, people from different part of the divide 
go to the north for tourism because of the famous and attractive areas such as Yankare 
Game Reserve, Mambila Plateau, Argungu Fishing Festival, Palace of the Emir of 
Kano and Othman Dan Fodio tomb amongst others.132 The former head of Nigeria’s 
Tourism Board also posited that the board used to generate about N80 Billion Naira 
($28 million) annually before the notorious acts of Boko Haram but, economic 
activities have halted such.133  
 
Also, the social and political impact has caused serious disaffection between the two 
dominant religions. The Southerners' notion is that the Boko Haram terrorism was 
initiated by some disgruntled elements in the northern part because they lost the grip of 
power at the centre.134  However, the group’s impact on the nation’s politics is 
unmeasurable. At the build-up of 2015 general election, a gubernatorial candidate of 
one of the political parties in Borno was assassinated, and the group claimed 
responsibility of such act.135 Series of political assassinations was recorded at that 
period, and the political instability has pushed the nation’s National Electoral Body 
(INEC) to postpone the scheduled elections to a later date due to the country's 
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2.6.4 Root Causes to the Emergence of Boko Haram   
The Boko Haram's primary motive was to impose an Islamic state in Nigeria with their 
fundamentalist ideology of Islamic doctrine. The hostility against corruption, poverty, 
and disproportional state wealth against the majority, is also one of the factors that led 
Boko Haram to take a violent path against the state.137 The few oligarchies' social and 
economic inequality are also amongst the causes that steered to the emergence of Boko 
Haram sect.138 The impunity by the state institutions such as the police and army that 
engaged in extrajudicial killings, incessant arrest and unlawful detention too, created a 
huge gap between those that are supposed to be protected and the security operatives 
attributed to the emergence of the group.  
Many commentators believe that at the embryonic stage of their acts, they believed 
they were leading an armed struggle against oppression, suppression, and pervasive 
corruption and dispel the religious tension between the two dominant religions in the 
country.139 But we saw the paradigm shift of Boko Haram acts from the peace 
movement to a violent one with the capacity of carrying out major attacks including 
suicide bombings that have never been experienced in Nigeria.  Their indiscriminate 
attacks are devoid of religion, sex, age, and regionalism. They killed security 
personnel, religious leaders, journalist, teachers, traders, civil servants amongst 
other.140 The new tactics applied was using bombs to attack government institutions 
and the kidnapping of students and teachers. Some disputed the fact that religion is not 
the core reason why Boko Haram terrorists staged a fight against the government in 
Nigeria. As contended, there are many reasons attributable to the ongoing fluidity in 
Nigeria.  Such as corruption, poverty, political gimmicks, marginalization, etc.  
A Substantial number of Nigeria’s population is constituted of the youth, of which a 
great percentage of it, is either unemployed or underemployed. According to Okafor 
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youth unemployment is a situation whereby young people are living without an 
engaged work to earn a living.141  According to Olawoyin citing the International 
Labour Organization, youth unemployment is an entire population of able people 
living in a society that were supposed to be part of the economically active people but 
are living without employment and are also willing and available for work.142 Oduwole 
in his research documented the percentage of unemployed youths in Nigeria143 
According to Oduwole in 2008 58.50% of female youths and 41.50% of male youths 
were unemployed.144 In 2009, 57.82% of youth female and 42.50% of youth male were 
not in employment.145 In 2010, 54.52% of female youths and 45.48% of male youths 
were not employed in Nigeria.146 In 2011, 50.85% of Nigerian female youths and 
49.15% of its male youth counterpart were unemployed in Nigeria.147 In 2012, 55.42% 
of female youths and 44.58% of male youths were unemployed in Nigeria148High rates 
of poverty, especially in the northern part where people live less than $1 a day is also 
amongst the factors that led to the emergence of Boko Haram. Owing to the historical 
legacies of northern Nigeria it can be said that the region is prone to ethnoreligious and 
communal conflicts. However, when the Christian missionaries penetrated Nigeria to 
propagate western ideology, unlike the southern part where the missionaries were 
received with an ebullience, the north did not give them such access to propagate, 
although it did exist in small part.149This development was peculiar to the missionaries’ 
evangelism; even within the country’s civil service, such fear of domination by another 
part of the country existed.150 For instance, a plan to execute a coup in 1966 by a 
particular ethnic group from the southern region was countered by their northern 
colleagues in the military circle. The consequence of that led to bloodshed in the 
country, which resulted in the death of thousands predominantly from the southern 
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part. Following the conflict, the southeastern part opted to secede, sparking the Biafran 
war.151  
2.6.5 Questions of Human Rights and Boko Haram  
Scholars noted that one of the controversial issues in international law is that of the 
connection between the internal security and human rights law.152When dealing with 
human rights, a state faces a tough task because it is obliged to guarantee that its 
citizens are fully protected from the scourge of terrorist acts, while in a similar vein 
must ensure that the cardinal rights and fundamental freedom of vulnerable people are 
vehemently protected when countering the acts of terror. The necessary mechanism 
employed in combating terrorist acts should equally be applied to the protection of 
human rights as clearly defined in regional and international legal instruments to 
uphold people's rights when fighting terrorism. For instance, some regional courts such 
as European Human Rights Court and the Economic Community of West African 
States Court condemned in its entirety the adoption of certain measures by states in 
fighting terrorism. The EHRC reiterated its position under Article 6 Right to a fair 
trial, and emphasized that in the determination of cases before it States must respect 
the right of persons to be entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.153 The ECOWAS Court 
of Justice stressed the need for States to respect the human rights of persons and to 
adhere to the rule of law.154 Moreover, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is committed to the 
transmission of urgent appeals and letters of allegation to Member States on alleged 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.155 
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Since the evolution of human rights, states acknowledged and made explicit provisions 
for protecting human rights in their constitutions. This trend cuts across civilization. 
These cardinal rights are also contained in all faith of humanity as well as local 
cultures and system of beliefs.156 The hostilities of the Second World War led to the 
development of the international human rights system. As Leary puts it: “it should not 
be forgotten that the horrifying activities committed by Nazi Germany were the 
primary impulsion for the development of an international system for protection of 
universal human rights.”157 Suppose a threat posed by an individual would challenge 
the international community to proffer a viable remedy which led to the development 
of international human rights. In that case, it becomes necessary again for international 
policymakers to find a dynamic and working mechanism that suits the evil threats 
posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria.  Viewing the cardinal rights of human being such as 
the right to life and liberty confirms that terrorism has devastating consequences for the 
enjoyment of such.158 This development is not only peculiar to Nigeria but the entire 
international community.  
 
However, the acts of BH has undoubtedly impacted both the Nigerian government and 
the residents of North-eastern Nigeria where lives and property, means of livelihood 
and family ties have been dismantled.159 Their notorious activities negate everything 
human rights enshrines, and also in stark contrast to provisions of the Nigerian 
Constitution, Terrorism Prevention Act, National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
(NACTEST)160 and international human rights law. Amnesty International raised so 
many allegations against Nigerian security forces bordering on gross violations of all 
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sorts such as extra-judicial killings, destruction of property, arbitrary and unlawful 
detention, forced eviction and house burning, and denied access to lawyers, family 
members and medical care amongst others.161 This claim pushed the Nigerian 
government to constitute a committee to unravel the allegations, which in-turn 
government acknowledged, but no action taken as at the time of writing this thesis.  





3.0 THE EVOLUTION OF RADICAL ISLAM, EMERGENCE AND 
OPERATIONS OF BOKO HARAM AS A TERRORIST GROUP 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter analyses the historical evolution of the Boko Haram group in northeastern 
Nigeria. The chapter systematically discovered the factors that led to the emergence of 
the group, their threat, and how their nefarious acts impacted the northeastern region 
and Nigeria's political and socio-economic environment as a whole. The fight against 
terrorism should take into account the emergence of Boko Haram as whatever 
measures put in place that fails to consider emergence may not yield the desired result. 
It assesses the pre-independent Islamic organisation's movement in Nigeria along the 
lines of Islamic orthodoxy such as Sufi, Salafi-Wahhabism revivalism, contemporary 
and rejectionist Islamism, and deviant Islamic cultism and how Boko Haram emerged 
as a terrorist group. 
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3.2 THE EVOLUTION, ANTECEDENTS OF RADICAL ISLAM AS WELL AS 
THE PROCESS OF RADICALISATION OF BOKO HARAM  
The genesis of Boko Haram is both traceable to religious movement that existed in 
Northern Nigeria as well as the Middle East Islamic intellectual miscegenation. It is 
fair to say that there is a connection between the Salafi Jihadist and Boko Haram 
organizations. Boko Haram came into being from been a local grassroot movement 
that engaged in localized politics and proselytizing into a dreaded terrorist 
organization. Boko Haram delighted itself in appealing to the da’wa people to accept 
its view of Islam, and in launching jihadist attacks. Given the modus operandi of the 
Salafis, Boko Haram believes that its conception of Islam is genuine and similar to the 
Islamic teachings of the al-salaf al-salih or sanctimonious precursor. The Salafi 
disapproves some of the identity of the Sunni mainstream Islamic practices and regards 
core Islamic teachings as applicable to their situation. The Boko Haram maintains the 
authority to proclaim that Muslim heads are heretics or nonconformist. Boko Haram 
also were rebellious against states they adjudged infidels, and they employed coercion 
in the imposition of a puritanical exegesis of Islamic doctrines as well as the Salafi faith 
on civilians. Regarding the states adjoining the Lake Chad vicinity, Boko Haram was 
determined on declaring those states an Islamic region. Boko Haram had an antipathy 
against Israel, European nations, and America, and perceives them as Islam’s 
adversaries. They fed their narrative by invoking the Iraq war and the United States 
foreign policy in the Middle East as well as the Israeli-Palestinian issue. They preached 
about an Ummah (Muslim community) that was facing extinction and annihilation, 
and this became an ideological pitch for them to launch reprisal attacks. Muhammad 
in his exegetical teaching of the Quran in Hausa language during 2008 Ramadan 
stated: “Look at what they are doing to Muslims in Guantanamo. Look at the Abu 
Ghraib prison inside Iraq. The prison was built with the money of the Iraqi people in 
their own land and property, yet they are the same people that are being incarcerated 
in the prison. They would put people in as prisoners, and a dog to assault the prisoners, 
while they were completely naked. They would also force a dog to sleep with the 
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female prisoners…”162 The ideology of Boko Haram reflects that of Salafi Jihadist and 
saw other Salafis as rivals.  
The Salafis represents a small group of Muslims. The Sufi orders mainly the Tijaniyya 
and Qadiriyya have exercised a dominant presence and influence in the current 
Northern Nigeria spanning two hundred years. Kano and Maiduguri are areas in 
Northern Nigeria where Sufism thrived and had great influence. But the credo or 
doctrine of Sufism have come to be questioned since the 1960s by the Salafis in 
Nigeria. The Salafis are known for their penchant of attracting large listeners using the 
media as well as their urbanized schools and mosques. According to the Salafi, they 
are the only sacrosanct and genuine Muslims in an environment that was characteristic 
of impishness, roguishness, and misbehaviour. There has been a denunciation and 
condemnation by the Salafi leaders of the mayhem and violence perpetrated by Boko 
Haram. The genesis of Salafism in Northern Nigeria started with Abubakar Gumi who 
lived around 1924-1992. Gumi studied Islamic law. It was Gumi’s disciples who 
established Jama’at Izalat al-Bid’a wa-Iqamat al-Sunna (The Society for the Removal 
of Heretical Innovation and the Establishment of the Prophet’s Model). This is also 
referred to as Izala. This large group spearheaded the propagation of opposition 
against Sufism across Northern Nigeria, which extended to Maiduguri which was the 
founding place of Boko Haram. The activities of Izala orchestrated serious intellectual 
polemism between the Salafis and Sufis. This development led to an attempt by the 
Sufis to hamstrung and alienate Salafism. It is interesting to note that the present 
leaders of Izala are stridently antithetical to Boko Haram. The battle within the Salafi 
for listeners or followers is what resulted in Boko Haram, and as such it cannot be said 
that Boko Haram emanated from Izala. This battle for audiences within the Salafi 
escalated as a result of demographical transformation which occurred. This 
development gave the youthful Izala proselytes such as Ja’far Mahmud Adam the 
opportunity to be heard. After studying at Saudi Arabia’s Islamic University of 
Medina, Ja’far Adam and other young Izala’s came back home only to find out that 
there was a division or split within Izala following Abubakar Gumi’s demise. These 
 




young Medina graduates established a followership out of Izala and espousing what 
tenets of what they had studied at Medina which was different from the teachings of 
Izala. These youngsters carved out a new audience outside Izala and commenced the 
recruitment of like-minded preachers into their new group. Amongst these new recruits 
was Muhammad Yusuf who founded Boko Haram.  
History had it that Muhammad Yusuf was born in 1970, although his early years are 
shrouded in obscurity. Yusuf was known as a disenchanted member of Izala, who 
happen to be an erstwhile Shi’ite, and Adam’s protégé. Muhammad Yusuf preached 
across Northern Nigeria and exercised a great deal of control over numerous 
Maiduguri mosques. Yusuf became notorious and taught in a more vociferous and 
raucous tone than his precursors. As arguments became apparent concerning the role 
of politics in Islam. The ideological fault line of Boko Haram became that of the 
toleration of violence against Muslims and re-defining who is an ummah imitating 
ISIS and al-Qaeda terrorists. It was not surprising that violence became the modus 
operandi of Boko Haram, and they mushroomed into a dreaded and deadliest terrorist 
organization. In his study Bukarti A.B. of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change 
entitled ‘Violent Extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from the Rise of Boko 
Haram’ identified the evolution of Boko Haram into five broad periods, namely: the 
non-violent preaching phase, organization and insurgency, allegiance to ISIS and the 
declaration of a caliphate, internal schism, and splintering.163 Bukarti reported about 
the Dawah Movement and non-violent phase. At this phase, Yusuf and Shekau and 
Nur as well as other ideologues embarked on aggressive radicalization and recruitment 
in Maiduguri and every length and breadth of Northern Nigeria.164 These ideologues 
preached that the government of Nigeria was against Islam because of its allegiance 
with West and the Christians in Nigeria to mistreat and discriminate against 
Muslims.When Nigeria reverted to civilian rule in 1999 after thirty-three years of 
military rule and democratic debacles. During this period, the activities of civic 
associations, private Islamic schools, and media outlets thrived. There was the 
infiltration of fresh speakers which joined the democratic debates among Muslims as 
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well as the question of Jihadism and values of the West. Adam of the Salafi movement 
looked to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden as role models. There was the 
implementation of full-scale Sharia by state governors of the North post-1999. This led 
to the introduction of new prison laws with corporal sanctions synonymous with the 
prescriptions and stipulations of the Quran or in compliance with Islamic statute. This 
transition to Sharia codes was informed or motivated by the fear among the Muslims 
of the North that their moral foundations were gradually been wiped out by the 
exponential social transformation in their states.  
Following the disagreements concerning the implementation and/or enforcement of 
Sharia in Northern Nigeria amongst Northern governors, the Salafis capitalized on 
this, and entered different ideological and political affiliations. There was a forging of 
new alliance between the new governor of Borno State and Muhammad Yusuf. Yusuf 
argued that it was only a full Islamic state that would suffice, and that a piecemeal 
implementation of Sharia was not enough. A Sharia implementation committee was 
instituted, and Yusuf was appointed a member of the committee. Later relationship 
between Sheriff broke down. Muhammad Yusuf began to experience a division in his 
alliances. A splinter faction emerged in 2003, this breakaway group set up a training 
ground for jihadist radicalization in Kannama, Yobe state. This Kannama faction 
engaged in skirmishes with police and villagers, and in 2004, they were eventually 
defeated. When Yusuf anticipated or foresaw problems or confrontation with the law 
enforcement agents, he fled to Saudi Arabia. Yusuf was asked to come back to 
Maiduguri by the government of Sheriff, because of the effect of his absence among his 
followers. There was a reconciliation between the Kannama faction and Yusuf, and he 
transformed from a poor preacher to an affluent leader and was admired by his 
followers because of his attack against the government and his advocating for a Sharia 
society. Yusuf’s obnoxious preaching and teachings which his adherents fancied but 
which the government abhorred led to his arrest and incarceration by the authorities in 
Abuja, and this fed into the mentality of his followers that he was been victimized and 
maltreated. There was an intensification of skirmish between Yusuf and the 
government authorities in 2009. In the 2009, governor Sheriff’s security outfit the 
‘Operation Flush’ skirmished with Boko Haram. There was a denunciation of the state 
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of Nigeria and the Sheriff government by Yusuf. This resulted in Boko Haram 
launching an insurrection that affected the five Northern states of Nigeria, and this 
insurrection was eventually stamped out. This operation led resulted in the death of 
1,100 people, and Muhammad Yusuf was among those who was murdered when he 
was in police detention. 
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Following the revolt that took place in 2009, Boko Haram went subterranean in its 
movement and operations with Abubakar Shekau as its new leader. Abubakar Shekau 
preached together with Yusuf. Shekau elevated Boko Haram to a new ideological 
position, advocating an all-out promotion of Islam and nothing less. Shekau took Boko 
Haram to a new dimension of violence, and spearheaded the virulent, violent, and 
deadly attacks against the government, neighbours, and civilians of Christian origins of 
Nigeria in Northern Nigeria. There was an emergence of a splinter group from Boko 
Haram in 2012, and this faction was called the Society of the Defenders of Muslims in 
the Lands of the Blacks (Jama’at Ansar al-Muslimin Bilad al-Sudan). However, it was 
a minority of attacks that were undertaken by Ansar al-Muslimin.  Shekau targeted 
Salafis who were antithetical to Boko Haram. The Salafis was implicated in the death 
in 2007 of Adam. There were other Salafi critics that Boko Haram murdered such as 
the death in 2014 of Muhammad Awwal Adam Albani. Izala’s leaders were also 
threatened by Shekau. Shekau’s violent exclusivism emanates from his invocation of 
the theological principle of Salafi. Shekau released a video which he titled ‘This is Our 
Creed’, and in that video footage, Shekau espoused Salafist orthodoxy, and stated: 
“Our creed is the creed of our Messenger, may God bless him and grant him peace. 
And our approach is the approach of our Messenger, may God bless him and grant 
him peace…And his creed is the oneness of God, may He be glorified and exalted.” 
Concerning Muhammad Yusuf’s exegesis of al-wala’ wa-l-bara, Shekau focused on 
increasingly criticizing and attacking the Western powers. 
Shekau was vehemently antagonistic to democracy and stated that Muslims should 
maintain an attitude of disdain and violent opposition to democracy. According to 
Shekau “Know, people of Nigeria and other places, a person is not a Muslim unless he 
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However, this segment of the chapter uprooted the coming of Islam to northern 
Nigeria. Contrary to what some European scholars speculated about Islam's arrival in 
northeastern Nigeria, Arabic literature or sources confirmed that Islam is an old 
religious practice in that part of Nigeria as far back as the eleventh century.166 The faith 
at inception has traditionally been embraced by petit traders and the early scholars of 
the time and hence accepted by rulers and their subjects. In 1774 ‘Uthman Ibn Fodio167 
noticed that Islam has spread widely to the other part and now noted Syncretism of 
Islam with cultural practices in core Muslim dominated areas and its periphery.168 
Fodio was an ancient scholar of Maliki School of thought and Qadiryyah order of 
Sufism. He was motivated following the increased repression by local authorities, 
making him engage in the struggle for jihad due to his reformist ideas. Danfodio 
succeeded in gaining people’s confidence and support primarily because of severe 
deprivation, marginalization, and oppression people face from the unjust leaders. The 
beginning of the struggle pushed them into exile with his lieutenants. Fodio’s followers 
named him Amir al-Muminin, and by virtue of that title, he became the political and 
religious leader of his time and perhaps had the power to declare and pursue a jihad. 
The congruous authority exerted on him, strapped his instinct to form an army and 
became the commander. Shortly after the uprising that engulfed in predominant 
Muslim territory in what we have today as northern Nigeria, where Fulani held sway 
due to the military advantage over their cavalry, the uprising later reinforced by the 
peasants who felt exploited by their leaders and because of that, Fodio started a jihad 
in Gobir kingdom in 1804. During this period, Fulani adopted a system of 
communication to their brethren through trading forts and rivers. With such strategy, 
the call for jihad covered the core Hausa-Fulani territory and descended to entire 
northern Nigeria. Few years after the uprising, Fodio had control over what is believed 
to be the largest state in Africa. His jihad version led to the establishment of many 
emirates that still exist in Nigeria, giving elaborate authority to the Emirates and 
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customary non-sectarianism that invariably gave rise to nonsectarian Islamic 
conservatism.169  
 
Thus, both traditional and contemporary Islamic scholars of northern extraction rely 
solely on Fodio’s Islamic traditionalist style. This development makes it explicitly 
difficult to understand the intricacies of Islamic practices and tautness amongst 
different Islamic sects that operate in the northern region of Nigeria.170 Following his 
peripatetic preaching within the African sub-region, his view about the concept of jihad 
became attractive which and influenced the emergence of many Islamic organizations 
in present-day Nigeria although some parts of northern Nigeria rejected his concept of 
jihad.  
 
In 1811 Fodio retired from active jihad and hence, continued to engage in writings 
about the virtue of Muslim belief. He authored more than a hundred books on 
government, religion, and society. He condemned vehemently the role of the African 
Muslim elites in what he considers as greed, paganism, or violation of Sharia law 
standards and heavy taxations. Fodio encouraged his followers of both sexes to acquire 
western and Islamic knowledge, and on that premise, several of his daughters became 
scholars.  After his retirement, some family members include his brother and son 
continued to consolidate on his teaching by fighting syncretism. Their distinctive 
writings place them among Sunni traditional Muslim reformers.171 Fodio’s jihad 
centred on establishing an efficient system grounded in Islamic law.  The trio reformers 
adopted al-Ghazali’s style of Sufism172 and commended the pieties of the Qadiriyya 
Sufis, which eventually led to the fusion of the reformism into Qadiriyya Sufism. It can 
be seen from this narrative that some Salafi jihadist of Muslim Brotherhood 
background extol the Fodio’s style of teaching and adopted such philosophy to 
condemn and later launched a jihad against the state of Egypt.  
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However, as time evolved, Qadiriyya became known and remain one of the strongest 
sects in Nigeria. Conceivably the most important post-jihad Muslim recognized sect in 
the Muslim dominated area in Nigeria then was the tariqa (path) of Qadirriyya. When 
the British colonial administrators conquered Nigerian territory in the early nineteenth 
century, various Islamic thought and practice supervene, and these sects relate with 
one another in their preaching.173  
 
With British rule in Nigeria, there were economic and political transformations. This 
transformation posed a significant challenge to Islam and the entire Muslims of 
northern Nigeria because it has changed the way of life of the adherents of the faith. 
There is no doubt that the transformation had an impact on Islam with values 
changing. The general belief amongst the Muslims is that Islam is a complete way of 
life, and hence it dominates both colonial and postcolonial ways of life. This 
orientation and environment, without doubt influenced the culture of the people. 
 
3.3 ISLAMIC SPIRITUAL ORDER: TARIQ/SUFISM, QADIRIYYA AND 
TIJANIYYA    
The 19th-century writings on Islamic mystical order refer to Sufi in many Muslim 
states, known in Nigeria as Tariq are to some extent inaccurate.174  The 14th-century 
scholars such as Ibn Khaldun describe the traditional conception of Sufism.175 
However, viewing from Ibn Khaldun’s narration of the concept of Sufism, it can be 
asserted that most of the so-called Sufi sects that operate in present-day Nigeria and 
other Muslim societies conflict with the true understanding of the concept. For 
instance, Boko Haram claimed severally that they followed the Prophet Muhammad's 
true teaching and practice and for them, they fall under the class of Sufism. The claim 
by the rejectionist Boko Haram that they follow and adopted the Salafi doctrine is 
 
173 Ibid. 
174 An-Na’im, ‘Ahmed, Islam and Human Rights in Sahelian Africa’, in David Westerlund and Eva 
Evers Rosander, African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists (Hurst 




merely an understanding of scripture from ignorance and myopic viewpoints. Like 
Boko Haram all the existing rejectionist groups that challenged international peace and 
security formed and consolidated their beliefs as Salafis. While on the contrary, all 
contemporary Salafi scholars strongly reject and condemn the vicious acts of violence; 
they allude such violent crimes superintended by these rejectionists as pure criminal 
activities. To this end, the presumption of nonaggression by some adherents of Sufis 
and violence among Salafi has no bases as far as Islam is concerned176  
  
However, tariq in Nigeria has traditionally associated with culture and materialism by 
its adherents which is contrary to the orthodox Sufism of the 2nd century as 
conceptualized by scholars like al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun and their contemporaries. 
According to Sufi tradition, any culture that conflicts with Islamic order is considered 
perfidious. For instance, a Sunni dynasty descendent of the first Songhai king was 
accused of introducing a doctrine that was contrary to the teaching of Islam by Al-Hajj 
in 15th century.177 
3.4 ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS IN POST-COLONIAL ERA 
 
However, Boko Haram is not the first terrorist group that emerged in Nigeria; a similar 
group existed in the early 1970s to 1980 known as Maitatsine. The leader of this sect, 
‘Marwa’, migrated from neighboring Cameroon to Kano's city in 1945.178 Like Yusuf, 
the founder of Boko Haram he believed that Islamic tenets were corrupted by 
advancements in technology and the formation of the contemporary world.179 His 
attack on established institutions became unbearable to the authority, and that led to 
his expulsion from the city. But after the demise of the paramount ruler of Kano in 
1966,180 he again found himself back to the city and continued with his manipulative 
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preaching and acts of lawlessness against the state, which eventually led to his 
imprisonment. The elements of terrorism have been raging in northern Nigeria since 
then, and this notion made some commentators believe that the Maitatsine sect is an 
extension of the Boko Haram sect.181 Surprisingly at the twilight of his death in 1980, it 
was discovered that Marwa was not even a Muslim and that laid to rest the notion that 
he wanted to Islamize Nigeria as perceived by some Christians.182   
The first Islamic organization that emerged after colonialism is known as Jama’atu 
Nasril Islam (JNI), being an organization was established by learned Muslim scholars of 
the highest eminence who acquired both western and Islamic knowledge.183 The 
organization was and still non-sectarian body. Sheikh Mahmud Gumi was the first 
head of the organization by virtue of his position as grand khadi of the northern region, 
although, he proposed the idea of its formation. The body aims to encourage jihad 
through sensitization and production of Islamic literature in both Arabic and English 
languages across the northern states and ensuring that it forms part of the school’s 
curriculum. Aside from that, it also targets constructing mosques and Islamic learnings 
hubs across the country. In other to have a backing of authority, it appointed Ahmadu 
Bello, the premier of the northern region, as its grand patron, who was a grandson of 
Fodio. Consequently, the premier by his position, suggested to the organization 
members that the presidency of the body should be vested in the office of the sultan of 
Sokoto who a direct descendant of Fodio, while renowned scholars hold positions such 
as secretary-general.   
Many groups have emerged propagating different Islamic ideologies. Notable of these 
include the Shi’a’s Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) or Muslim Brothers led by 
Sheikh El-Zakzaky as well as its splinter group known as the Jamat al-Tajdeed al 
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Islami , (JTI); the Nasrul-Lahi Fathi Society of Nigeria (NASFAT); Ansar al Deen, 
Nawairrudeen, Nurudeen, Umarudeen and Ahmadiyya among others.184  
Boko Haram emerged with its own ideological view and later became violent in its 
approach. Educated and Arabic adherents of wahhabism and salafism exist and it can be 
seen to have sharpened the ideological position of Boko Haram. The adherent of this 
movement known as ‘Yan Medina’ acquired both the western and Arabic knowledge 
from the University of Medina and Makkah, respectively; their common characteristics 
include above average in speaking and understanding Arabic vernacular. It is believed 
that because of the opportunity, some of them had studied abroad, especially in 
Medina and Makkah that gave them an opportunity to establish contacts 
internationally. In addition to their contact outside the shore of Nigeria, they ensured 
the knowledge acquired, including religious, social, and political, is transmitted to their 
adherents, making them imams in secluded mosques where elites and petit bourgeois 
observe salat. Owing to their vast knowledge and exposure in both western and Arabic 
spheres, they attract more excellent followership from the youth and hence exercise 
substantial influence on them.   
3.5 EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM AS A TERRORIST GROUP 
 
The term Boko Haram is more of an identity than an appellation.185 The original 
group’s name is jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad known as Boko Haram 
meaning western education is sinful.186 The group emerged in early 2002 as a peaceful 
Salafi Islamic movement whose primary aim was propagating Islamic doctrine 
‘dawah187’ and helping the fewer privileged people. Following the crackdown on its 
followers by the government security operatives which led to the killing of their 
spiritual leader Mohammed Yusuf belief to be inspired by some radical Islamic 
 
184 Medinat A Malefakis, ‘Religion and Religious Fundamentalism in Nigeria: Boko Haram's Claims 
to Truth’ (WZB Discussion Paper, No. SP VI 2019-102) 7, 
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/205231, accessed 12 January 2021. 
185 Elimma Ezeani, ‘Responding to Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of Boko Haram’ (2017) 22(1) 
Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 1, 1-32. 
186 Uyo Salifu and Martin Ewi, Boko Haram and Violent Extremism Perspectives from Peacebuilders 
(Institute of Security Studies, 2017) 1. 
187 S Umar, the Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism in Nigeria: A Case 
Study of Boko Haram. (Northwestern University Press, 2011) 156  
60 
 
scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah,188 the modus operandi of the group changed and 
resorted to a violent approach especially towards security formations, and later the 
general populace which left a score of people dead. This part of the thesis would 
unequivocally look at the sect's peaceful movement before eventually transmigrating to 
a full-blown terrorist group that is regarded as one of the deadliest terrorist 
organizations in the world vis-a-vis the lack of a legal framework to address their acts 
at embryonic stage.    
The founder of the sect, Mohammed Yusuf who was well known to be a radical 
Islamic preacher in Maiduguri, sets up a religious complex called Markaz,189 when he 
suddenly had a truce with some fellow clerics that share a different opinion with him. 
The complex suits Mosque and Islamic school ‘Islamiyah’ where fewer privileged 
people from different parts of the divide, including neighboring countries like 
Cameroon and Chad send their children to acquire Islamic knowledge.190 Unknown to 
the authority, the complex had a hidden political motive to create a state within the 
state and impose Sharia laws.191 The centre had astonishedly become a recruiting 
centre of future Jihadist that would unleash mayhem to both the state and the 
populace. Also, Yusuf, in his interpretation, believed that modernization is contrary to 
Islamic doctrine. To him, globalization has embosomed a matter contrary to the 
provisions of Islam and therefore not only sinful to take the path of westernization but 
also forbidden to support, operate, and acquire western knowledge.192 In some of his 
preaching, he usually criticises how colonialism corrupted the northern Muslims' 
minds by applying the pure western style of leadership and the position of Muslim and 
Islam in the current political environment. Yusuf curiously believed that Muslims 
should cease imbibing western culture and accept to be ruled by Allah's laws, which is 
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Undoubtedly, one of the factors that led to the emergence of Boko Haram could be 
attributed to the inspiration derived from the Taliban. This has influenced the 
ascendancy of Boko Haram especially after the event of September 11, which made the 
group adopt the name “Nigerian Taliban.”193 This has been demonstrated by their first 
attack on police station and private properties in some remote areas of Yobe state in 
2003. After such an attack, the group foisted the flag of Afghan Taliban in the captured 
towns.194 In 2009 Mohammed Yusuf categorically said in one of his sermons that the 
Nigerian Taliban as a group has yet to commence operating as a core Sunni sect that 
will take on ignorance and secularism. The existing Sunni sects we have across the 
globe are Taliban and Al-Qaeda.195  Soon after his sermon, selected members of the 
group had resumed training in Taliban camp in Afghanistan, which Shekau was 
presumably amongst them. 196 
The initial name of the group was Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization under the 
leadership of Mallam Lawal.197 Lawal proceeded to Medina, Saudi Arabia, to further 
his education, which subsequently saw Yusuf's emergence as the new leader of the 
group. With Yusuf’s emergence, the group change their mode of operation 
considerably by involving in state affairs as it was in record that the sect signed a pact 
with the then Governor of the state “Ali Sheriff” who was believed to have trotted on 
the influence of the sect to get re-elected for the second term as governor in 2007.198 
Under Yusuf’s watch, the group operated as a peaceful sect for the period of seven 
years. 
 
In 2009 the crisis ensued when the state government's enacted legislation over wearing 
the helmet for motorcycle riders in Maiduguri metropolis.199 To enforce the use of 
helmet, Borno state government ordered police to arrest and prosecute anyone found 
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to have violated the law, and on that premise, an attempt to arrest some members of 
the group by police after violating the law resulted in the confrontation between them 
and the police which led to the death of four of their members and some sustained 
degree of injuries.200 After this barefaced incident, the sect leader communicated to the 
Nigerian government in an open letter addressed to the President of Nigeria that if 
within forty days the government does not respond with the view of finding a lasting 
solution between them and the government, then certainly the sect would launch a 
jihad in the country which no one can tell the gravity and how long the operation 
would last.201  However, the government ignored the warning, which pushed the sect to 
deploy strategies and planned to make the state ungovernable.   
 
The group's violent act was first recorded in December 2003 when they attacked police 
facility and private properties in the remote areas of Yobe state. After such attack, the 
group foisted the flag of Afghan Taliban in the captured towns for several days, until 
the arrival of the security forces that repelled and killed some of their members and 
many sustained injuries.202 Similarly, some group members who were fortunate to 
escape from the crackdown were said to have dispersed to other parts of Nigeria and 
continued with their struggle. For instance, the Bauchi attack of July 26th, 2009, was 
said to have occurred because of the migration of the members to the city.  However, 
in September 2004, they launched a devastating attack on the police station in Bama 
local council, and in such attack, many officers killed and carted away arms and 
ammunition. Three years after such attacks, the group re-strategized and attacked 
another police formation in the outskirt of Kano city in September 2007, killing 13 
officers. With these unprecedented acts, the Nigerian security forces staged a well-
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Still, in Kano, the group emerged stronger with more than 250 members and raided a 
police station in Wudil local council moving within the town carrying different 
sophisticated weapons, although they were repelled by the security forces and some of 
them, including the Amir of Wudil were arrested. The Amir was relatively lenient 
amongst them because of his antecedence before he joined the group.204 The case of 
Danja police station attack in Katsina state was different from others because they 
were repelled and fled leaving their weapons which they planned to destroy the station. 
In their continuing assault on the government establishment, the group in July 2009, 
attacked and burnt government agencies in Maiduguri and at the same time attacked a 
mobile police station and prison headquarters and freed the inmates.  
 
This according to Danjibo:205 
 
“Members of the sect in Maiduguri were dressed in military fatigue, armed with RPGs, AK 47, 
Dane guns, bow and arrows, sword, matches, knives, petrol bombs and catapults. Their large 
numbers and operation mode made the security forces encounter initial difficulties in dealing with 
them. They mounted roadblocks and confronted the security for three days until reinforcement of 
troops was brought from Jos and Bauchi.” 
 
Following the attacks on these institutions, then President Yar’Adua directed the 
armed forces hierarchy to use all resources at their disposal to nip the group instantly. 
Hence, this led to the emergence of the Special Security Unit, drawn from all security 
agencies of the government and later incorporates local youths who were privy to the 
grand plan of the group because of their communal interactions.206 In their first 
presidential assignment, the task force encountered a problem due to the group 
members' hideout or location. With the help of local intelligence (CJTF), the task force 
identified the location that was regarded as their headquarters and housed Yusuf and 
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his companions within the railway station terminal.207 The thorough surveillance of the 
area made the residents relocate to the other part of the metropolis and hence, became 
accessible to the security forces to nip them instantaneously. With the myth and 
strength of the security operatives, it took them only six days to destroy all the existing 
structures in that area. Some of the items recovered in the headquarters include arms 
and ammunition, medical equipment, and foodstuff.208 Another incidence of a police 
station raid was witnessed in major cities of Yobe state, that is, Damaturu and 
Potiskum, in July 2010. In these attacks, not many casualties were recorded because 
the members concentrated in freeing inmates from the prison, which they believe will 
join their notorious campaign against the state.209  
 
The early confrontation between the sect and the security forces resulted in the death of 
at least 1000 people before escalating to some states such as Kano, Jigawa, and Yobe. 
Several dead bodies were said to have been found around police headquarters in 
Maiduguri, and quite a lot flee their homes to avoid being caught off by the mayhem.210 
The confrontation resulted in Yusuf's extrajudicial killing and eventually contended the 
situation for a short period. Their nefarious acts pushed the government to set up a 
quasi-counter-terrorism team that comprises security agents from all establishments 
“Joint Task Force” in 2009.211 The deployment of the security forces appeared to have 
added salt to an injury because the security forces were not different from the enemies 
they were confronting as a result of gross abuses of the peoples’ rights.  This 
development made the victim's lost the trust of their protectors; hence, created an 
avenue for the youths to be incorporated into the sect’s struggle. 
  
Consequently, Yusuf's death weakened the group's acts before they eventually 
regrouped stronger in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. The notion after 
the death of Yusuf was that the government has effectively defeated Boko Haram. The 
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group resumed its notorious act in 2010 by carrying out an attack on a prison facility in 
Bauchi state freeing more than 700 inmates, including their sects.212 After the Bauchi 
prison attack and followed by persistent horrendous attacks on security agents, 
government institutions, places of worship, schools as well as the general populace. In 
2011 the sect carried out their first suicide bombing at the Nigerian police 
headquarters, and two months later orchestrated similar attack at the United Nations 
Building in Abuja; many people were reported dead, and scores sustained fatal injuries. 
The attack was believed to be engineered by Al Qaeda, and Al Shabaab trained 
Cameroonian terrorist Hamman Nur.213     
Since the assumption of Shekau as head of the group in 2010, the rates of the attacks 
increased in frequency and strength, especially towards security formations, one of the 
deadliest attacks orchestrated by the group was in Kano in 2012 where a score of 
people numbering 180 including security agents have lost their lives.214 The attack is 
believed to be one of the worst in a single day. As pointed out in the preceding 
analysis, these attacks became continually the practice by the group. In 2013, the 
group's acts pushed the Nigerian government to react with stringent measures by 
declaring a state of emergency in three states where their acts were much in prevalence. 
Although there was the subsisting emergency rule in some parts of the affected states,215 
the government's declaration of the emergency rule indicates that all matters 
concerning security and political decision of the affected states lies with the federal 
government. Their acts' intensity has tremendously changed as their tactics 
transmogrify between 2013 and 2014, resorting to kidnapping and attacking banks.216 
The continuing fierce fighting between the security forces and the sect pushed the 
group to relocate to a tick forest, “Sambisa,” a remote area in Borno State where they 
continue with their onslaught.  
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Abubakar Shekau was known as lieutenant or deputy to Mohammed Yusuf the first 
leader of the notorious Boko Haram group.217 Unlike Yusuf under whose leadership 
focused their struggle against the western ideology and pervasive corruption of the 
Nigerian system, which to him rendered youths unproductive but the former opted to 
wage jihad against the government. Shekau desired to see Nigeria as an Islamic state 
but followed a wrong path of actualizing that, even though not realistically possible 
whichever path he followed. His principal had exhibited a little decency at the 
beginning of his campaign, which was why he could attract even those who have 
acquired western knowledge.218 Following the death of Yusuf in 2009, Shekau emerged 
as the leader of the group. Under his watch, the acts of the group changed considerably 
and became ruthless and ambitious in their struggle. This was demonstrated by the 
group’s adoption of suicide bombings to eliminate targets.219 Their unending acts 
against the authority and general populace under his leadership are evidence that Boko 
Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in history. His leadership was 
marked by the persistent use of media to disseminate their campaign of violence 
against the authority and civilians. The tactic employed by the group under his watch, 
especially the suicide bombers or a martyr of jihad, was evident that the group can go 
to any length to actualise their aims.220 Shekau uses his convincing messages to attract 
the vulnerable youths into their struggle, especially after their training in Afghanistan 
with some of AQIM members hitherto to the formation of Boko Haram in 2009. These 
members see Shekau as a martyr because at the beginning of his notorious leadership, 
he boasted to wage war against western states like the United States and England.221   
 
However, because of his desire to destroy the federal establishments, he wittingly chose 
to use innocent children and women as suicide bombers. This development is a 
problem to the Nigerian authority and the international community as a whole.222 For 
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instance, the first suicide bombings was witnessed in Nigeria in 2010 on the UN 
building and police headquarters.223 These incessant acts, primarily in the northeast 
region of the country, prompted the then president Jonathan to re-instate the existing 
emergency rule imposed in three states of the northeast.224 Subsequent upon that, 
followed the deployment of security forces to the affected states to ensure the 
implementation of the emergency rule. Despite the imposed rule, the group continued 
their onslaught on the authority and the innocent citizens, which according to 
observers of the event resulted in the death of more than 2000225 people within the first 
five months of 2012. Their unprecedented notoriety led the United States and the UK 
to label them an International Terrorist Organization in 2013.226 In 2012 the group 
made different attempt to kill top northern traditional leaders through coordinated 
attacks. Some of the leaders include the Emir of Kano whom assassination attempt 
was made on his life, the Emir of Fika, Shehu of Borno as well as the Sultan of Sokoto, 
although they succeeded in killing the Emir of Gwoza.227 For instance, after the Sokoto 
attack, the group, through Shekau platform of communication, warned Sultan that he 
should order his members' immediate release who were arrested following their 
coordinated attack on the government building in Sokoto.228   
 
By 2014, the group became fortified and challenged the Nigerian government after 
capturing some local government councils and foisted their flag and declared the areas 
as Islamic Caliphates. According to BBC News, the captured areas are as big as the 
size of Belgium.229 The group became prominent following the kidnapping of 275 
schoolgirls in Girls Secondary School Chibok in April 2014 and replicated same by 
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abducting over 200 in Girls Secondary School Dapchi in Yobe state in January 2018.230 
A campaign to Bring Back our Girls was launched in Nigeria, and some countries 
including the United States mounted immense pressure on the government to facilitate 
the release of the girls and ensured their safe return to their families.231 Thus, the 
Nigerian government's ambivalent nature does not allow it to take appropriate action 
to rescue the girls and hence, remain in captivity until 2016 when the Buhari 
administration came on board and negotiated their release. Although some of them 
died while in captivity, and some were married off to the group members, according to 
online videos which emanated from Shekau.232 Furthermore, with the continuous 
suicide bombings witnessed in some affected areas, the kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls 
have received training from the group and eventually used them for suicide bombing.233 
This account can be viewed from a series of suicide bombings launched in Kano, 
Maiduguri, Damaturu, Abuja, Yola, Mubi, and Kaduna, amongst other cities. Also, in 
2014, the group carried out a deadly attack on Kano central mosque resulting in the 
deaths of more than 100 people and several sustained degrees of injuries. 234 
 
As indicated, the incorporation of the local vigilante groups known as Civilian (CJTF) 
into the joint task force has effectively helped counter the group's acts.235 This was 
demonstrated by their unflinching efforts in confronting the group members openly.  
After the first incidence of the kidnapping of the schoolgirls, the United Nations 
Security Council blacklisted the group and described it as an international terrorist 
organization that has linked with Al-Qaeda and the organization of Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb.236 The Nigerian government and the UN have put a gory number of 
people killed by the group between 2013 and 2014 at 15000, and more than six million 
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were affected while 1.5 million have been displaced.237 Indeed, the acts of the group 
questioned the sovereign status of Nigeria as a state of political independence, as these 
acts have been ongoing intermittingly, especially from 2008-2015 
 
However, when carefully anatomised the notorious acts of Boko Haram under the 
classification of irregular warfare, the one that had similar coloration with the former is 
a Malayan war of 1948-1960. Some analysts regarded this war as the classic 
counterterrorism success for the British government, and it allies and hence becomes a 
point of reference for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism afterward.238  Like Boko 
Haram insurgency, the latter’s war has lasted for 12 years, and the same modus 
operandi adopted by the Nigerian military in its quest to defeat Boko Haram, which 
was employed by the British army, involved the application of brute force. Again, just 
like a Malayan war where the deployed tactics of using the geographical environment 
to attack their opponents, Boko Haram uses the same tactics in their notorious acts, 
especially after its relocation to Sambisa Forest as a weapon against the security 
operatives who do not know the terrain. In all the fight against the Malayans, no open 
confrontation between them and the British army was recorded. Instead, they usually 
hid in the jungles and ambushed the army, and this practice made it strenuously 
difficult for the British army to know whether they have defeated the fighters or not.239 
In the fight against Boko Haram, a similar problem is facing the Nigerian security 
operatives who have no knowledge or conversant with the northeast's geographical 
environment, especially the famous Sambisa Forest. A soldier who was born and 
raised in the other part of the country never travels to any part of the divide is sent to 
fight Boko Haram in a terrain that is not known to him that will be hard to have a 
positive outcome from such fight. The group always take advantage of such 
weaknesses and stage an ambush against the security operatives.  
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The similar nature between the two is logical. During the Malayan war, the British 
forces destroyed the hideouts and other structures believed to be aiding the insurgents, 
and they equally engaged in extrajudicial killings of civilians’ who tries running away 
during the operation.240 This method was still a practice of the Nigerian security forces 
against Boko Haram and the host communities.  
However, some years after the defeat of the Malayan insurgents, Field Marshall 
Montgomery contends that “a clear action and a fit-for-purpose man to execute the 
plan was needed for victory in the Malayan war. He further asserts that we must have 
a congruous plan, and we must have a man, when we have a plan and a man, we shall 
succeed: not otherwise.”241 By 1952, the British authority wasted no time and 
subscribed to Montgomery's advice and designed comprehensive counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism strategies under General Templer's able leadership by sharing 
intelligence with the civilian population and hence defeated the Malayan insurgents.242  
The relocation of the group to the thick forest of Sambisa because of its physical 
characteristics confirmed that they are not ready to surrender their notorious 
campaign. The forest covers approximately 60,000sq linking four states in the 
northeast region.243 The forest's physical characteristic makes it difficult to have a clear 
vision of 200 meters; it is also not easy to penetrate and can accommodate a large 
number of people that cannot be detected easily.244 However, since their relocation to 
the Sambisa forest, they established full control of the communities under their so-
called caliphate by exercising authority on the residents, such as collecting taxes and 
restricting their movement. Before the build-up of the 2015 general elections, 
substantial parts of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe were under their control until 
Nigeria's joint military forces and its counterparts from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger 
chased them from the captured communities under their control. Following some 
success in nipping their acts in the bud by the security forces, Shekau boasted that the 
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Nigerian government could not withstand them because of their alliance with ISIS and 
Al-Qaeda, who provides them with all the myths needed to confront the 
government.245  
The group's numerical strength and capacity to challenge the mighty Nigerian army, 
who are regionally known to be strong and powerful, suggested that they have allies 
either outside or within Nigeria who provide them with sophisticated weapons and 
logistics. The attack on Giwa Barracks Maiduguri has confirmed the above assertion.246 
The deadliest attack ever recorded since the emergence of the sect was in Baga, a local 
council in Borno state, where more than 2000 people were reported to have been 
killed.247 Amnesty International described it as the worst attack in the history of the 
terrorists’ attack in the world. 
 
The fact is that if Nigeria wants to defeat Boko Haram and other terrorist groups such 
as the herdsmen and others, a comprehensive overhaul of the counterterrorism strategy 
should be carried out to include a civil-military coalition, sharing of vital security 
information to some critical civilian elements within the community. Although, the 
army created a department related to that, and a unit exists at the Office of the 
National Security Adviser to the President. However, the reality is that such units exist 
only by name as the security operative in the field doesn’t relate with the civilians to 
have the first-hand information from the community relating to security threats. 
 
However, the deteriorating situation in Nigeria and the effort in ensuring that the acts 
of the group have not spread to another part of West African states necessitated the 
Paris Colloquium in 2014, were the leaders of Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria 
unanimously agreed to expand and strengthen the capacity of the Multinational Joint 
Task Forces to respond to the threat posed by the group effectively.248 Similarly, on 30th 
November 2018 Nigeria’s president met with his counterparts from the Sahel region 
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and discussed how Boko Haram and other terrorist organization operating in the 
region would be decimated. President Buhari had observed that Boko Haram using 
uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance activities and its mining strategy has 
indicated that the group is still strong.249 He, therefore, called for renewed and urgent 
measures to eliminate remnants of the group. The leaders believed that poverty and 
shrinkage of Lake Chad are two refueling elements.  
 
Nigeria's government made an effort to negotiate the Chibok girls' release by entering 
into a ceasefire agreement with the group in October 2014 that the agreement would 
take effect immediately. The group representatives agreed in their first meeting with 
the government officials, but a few days later, an online video released by Shekau told 
the government that those that attended meeting with them were imposters, not 
members of his group.250   
We can also see how the inspiration of the Afghan Taliban has impacted positively on 
Boko Haram. The latter has adopted the former's notorious tactics by shutting down 
the nation’s telecommunication firm mars to prevent the security forces from tracking 
and tracing their whereabouts.  They also instilled fears in the residents, warning them 
not to cooperate with the authorities, and deployed the tactics of extorting taxes from 
the local traders.  
The organization sees itself as an established security institution of the government 
because they are well organised. Following the emergence of the group, Mohammed 
Yusuf became both the spiritual and political leader of the group and had two 
assistants who channel his directives to a designated head or representative of the 
group in each of the local government of Borno State.251 The group just like the 
military council, the highest decision body of the military, had its council known as 
“Shura252 Committee” which advised the top commanders of the group on action to be 
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taken. The group had police, soldiers, DSS, and prison amongst its folks.253 Because of 
the abject poverty resulting from corruption, the group has conveniently succeeded in 
recruiting restive youths into their struggle. Apart from the estranged youths who 
joined the group, many graduates have equally joined their struggle because they 
neglected them after completing school.  
 
However, the perception is that what is the essence of acquiring knowledge if in return, 
the government that is saddled with the responsibility failed in all ramifications to 
provide job security to its teeming youths? So, this unpalatable stance by the 
government is the acknowledgment that acquiring western knowledge is of no use in 
Nigeria. The estimated number of the group as at 2012 was 280,000254 drawn from all 
the states of the northern Nigeria and the neighboring countries. The group resorted to 
extortion, bank robbery, kidnappings, collection of taxes from its members and others 
as sources of their funding.255 Although, key personnel of the government was said that 
have been contributing monetary wise.256  
 
3.6 THE JIHADIST IDEOLOGY AND BOKO HARAM  
In the mid-twentieth century, jihadism that emerged believed to be inspired by Sayyid 
Qutb arrowhead of Muslim Brotherhood seen as the influential Egyptian ideologue of 
Islamism257 took a violent path and ideological extremism, especially against the state. 
The ideology is rooted in the days of Sayyid Qutb. It is believed that the writings of 
Sayyid Qutb as well as other Islamic scholars such as Abul Ala Maududi and Hassan 
al-Banna, elicited the intellectual rationalizations and ratiocinations underpinning 
Islamism. Qutb writings have been described as a synthesis of strict and unacceptable 
Islamic orientations that involve groups from both the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam 
with extensive techniques and objectives.258 Outb equally incorporates the Islamist 
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pedagogy of Maududi and al-Banna laced with the polemics of Sayyid Qutb, which 
formulates justifications for armed jihad to further the advancement of Islam as well as 
other brutal and ferocious stratagems employed by modern militants.259 Qutb 
encapsulates an Islamist ideology with proclivities for the justification of terrorism and 
advocates violence against both unbelievers and dissenters and heretics alike with a 
view to establishing God’s rulership. Elkmeier notes that it was Qutb that incentivised 
men like Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam and Ayman Al-Zawahiri to build 
terrorist networks and converted or translated such an ideological Islamism into a 
global force.260 Elkmeier adumbrated the four core beliefs which Qutb espouses. Qutb 
believes that Muslims have digressed from pure Islam and must come back to pure 
Islam as previously practiced during the period of Prophet Muhammad.261  Qutb 
equally believes that the route to true Islam is only via a strict and literal interpretation 
of the Hadith and Islam and the concomitant actualization of the commands of the 
Prophet Muhammad.262 Qutb believes that Muslims should individually interpret the 
original sources and not be slavishly bound to Islamic scholars' interpretations.263 Qutb 
believes that any interpretation of the Quran from a historical and contextual view is 
unethical, so the totality of Islamic history and its classical jurisprudential tradition is 
mere sophistry. 
Observers, journalists and scholars attributed Qutb as formulating the theoretical bases 
of Islamism in the post-colonial Sunni Muslim World.264 It has been suggested that no 
other Islamist ideologue achieved the feat of Qutb save for Abu I-A’la Mawdudi.265 
The precursor to Qutb was the Islamist Hasan al-Banna, who founded the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood and laid the foundation for what became a movement aimed at 
tackling attacks against Islam that emanated from the external Abode of Islam, mainly 
the Western nations and Israel.266 There is no extensive theoretical work to provide an 
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explanation of al-Banna’s views coherently and logically.267  Al-Banna in ‘Between 
Yesterday and Today’ presented a historical analysis of the Muslims, Egyptians, and 
Arabs. But his historical view loses sight of the pre-Islamic Egyptians and Arabs 
entirely. Al-Banna commenced with a depiction of the first Islamic Caliphate and the 
golden age existence and mythologies. The golden age alluded to by Al-Banna are 
Muslims and not Arabs and consistently refers to Islamic umma and the Islamic 
state.268  
Al-Banna’s perception of history is highlighted in his perspective of the history of 
Europe. Al-Banna construed Europe as one of the umma until the Reformation and 
acted in a collective will be analogous to Islam's enemy. According to Al-Banna, 
Europe, having been exposed to Islam's cultural superiority through Spain and the 
Crusades in the East capitalized on the opportunity and benefitted from it. Al-Banna 
notes that Europe became united under the umbrella of the Franks in the land of 
Gaul.269 Al-Banna recognised the role played by ethnic divisions in understanding 
Europe’s political actions. But he did not see national unity as the reason for European 
states' creation but believe that the Reformation played a powerful part in the 
emergence of nationalities in Europe. 270 In Al-Banna’s teleological perception of 
history, the issue of Islamic umma came to the fore because of European involvement 
and the part played by colonialism. Al-Banna asserts that the Muslim people's 
awakening is because of the extirpation by the Europeans of the Islamic umma. Al-
Banna asserted that when the Islamic Caliphate is re-constituted, the question of 
national sentiments among Muslims will abate.271  Al-Banna’s view is better 
reproduced here for the purpose of this discussion. He stated thus: “Although 
[European colonization of the Muslim world] led to the development of local 
nationalism, with each nation demanding its right to freedom as an independent entity, 
and while many of those who worked for this revival purposely ignored the idea of 
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unity, nevertheless the outcome of these steps will be, without a doubt, consolidation 
and resurrection of the Islamic empire as a unified state embracing the scattered 
peoples of the Islamic world and bearing its message.272 There is no nation in the world 
held together by the same kind of linguistic unity, joint participation in material and 
spiritual interests, and similarity of suffering and hope that hold the Muslims 
together.273  According to Al-Banna, nationalism should not be given a conspicuous or 
prominent role in history. Al-Banna maintains the view that European nationalism 
was an inimical occurrence, and the individual selfishness it brought about was 
synonymous to the national selfishness it caused, and this was prevalent in the West's 
culture.274  Al-Banna asserts that nationalism helped Muslims respond to the West's 
oppression and played a positive part in unifying Muslims politically.275  Al-Banna’s 
historical perspective provided an answer for the collapse of the erstwhile Caliphate 
because of the political transfer of authority to the Turks, Mamluks, Persians, and the 
Daylamites who could not practice genuine Islam.276 He further said that the Islamic 
conquest resulted in the Arab cultural conquest. He argued that Egypt salvaged Islam 
from the conquest of the Mongols and the Crusaders.277  Al-Banna did the best he 
could to clarify as to the vision of the Muslim Brotherhood and that the Muslim 
Brotherhood of political Islam was not intended to cause division and disaffection 
among Muslims and not aimed at splitting its youth organization. Al-Banna stressed 
that Muslim Brotherhoods' nationalists’ objectives were the Muslim states' 
emancipation from the clutches of European colonialism and the unification of the 
Muslim countries. He stated that the Islamic emphasis on love is preeminent in 
Muslim lands. In much of his work, Al-Banna personified a nationalist of the Muslim 
cause and he stated that “we do not deny that the various states have their own distinct 
qualities and particular moral characters, for we know that every people has its own 
share of excellence and moral fibre, and we know too that in this respect the various 
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peoples differ from one another and vie with one another in excellence. We believe 
that in these respects, the Arabs possess the fullest and most abundant share.278 At the 
1938 Congress of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Banna stated that the Islamic State 
would come into existence slowly. He submitted that the Muslim Brotherhood will lay 
the foundations of the Islamic state in the Nile valley and that it will advance to other 
Arab nations and in every other Muslim land founded based on the Islamic faith.279 Al-
Banna stated that the Muslim Brotherhood would respect its nationalism, which is the 
central pillar of its revivalist mission. He stressed that the Arab Brotherhood would 
strive to maintain the Muslim unity which is perceived as the ultimate Islamic vision. 
Brykczynski submits that regardless of the intellectual split between other secular 
nationalists and Al-Banna, they accepted the division and the accommodating nature 
of the identities of the Egyptians and shared similar conceptual frameworks.280  The 
key plank of Al-Banna’s message is that every Muslim owe its allegiance to the Islamic 
creed and not to any ethnic, civic, and tribal concept of nationalist connection.281John 
Calvert opines that after Hasan al-Banna, what Qutb did was to shift the emphasis. 
Essentially following Hasan al-Banna, Qutb changed the narrative and elevated the 
teachings of Hasan al-Banna to another level. In that era, only a few of the Jihadist 
maintained their position against the struggle. Ibn Taymiyyah was another precursor of 
Qutb. Ibn Taymiyyah contended that the contemporary world lives in a Jahiliyya282 
period. The term “Jahiliyya” literarily means a period before the advent of Islam. Qutb 
believed that despite the coming and proliferation of Islam, there exist some elements 
of Jahiliyya amongst the Muslim dominated states. Ibn Taymiyyah argued for the 
doctrine of tawhid in Islam, which means Muslims should come together for Allah's 
unity.  The concept was based on the movement founded by the Iranian Prophet Mani 
in a Sasanian Empire, which is an outdated concept that abides by dualism.283 The 
doctrine of Tawhid enshrines that Muslims should operate within Allah's defined laws 
and follow the Sunnah of the prophet Muhammad and distance themselves from any 
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other doctrine apart from these.284   The notion of this concept is that any Muslim that 
fails to abide by the doctrine as a way of life falls under the categorization of Jahiliyyah 
and such person or entity seizes to be a Muslim, and to some extent regarded as Takfir.  
In the light of the foregoing, the basis on which Boko Haram and other terrorist 
organizations operate can be traced to Sayyid Qutb's writings as far back in the 1940s 
and towards the twilight of the 1960s.285 Qutb developed his particular version of Islam 
and a particular model of where Islam was in history. Basically, what Qutb and other 
brotherhood writers who came before him did as find in his treatise in 1928286 was on 
the understanding that the leadership of Egypt and Muslim dominated states all these 
leaders were not acting correctly or not real Muslims. Qutb developed two thoughts 
about this; one is that jihad should be waged against what he called “fake Muslims” 
who were leading the Islamic world. He particularly emphasised that the new class of 
Muslim leaders should work towards the creation of Islamic states to ensure 
compliance with the provisions of the Sunnah. The idea that the leadership of the 
Muslim world and secular leaders were not real Muslims at all; and you need to have 
some form of jihad whether through violent or political protest against them was very 
fundamental to Qutb.287   
The second version developed by Qutb is that the existing system of governance 
adopted by the Muslim states should be remodeled, and the political leaders must be 
confronted for their sins. Qutb persuaded Muslims to stand up to what he perceived as 
the institutional, political, and cultural corruptions rooted deeply in the foundations of 
their respective nations.288 Qutb urged Muslims to work hard to substitute earthly 
governance with God’s decisions as provided by the Sharia.289 Qutb enjoined Muslims 
across the globe to be united concerning this cause.290However, relying on this 
parochial doctrine, the violent insurgents adopted and propagate their struggle against 
the states.  
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Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram have declared on the different fora that every Muslim must 
rise against any state that fails to adopt the laws of Allah and the teaching of the 
prophet Muhammad. But the violent terrorist on their part adopted a barbaric system 
that defies both the doctrine of Islam and secularism. For instance, Boko Haram’s 
adoption of Chibok schoolgirls and ISIS capturing of Yazidi women in Iraq.291 
Although, not only the terrorist organizations that have been aspired by Qutb, Islamic 
Republic of Iran extol Qutb commitment to Islamist revolution and on that premise the 
government honoured him by issuing a postage stamp showing him while he was in 
prison after been sentenced to death by Nasser regime in 1966.292  
Qutb vehemently believed that society could only be freed from this barbarism when 
Islamic law is adopted by all Muslim dominated states as a system of governance 
rather than western style. Just like Ibn Taymiyyah, Qutb underpinned the declaration 
and waging war against Muslim states that are not operating according to the dictates 
of Sharia.293 He justified his reasons of waging jihad against such states on the basis 
that once a jihad is launched, such state has no option than to succumb to the 
establishment of the Islamic law. This concept has been adopted by all terrorist 
organizations across the board. For instance, Boko Haram uses his Mardin Fatwa 
concept by declaring Nigerian leaders as infidels. But Taymiyyah’s position on this 
concept has been criticized by some scholars because to them such stance has violated 
the ijmas of core Sunni Muslims.294 As indicated that Qutb followed and consolidated 
the doctrine of Taymiyyah and with this chain, the terrorist organizations adopted and 
followed Qutb teaching and resorted their violent struggle against states that are not 
even Islamic states such as Nigeria.  
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Intrinsically, the contemporary scholars of international political discourse 
acknowledged Qutb in shaping the theological bases of the terrorists in the post-
colonial dominated Muslim societies. This assertion has been ostensibly established 
and recognised by vast commentators and observers of the event.  Unlike Banna, 
although, consolidated on his ideology, Qutb, transformed the struggle by challenging 
the established authority of Egypt that Egyptian Muslims should reject secular 
government instead, it should advocate for the establishment of Sharia law. His call 
regarding the imposition of Islamic law, should not be restricted to Egypt only, but the 
entire Muslim world.295  
Consequently, the constant security threats hovering within the international 
community should not come as a shock, mainly because of Qutb’s negative preaching 
and thoughts. For instance, Abdallah Benkirane of Morocco’s neo-conservative party 
al-Tawhid wa al-Islah296 posited that whenever he lays hands on Qutb’s literature, he 
found it so inspiring and overwhelming. He further contends that he began to 
understand things from a different perspective and that changed his mind entirely. 
Equally, Qutb’s inspirational thoughts influenced the radical Algerian preacher of the 
Islamic Salvation Front Ali Belhaji297 in fighting the state’s party apparatchiks and 
seizing general in the 1980s and the 1990s.298 Ghannouchi Rashid of Tunisia’s 
Islamism al-Nahda (Renaissance)299 party confirmed how Qutb and other Salafi-
jihadist influenced his thinking by resorting to extremism whenever he lay hands on 
their literature. Qutb’s influence on these jihadists is so overwhelming. The then leader 
of Morocco Islamic Liberation Front, Shaykh Hashim300 admits Qutb’s adverse 
writings about jihad pushed him to instigate and plant the seed of Islamic Revolution 
in Bangsamoro homeland in the Philippines.301  
It is apparent to know why Qubt's name became a household name within the 
dynasties of the terrorist than the other advocates of the Salafi jihadists like Ibn 
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Taymiyyah and others. There are three types of Salafism operating across the globe. 
Salafism has become mainly conflated with terrorism in a great deal of academic and 
intellectual discussion due mainly as a result of events in Iraq and Syria. In fact, 
Salafism is a very extensive tradition whereby three ideological strands of thought exist 
within the same paradigm.302 The three types of Salafism are quietists, political 
Salafists, and the Jihadists.303 The quietists believe in purification and education, that 
is, learning more concerning their faith and purifying their practice of the faith. The 
quietists are not supposed to be dangerous to people and are not concerned with 
society.304 This group are self-oriented in approach and busy themselves with personal 
things such as their communities, families, and themselves. They are concerned with 
change or the rearrangement of the society. The other group is the political Salafists. 
This group is state-oriented. The political Salafists employ the apparatus of the state's 
system to champion reform in the political sphere.305 An example of this group 
manifested after the 2011 Arab insurrections. The political Salafists prefer revolution 
rather than evolution and see responsibilities and rights on similar platforms. We also 
have the group within the Salafists seen as Jihadists. This group is a rejectionist in 
orientation. They are repugnant to internal institutions of the state as well as global 
institutions.  
However, the Salafi Jihadists seek a violent and radicalized millenarian upheaval. 
They are smaller than the Quietists and political Salafists.306 Recently, they have been 
able to establish a sphere of political influence between Syria and Iraq, the ISIS 
Caliphate or the popularly known as the Islamic State. The Salafi-Jihadism believe that 
jihad should be waged as a means to implement the provisions of Islam or the Sharia. 
In other words, the Salafi-Islamism pursues a different ideological objective, which 
sees their propagation as one of political religion307. Salafi-Islamism show a tendency 
towards brutal nihilism with its advocate of the use of force or violence to change the 
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society.308 Salafi-Jihadism believe in making the individual the focus of its position 
rather than God. Salafi-Jihadism respect the position of their leader and pushes for 
territorial expansion or conquest at the instruction or command of their leader 
disregarding what the Sharia provided concerning their actions.309 It is not wrong to 
say that Qutb’s understanding of Islam was in contrast to the other advocates that 
existed before him because he sees Islam as culturally reliable, a programmatic 
ideology which is in sharp contrast to the teaching and practice of contemporary 
Islamic scholars in the Muslim dominated states.310 Going by Qutb’s belief and 
philosophy, the Muslim world would have been freed from the bondage of western 
hegemony if they had opted for the actual teaching of Islam.311 His writings have 
provided what is called “lawful bases for the rejectionists” to carry out their struggle in 
a forceful manner against the dismantled military regimes in all the Muslim dominated 
states. For instance, according to Maher, in Syria the frontline insurgents like Habib 
Marwan312 and his affiliates campaigned and launched their jihad against the Alawi-
dominated Ba’athist Regime in Damascus in the 1970s.   
Admittedly, the pattern and overwhelming inspiration derived by the terrorist from the 
teaching of Qutb led the Egyptian Islamic groups (al-jama’at al-jihad) to attack 
personnel and institution who were allies of the Mubarak’s government.313 This trend 
has paved the way for the terrorist to adopt some radical approach in changing 
governments in what we witnessed in the Middle East in (Arab spring) 2011-13. Owing 
to Qutb influence on the insurgents, today majority of the Middle East states see his 
idea as a threat to them because overwhelming advocates of jihad cite his writings.  For 
any violence the terrorist commit, always refer to authoritative sources and justifies 
such actions. Shiraz looks at the intellectual development of Islamism, and what it 
seeks to achieve. Shiraz focuses on the contemporary evolution of the ideology than 
the history of the movement. Shiraz Maher opines that these diverging perspective 
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gives explanation as to the demarcation or separation of methodologies between Salafi-
Jihadis and the other Muslim organization.314 Salafi-Jihadis maintains that the West 
was the root cause of all suffering in the Muslim world.315 The Salafi-Jihadis hold the 
view that the entirety of the global community as exemplified in international law, The 
United Nations, banking industry, development aids are agencies of modern 
colonialism.316  This is the position which to all intents and purposes dominates the 
Salafi-Jihadi global view and represents its most enduring features or attributes.317 
Shiraz in his academic perspective, notes that Salafists preached progression through 
regression and advocated a return to the practice of the first three generations of 
Muslims the Salaf Al Salih, also referred to as the righteous predecessors. Salafism is a 
modernized response to modernity. Salafism boasts of the quietest and activist strands. 
However, Shiraz Mahers book focuses on the violent Islamist who have become 
recently popular. Maher quotes Trotsky’s aphorism that war is the locomotive of 
history.318 For example, the wars in Iraq, conflict in Syria, the anti-Soviet war in 
Afghanistan, the war which emanated from the suspension of Algerian democracy are 
all hallmarks in the development of Salafi-Jihadism, a movement which is both 
profoundly reactionary and revolutionary. Mahers defines Salafi-Jihadism from the 
perspective of the interpretations of five key concepts of jihad, takkir, al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ 
tawhid and hakimiyya.319 These five influences come together to make the Salafists 
violent in their modus operandi. The key motivations of Salafi-Jihadists are war, and 
war provides the impetus and catalyst to the rise of Salafi-Jihadism. The area they 
exercise sphere of influence is in Syria and Iraq. What gave a fillip to the interest in 
hakimiyya or the securing of political supremacy or sovereignty for God was provoked 
by negative experiences of colonial conquest and forced industrialization.320  
As a result, Islamic cultural renaissance alongside social justice was encouraged and 
preached by many important Muslim thinkers in British India as well as poet 
 









Muhammad Iqbal and Abul A’la Maududi. The violent Islamist saw democracy as a 
man-made deity that is truncating and usurping the powers of God. Salafist maintains 
the view that all Muslim nations have woefully failed to secure divine rule, and as such 
jihad must be fought. Shiraz Maher offers an explanation regarding the exegetical 
move which transferred the concept of the eye for an eye law of qisas, or equal 
retaliation to the territory of international relations.321 Salafi-Jihadist justifications for 
perpetrating terror jettisons theology in some instances. For example, Ayman Al 
Zawahiri Al Qaeda’s leader and other leaders argue that the rules of Islam which 
govern tartarus, that is, human shields are desuetude in the sense that weapons of 
modern warfare make no distinction between combatants and civilians.322 Maher posits 
that asymmetrical warfare through terrorism are prosecuted because Jihadists as non-
state actors are compelled to do so. Because of this erroneous and misleading logic, the 
massive murder of civilians perpetrated by Sunni Muslims is justified and approbated. 
The facile treatment which classical jurisprudence receives, such as the Bida or 
innovation, is anathematic to the Salafi-Jihadist. In the past, Al Zawahiri’s nihilistic 
tendencies have been challenged and questioned by Salafi-Jihadist’s scholar such as 
Abu Bashir Al Tartusi. Maher postulated that these fault-lines in the movement are 
mainly ostensible between those who are operationally effective in the field and the 
theorists who are not active on the field.323  
However, Qutb enunciated the Islamist vision by using both Marxist and fascist 
appraisals of democratic capitalism. What Qutb expected to have done was comparing 
Islamic theology and another religious doctrine, but instead, he succinctly viewed 
secular ideologies and stages in history.324 Qutb like Marx contended that the way 
agrarianism replaced industrial capitalism according to the philosophy of Marxism, so 
shall Islamism dominate and replace the latter.325  Qutb ideology is grounded in 
political Islam which asserts that ideology and global perspective are sources of every 
change and transformation. Qutb maintains that Islamic faith and belief is the only 
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religion capable of stopping people from degeneration, abuses, distortions, and anxiety 
and establishes truth in people’s lives. The Sharia law must be used to fulfill the 
requirement of an Islamic government. The ideological leaning of Qutb espouses that 
the concept of political Islamism, which manifests hostile attitudes towards every type 
of intellectualism, sectarianism in Islam, mysticism and adjudges them heretical 
organizations from non-Islamic dominations.326 Qutb believes that to lead individuals 
to the direction of God, there must be the existence of an Islamic system because it is 
difficult, if not impossible. 
Correspondingly, what is interesting about Muslim Brotherhood ideology as developed 
by Qutb is very puritanical conception and is not about making compromises quite the 
opposite, to him is about preserving the new class of believers who would form the 
basis for new society and that anyone who gets in the way of that, is getting in the way 
of Islam.327 From the viewpoint of Islamic history, it is a devastating historical result 
because as far as Qutb was concerned, only the Muslim Brotherhood and their 
supporters are real Muslim. This means after 1440 of the existence of Islam, is now 
reduced to a small group of people. What is so critical about that, is how a small layer 
within the Muslim community began to see themselves as the bearers of the new 
society and must fight against everything that gets in the way of that either spiritually 
or possibly with fiscal combat, scholarship, financially depending on the circumstance 
that would lead to the jihad.328  
Qubt’s campaign against the western culture and their system describes his struggle as 
a radical reformist. Some reformists amongst his rank proposed to seek for the 
transformation of society on a gradual basis through preaching and intellectualism,329 
but Qubt literature suggested a radical approach calling on leaders to either accept the 
proposed system or step down from the positions they hold.  The step taken by Qubt 
on imposing Islamic law was regarded as a late decision. Because in his early struggle, 
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he was a moderate advocate of the Muslim Brotherhood who see politics as the only 
alternative for the Brotherhood to attaining power.330 He began his radical struggle 
against the state when the Egyptian government planned to suppress the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the mid-1950s. However, scholars and other commentators have failed 
to situate Qutb in the historical and intellectual milieu or ambiance and have 
consistently introduced Western-sponsored evaluation of him, which seemed unfair in 
their analysis. Zimmerman depicted Qutb as one of the architects of contemporary 
Islamic extremism.331 Zimmerman took a hard view of Qutb and noted that Qutb’s 
writings provided an intellectual justification for extreme sentiment against the West 
and that Qutb provided an explanation for ousting the entire global governments, 
which included the states ruled by Muslims, through the use of global holy war.332 Far 
from the harsh criticism of Qutb by Zimmerman, other scholars, writers, and 
commentators were fair in their assessment of Qutb and presented a more balanced 
view of Qutb been scholars or writers who knew much about Qutb’s intellectual 
pedigree. Calvert opines that Qutb would never have approved the killing of civilians 
and said that Qutb restrained himself from using the word kuffar, meaning unbelievers 
for the general culture of the age and not individuals in their description who was the 
common practice of Islamist groups.333  Christopher Howarth notes that it is clear that 
while Qutb’s writings to some extent provided the grounds for radical Islamic 
extremism in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s noticeably because of their black and white 
separation of human societies into Islamic and jahili, that is, ignorant and his 
recommendation of non-defensive jihad against illegal governments, Qutb has been 
negatively misrepresented by writers since he died.334 Calvert notes that much of the 
uninformed and harsh criticism of Qutb stems from the ambiguity surrounding Qutb's 
works or writings.335 Calvert noted that one of Qutb's writings entitled ‘Milestones’ 
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alluded to taking all action necessary to emancipate mankind, and this view gave rise 
to the emergence of highly radical interpretations of his work. 
Bergesen noted that Qutb held this view because of his incarceration, which perhaps 
hardened him and Qutb’s appeal for arms use.336 Howarth notes that for an 
understanding of Qutb and what he stood for, there is a need to flash our minds back 
to some of the earliest works written about Egyptian Islamism.337 Howarth noted that 
the starting point would be ‘The Prophet and Pharaoh, written in 1984 by Gilles Kepel. 
Howarth notes that this book kick-started the polemics concerning the interaction 
between the West and Islam, which influenced succeeding or following conversation of 
Qutb and his legacy, and commenced a very provocative discussion looking at the 
work entitled Orientalism by Said, which argued that western countries have from the 
beginning held perception of Islam with a combination of obsession and abhorrence.338 
Howarth notes that Kepel's objective is intended to take up the challenge to Western 
categories of thought that the Islamicist Movement presented as a challenge, resulting 
in an unequal event such as the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 as well 
as the 1979 Islamic putsch in Iran.339 Because of Egypt's significant position in the 
development of Islamist movements, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood, Kepel 
chose to commence his discussion with Egypt.340 In his book, Social Justice in Islam 
Qutb noted that what is Caesar’s is to Caesar’s and what is to God is to God, and this 
assertion has been extensively cited in academic works and discussion.  
However, what Qutb tried to do was to stress the connection between politics and 
religion in Islam.341 However, some scholars nevertheless animadverted Qutb because 
of this assertion. Calvert notes that scholars frequently comprehend Islamism by 
alluding to its effectiveness as an avenue for material disaffection and their failure to 
accept the religious motivations that steer many, if not most Islamist, and Calvert 
 
336 See Bergesen, A. J. ‘The Sayyid Qutb Reader. Selected Writings on Politics, Religion, and 
Society’ (2008, New York: Routledge) 5. 
337 Ibid at p 3 
338 See Kepel, G. The Prophet and Pharaoh in Rothchild J. (1985, The Thetford Press Ltd, Thetford, 
Norfolk, UK) p.21 
339 Ibid. 21 
340 Ibid. 21 
341 Ibid. 4 
88 
 
concludes in the world of Qutb, God is genuine and very dear.342 This contradiction 
emanates from Qutb’s own making. For example, writing in Milestones, Qutb stated 
that the detractors or the believers might contemplate changing this struggle into a 
political, economic, or racial struggle, and they must, however, accept that this is a 
trick.343 Calvert notes that such a functionalist interpretation of Islamist movements has 
value.344  Calvert used a biographical, chronological structure and a lengthy isagogic to 
identify both the Western and Islamic dominations of Qutb’s thought and trace it back 
to the Jacobins whose insurrectional ideas Qutb inculcated and repackaged in Islamic 
construction.345 Calvert offered an explanation of Qutb’s experiences mainly because of 
his journey to the US and incarceration, and not for his intellectual influences.346 
Calvert opines that Qutb discussion on the US exemplifies Orientalism in Reverse and 
ipso facto defining the typical Islamic society which responds or reacts to a Western 
attitude.347 Calvert notes that Qutb’s American study adventure was not the turning 
point in Qutb’s career as some commentators have asserted and reinforced and an 
initiated Islamist predilections.348 Calvert notes Qutb’s radical Islamist inclination dates 
back to 1950 due to his arrest and torture in Egypt.349  
Furthermore, a different focus on the life of Qutb came from Musallam.350 Musallam 
describes Qutb’s sojourn in the US as very prominent in Qutb’s beliefs and attitude 
against the West. Musallam notes that what Qutb observed as well as his perception of 
his trips reinforced his prejudged views regarding the moral decadence of the 
civilization of the West which before his arrival in the US he had written about.351 
However, according to the advocates of jihad, especially in classical time, asserts that 
Muslim scholars and political leaders discarded what the concept of jihad means in 
Islam; with such castoff, the global community is witnessing a high rise to different 
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jihadists and their splinter groups across the board who have no regard what the 
consequences of their actions would be on the society. 
Similarly, the Iraq invasion by the led government of Bush in 2003 made Salafi-jihadist 
elements expand the brutal nature of their struggle against the western bloc and some 
Muslim states that supported the incursion. However, salafi-jihadism started its violent 
campaign during the Algerian Civil War but became more concrete and coherent 
during the Gulf War. What comes out after the invasion was the vicarious bondage of 
private citizens who were punished on account of the shape practices of their 
government.352 Interestingly, the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria appears to be 
fascinations of events that happened in some Muslim dominated states and the 
perception that the western hegemony conspired and controlling the north, especially 
the Muslim dominated territories, because of the pervasive corruption, impunity, 
nepotism, and political instability among others not considering the secular and 
complex nature of Nigeria.  
The irony of this erogenous position of the salafi-jihadist is that they denounce or 
rejected the use of the term salafi-jihadist.353 For instance, in the words of Omar 
Haddouchi,354 one of the jihadists that “the imagination of the atheist media, “they 
coined the phrase Salafi-jihadist to define those that engage in the cause of Allah. He 
further posits that the negative connotation of the phrase situates them in a debauched 
spectrum in the society; why not use the phrase to describe true believers like us. 
According to him, we pray, we perform pilgrimage to Mecca, we perform fasting 
according to the laid down laws of Allah why would not they coin phrases such as 
salafiyya praying, salafiyya- pilgrimage to describe them.355 This group of salafi believe 
that their struggle is for the cause of Allah.  One of the developmental episodes of 
salafi-jihadist was the identity crisis that followed in Saudi ruling dynasty alliance with 
United States to repel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.356 This development led to 
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serious unrest in the Middle East by the supporters of Saddam even within the 
kingdom of Saudi, some leading scholars were harassed and arrested. 
However, salafi-jihadist has been trying to develop their intellectual capacity even 
before the Second Gulf War for a very long period. Different ideas were said to have 
developed in reaction to the unrest in which the jihadist's widespread movement at that 
material time.  Under Hassan Al-Turabi leadership, the jihadists regrouped in Sudan 
and keenly examined how their countries of origin were collapsing in a different way 
because of incursion of hegemonic bloc and their allies.357  The exigencies of these 
crises, cruelty, and detention pushed the salafi- sophists to forecast and propound the 
nature of their future struggle against the enemy and how they intend to realize such.358 
Sudan used to be the recruiting centre for the jihadists where they developed their 
ideology at embryonic stage before transmigrating to Afghanistan and formed what we 
have today as al-Qaeda.359 With this trend, it was evident that the jihadist moved their 
base from the Arab states and spread their venom across the globe because of the 
advancement of communication technology.     
However, it is essential to dwelling briefly on the writings of one of the precursors of 
Qutb, Ibn Taymiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah was the real founder of salafi-jihadism.360 He 
was a fourteen-century scholar of Islamic thought. A Turkish by nationality studied 
both secular and Islamic education and followed the teaching of Hanbali Islamic 
monotheism.361  He lived when Islam was said to be tumultuous in ascension and 
challenged the Mongol invasion of Syria and Iraq.362 He demanded that Muslims 
propagate and spread Allah's message (jihad) to the Mongol nation. Taymiyyah 
challenged the authority to introduce new things that were contrary to the teaching and 
beliefs of Islam, which created a delinquent between him and the authority.363 He 
despised any discursive reasoning to reach any ruling on the innovation that was in 
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contrast with the teaching and practice of the prophet and his companions. For 
instance, some of the innovations he scorned were the visitation by the Shiite adherents 
to tombs of either companion of the prophet or saints that existed at the time of the 
prophet.364 This was another form of worshipping idols as practiced by the pagans 
before the advent of Islam. He, therefore, demanded that Islam should be practiced the 
way the prophet and his companions practiced and teaches umma to do, not to 
innovate a new thing that contrasts with the teaching and understanding of Islamic 
theology. His firm belief and disdain to innovations led to his imprisonment, and he 
later died in 1328 in Damascus.365  
Consequently, four centuries after Taymiyyah, a Saudi reformer Ibn Abdul Wahhab 
expounded on the former’s teaching of salaf and demanded that society return to 
Islam's puritanical form as practiced in the days of the prophet and his companions.366 
Just like his mentor Taymiyyah, Wahhab had series of trouble with Saudi authority for 
instance, he sarcastically destroyed the tomb of one of the companions of the prophet 
on one occasion and spearheaded the stoning of a woman who committed adultery. 
On that premise, he was banished from the region and hence, met the founder of the 
ruling dynasty of the kingdom of Arabia Ibn Saud.367 Both Saud and Wahhab formed 
an alliance and agree that Wahhab becomes the head of religious affairs while Saud 
becomes the military commander of the region, which subsequently paved the way to 
the establishment of what we have today as Saudi Arabia governed by the Saud 
dynasty.368  
Thus, it is believed that such an alliance between Saud and Wahhab exist to the 
present time. The puritanical concept of Wahabbi Islam in Saudi Arabia, enjoys the 
state patronage and also formed part of the educational curriculum where it sharpens 
and remains part of daily life of people. For instance, today in the kingdom once a call 
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that forms part of the culture is that women are not allowed to move freely without 
male guardian who must ensure their protection in case of eventualities, though the 
present leadership in the kingdom has abrogated such stand and opted for the 
amendment of the royal decree. Banning of drinking and sale of alcohol is prohibited 
in the kingdom and its environs, even though, such law is also prohibited in Islam. All 
these formed part of the puritanical conception of Wahhabi.369  
However, after Wahhabi austere concept in the Arabia peninsula, his style of Islamic 
teaching spread and adopted by the founder of Muslim Brotherhood Hassan al-Bana 
who like Wahhabi was adherent of Hanbali school of thought.370 Bana's new approach 
was more of militancy because of the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 that made him 
become perilous in his struggle. The experience he gained during his struggle put him 
as a nationalist as well as a political figure when he formed the Muslim Brotherhood in 
1928.371  
Muslim Brotherhood began as a charitable organization just like Boko Haram in 
Nigeria. Unlike the latter group, the former allied with some renowned business 
empires, associations, and mosques to oppose British domination. He adopted a style 
of propagating Islam and related to pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism, and anti-
colonialism such style makes him reverberate powerfully with the people.372 With such 
trends of events, Muslim Brotherhood continued to be vibrant and consolidate on their 
struggle and perhaps posed a threat to the Egyptian monarchy. Following the 
Palestinian revolt of 1936,373 the group became popular and reckoned by in Arab 
republics. The Brotherhood supported Palestine by mobilizing people to fight in the 
1948 Arab Israeli war. In 1948 the Egyptian monarchy noticed how stronger the group 
 
369 Ibid. 
370 J Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (Columbia University Press, 2010) 
23. 
371 S Maher, Salafi-Jihadism-The History of an Idea (Penguin Random House, 2016) 72. 
372 Natana J DeLong-Bas, Wahhabism Islam: From Revival and Freedom to Global Jihad (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 7 
373 J Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (Columbia University Press, 2010) 6. 
93 
 
was and, hence proscribed the movement and Bana assassinated in a dramatic 
circumstance in same year.374 
The issue of religious extremism became prominent to the international community 
after the 1990s Cold War, notably in the Middle East region. In the words of 
Huntington, the “clash of civilization.”375 The idea of the concept of jihad perceived by 
the terrorists came into the spotlight after September 11, although it has never been 
there in the Islamic catechism since the advent of Islam in 1440 years. The fact about 
the doctrine of jihad during the early days of Islam is that it did not exist at the 
embryonic stage; the first jihad that appeared was when prophet Muhammad migrated 
to Medina thirteen years after Islam's existence that jihad was introduced.376 The 
introduction of jihad into Islamic doctrine in the early days was done to protect and 
safeguard territories.   But the orthodox scholars of Islamic jurisprudence such as Ibn 
Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Abdul-Wahhab have conceptualized the doctrine and, 
hence some Islamist adopted it as an idea to perpetrate evil against humanity.  For 
instance, Zarqawi former leader of al-Qaeda contends that, “our ideology is spreading, 
thank Allah, and all the young people of the umma {Islamic states} are receptive to this 
ideology which is, as we said, the ideology of Islam, not just the ideology of al-
Qaeda.”377  
However, the jurisprudential stance of Ibn Nuhaas on the concept of jihad contributed 
to the fiercer nature of the terrorist organizations especially Al-Qaeda. The latter has 
proclaimed that jihad should constitute an article of faith,378 that is, Iman. He further 
suggested that “if it weren’t for Allah checking the nonbelievers through the believers 
and giving the authority to protect Islam and break the armies of disbelief would have 
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reigned on the earth, and true religion would have been eliminated. This proves that 
whatever is in this status that is, jihad deserves to be a pillar of Iman.”379 
We could see from the above quotation how his fatwa influenced these fighters. Al 
Qaeda leaders and their sister organizations such as ISIS and Boko Haram often use 
this fatwa to consolidate their violent struggle. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda 
contended that after proclaiming Shahada (Iman) the next pillar of Islam ought to be 
jihad.380 He believed that jihad should have included as the second pillar of Islam381 
because there is nothing more important than waging a jihad against nonbeliever who 
rejects Islamic faith. Similarly, Abu Qatada one of the arrow heads of al-Qaeda argued 
that God created human being to worship only, and as such, whoever becomes defiant 
to God, jihad should be waged against such fellow.382 He opined that jihad is the 
commandment for the establishment of the religion of Allah for humanity and 
anything short of that gets to the way of Allah. In his own part, Azzam contended that 
some see jihad as a new phenomenon under Islamic catechism but the latter has been 
in existence since the emergence of Islam and as such should be regarded as one of the 
core fundamentals of Islamic principle and anything out of the ordinary, should be 
rejected conscientiously.383 Yusuf al-Uyayri shared a similar view with Zarqawi that 
jihad is not just a fundamental principle of Islam but rather one of the cardinal features 
that has been in practice since the emergence of the Islamic faith. Both leaders of these 
Islamist groups argued that jihad would continue to supervene on the surface of the 
earth till the time of resurrection.384  
Additionally, the Brotherhood was pivotal to the emergence of jihadism in the Middle 
East. The Brotherhood employed the concept of merging the pan-Arabism and pan-
Islamism in their struggle with persuasive anti-colonialism. The group was not 
unenthusiastic to discourage its adherents to fight in the course of Islam and Arab 
world whenever the situation prevail itself. The fact that the group has massive support 
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and carries heavy weight in the political persuasion of Egypt, makes it explicitly 
eminent for all governments to maintain the proscription of the group until after the 
exit of Mubarak’s government in 2011.385  
Muslim Brotherhood, unlike Boko Haram and Islamist al-Nahda Renaissance Party in 
Nigeria and Tunisia, has solid charitable and educational facilities due to the 
significant financial support it enjoyed from Salafi-Wahhabist of the Arab world.386 
According to these groups it solidifies it struggle in defending Islam and Arabs 
worldwide, on that premise the group continued to maintain and believe to be a key 
player in the political discourse of Egyptian society. Although, they were schemed out 
of the political events of Egypt387 for a while, until 2011 when the late President Morshi 
emerged. The sequence of the Brotherhood crusade resulted in imitating them where 
many Islamists adopted the name in their states. For instance, at the embryonic stage 
of Boko Haram they adopted the name Muslim Brotherhood of Nigeria.       
Consequently, this part of the chapter analyses in brief the central argument of 
defensive and offensive jihad in order to know the classification that these Islamist 
terrorists fall under. In the case of offensive jihad, it is generally accepted by both 
normative Islam and salafi-jihadists that if someone is found culpable of the offence, 
only established authority such as caliph can sanction such a person while the former 
has some rules that apply to it because of its reactive nature emanating from external 
antagonism. From a historical perspective, we can see that defensive jihad has 
vigorously been utilized during the invasion of Baghdad by Mongol led by Hulagu 
Khan who led the Mongol to capture Baghdad and killed the last caliph from the 
descendant of Abbasid. Mongol hurriedly ran and invaded Baghdad following the 
interval in the appointment of the caliph until the ascension of al-Mustansir who later 
moved the seat of authority from Baghdad to Cairo. Following the vacuum created 
after the invasion of Baghdad and subsequent massacre of the people including the 
caliph, people continued to resist the Mongols with irregular and voluntary campaigns 
 





until the formation of the army by the new caliph al-Muntansir.388 The concept of 
defensive jihad in Islam became necessary following the circumstances that led to the 
jihad in the classical era. Some scholars of Salafi background such as Albani thought it 
was appropriate to address some misconception of the doctrine of defensive jihad 
within the Salafi community. Like other advocates, Albani does not distance himself 
from the general concept of jihad389, but intrinsically opined that once there is no leader 
to declare jihad, then, it should be suspended in all circumstances in the absence of 
amir. Albani’s position on this subject is that once there is no leader to preside over 
umma is an indication that the underlying problem would be weighty. This unreceptive 
tendency was reflected during the early stage of Islam when the prophet Muhammad 
spread his monotheism message in Makkah before migrating to Medina. The prophet 
was in medina when he received a divine revelation regarding the concept of jihad.390 
Albani reasoned that “to do the jihad we need amir, to get this amir we must work on 
the tasfiya and tarbiya.391” 
 Furthermore, when critically examining Albani’s concept of declaring jihad in Islam, 
he is not condemning it but instead arguing that it should be deferred while people 
strive for better accomplishment. In his words  
“Jihad is, without doubt the pride of Islam and the basis of Islam, and the verses and hadith 
regarding this are known to everybody inshallah (God willing). But this jihad has its (own) 
conditions and introductions”.392 Albani viewed the political and sharp drop of Muslims 
inffuences emanating from lack of wisdom to realize the benefits of aqida through al-
tasfiya wa-l-tarbiya.393 He maintained a tacit and constant view and equally issued a 
contentious fatwa urging the Palestinians to leave the west bank for Israeli because 
they would not be allowed to practice their deen (faith) correctly. Muqbil bin Hadi al-
Wadil’I one of Albani’s students contends that the sovereignty of the southern Yemen 
from the British has no basis, largely because the foundation of the Yemeni 
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government resulted in producing a communist state that denies Muslim adherents 
practicing their faith. Although, his view was considered inimical within the Salafi 
community who see defensive jihad as being routinely authorized once attacked by an 
enemy.394  
3.6 OPERATIONAL MODES OF BOKO HARAM  
Boko Haram a terrorist group claiming to operate under the guise of the Sunni Islamic 
movement, has killed approximately 20-30 thousand people in Nigeria, Cameroon, 
Chad, and Niger since the beginning of their violent act in 2009 to date.395 Thousands 
of lives have been lost amid the broader crisis resulting from the acts of the group. 
People of all faiths, mostly civilians, have fallen victims to hunger and chronic 
diseases, and over 1.5 million people in northeastern Nigeria now face pliancy.396  The 
fiercer battle between the group and the government security operatives has aggravated 
the conflict. The rejection of the group to surrender their deadly and gratuitous struggle 
against the state, necessitated the classification of the group as one of the deadliest 
jihadists in the world.  
The group has been operating peacefully in Maiduguri, preaching Islamic tenets as a 
Salafi movement before it eventually turned violent in 2009. Salafi doctrine focused 
more on the historical period and viciously examined how modern society should be 
ordered. Salafi is believed to be a movement ascribed to pious followers of the 
companions of the Prophet (PBUH)397 from the fourth generation. They support full 
implementation of Islamic law “Sharia” and vehemently opposed any innovation to 
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the religion of Islam which is referred to as bid’ah.398 Saudi Arabia became a centre of 
the movement by accepting any transmitter of disseminating Salafis ideology, and on 
that premise, the founder of Salafi movement in Maiduguri, Lawal truant his way to 
the kingdom.399 The movement, especially towards the end of twentieth century 
proliferate globally and in some countries like Nigeria became localized.  
The question is that who are the Islamic thinkers that shaped the minds of Boko 
Haram? This question becomes necessary to analyze the development of modern 
Islamism, which argued that to be a pure Muslim, you must live in a Muslim-
dominated society where Islamic law operates. In answering the above question, we 
need to view how the development came into being. It began in a modern form in the 
19th century with Al-Afghani after the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood. During the 
19th century, colonialism became a severe issue for emerging society’s especially 
Muslim-dominated territories, where knowledge in administering societies has 
declined. By that, Afghani fought for religious and political reforms of the Muslim-
dominated states and recommended an interpretation of the original Muslim scriptures 
such as the Quran and Hadith.400 Unlike Qutb, Afghani consolidated his struggle on 
liberation, unity, and revolution of Muslim territories, and he opposed colonialism 
despite his apparent interest in politics. His firm position on the unity of Muslim, 
Afghani called on the understanding and solidarity amongst Muslim brethren 
especially the shite and Sunni division as their division was not characteristic of Islam. 
His vehement idea of the liberation struggle against the west and proliferation of Islam 
to the rest of the world was in contrast to Qutb who believed that jihad be waged 
against whoever that stand on the way of Islam. The former was diplomatic in his 
dealings as he opposed any idea of propagating Islam against the people's will.  
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3.7 BOKO HARAM, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGICAL COVER WITH 
RELIGION   
Religion and politics in Nigeria are highly contestable and susceptible phenomena. The 
descriptive power of religion and comprehension of religion on individual belief and 
faith remains a difficult task for many analysts to examine the jihadist movement's 
religious content. Some analysts staunchly distance jihadism from the core 
fundamentals of Islamic doctrine. It is unlikely to rule out that the leaders of Boko 
Haram and their adherents believe in the struggle of the group despite the leadership 
concomitant religion ideology. The northeastern region where the prevalence of the 
acts of Boko Haram is fashionable, happens to be a region where religious circle is 
pervasive, and youths in their tens acquire such knowledge.401 Some of these youths 
joined the violent struggle of Boko Haram with the view of understanding religious 
issues. In one of the early videos of Boko Haram surfaced online, the erstwhile leader 
of the group Muhammad Yusuf was seen preaching and responding to questions 
regarding the subsisting sects of Islam.402  
However, at the beginning of Boko Haram violent struggle, the religious ideas of Yusuf 
and other hardcore leaders of the group caused stern apprehension amongst them,403 
and this is mostly because of the former’s extremist view about religion. As the 
movement continues, Yusuf was able to have a grip of the group; hence, all the 
hardline voices pledged their full loyalty and forged ahead with the movement. The 
group’s early movement's analytical view indicates that the group's hardline voices did 
not embark on this struggle for power's sake but rather to fight one of the most 
powerful state in the African sub-region with the view to imposing sharia law.404 
Indeed, Boko Haram’s struggle has marked with series of tangles, especially long 
existing hatred among the brethren residing in the same community, and so much 
eventualities that looks incongruous to treat each other as rational actors who could 
laid-back the consequences of their actions.  
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Compassionately, religion has become part and parcel of jihadism in the vernacular of 
the Islamist. In reference to notoriety of Islamic States, Hamid Shadi contends that 
“religion matters a great deal to jihadists:” “It inspires supporters to action; it affects 
the willingness to die (and, in the case of ISIS, the willingness to kill); it influences 
strategic calculations and even battlefield decisions.”405 As one study of jihadists in 
Pakistan has established, “religious ideals can influence individual and collective 
choices” when those ideals have “moral or practical appeal for the believer” and 
“when the prescribed beliefs were repeatedly seen to help address the everyday realities 
of life.406”This development is similar to how the defiant Boko Haram recruit the 
vulnerable youths into their struggle. We have noted a while that the recruitment 
process of all the Islamist movements involves finances and other degrees of 
coercion.407 When carefully examined the role of religion, not just apprises the Islamist 
pomposity but enthusiastically shapes the jihadist modus operandi and it is not 
necessarily mean that their actions represent Islam as a religion. Boko Haram’s 
ideological cover with religion, and its messages needs to be analyzed in this segment 
of the chapter. After carefully listening to hardline leaders of Boko Haram messages 
emanating from social media platforms, it is not wrong to say that their messages are 
well structured speeches. Analyzing such messages is an indication of what the group’s 
movement is all about and how it understands the concept of jihad vis-a-vis translation 
of Islamic literatures.  
In the northern part of Nigeria, owing to the educational backwardness, Boko Haram 
has been able to occupy a complicated niche because of the vacuum created by the 
government to deal with them squarely at the early stage of their struggle. Tracing 
religious fragmentation in northern Nigeria especially from the 1970s to date, and the 
fragmentation of scared authority, paved the way to the emergence of Boko Haram 
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and other social vices confronting Nigeria today.408The initial messages of the group 
were considered less marginal especially by the northern states. Oftentimes, a less 
marginal movement begins with a support from mainstream religious authorities, as 
study has found in Saudi Arabia with Juhayman al-Utaybi,409 but at the same time 
such dissidents can lose support of the religious authority when they opted the road to 
violence. For instance, Boko Haram’s early struggle fits into this classification. 
 
However, this chapter drives two aspects of politics suiting Nigeria’s system of politics. 
People struggle for political positions to control resources, resource flow and decision 
making, which entails who gets what, when and how.410 This type of politics involves 
exerting effort by political actors in the same political platform or coming into alliance 
by other forces in ensuring that a government is formed. The pervasive corruption of 
the Nigerian system turned the political structure as do or die affair. For instance, at 
the build-up of 2007 general elections, president Obasanjo has sarcastically vowed that 
his political party’s candidate must win the election either by hook or by crook.411 This 
type of expression coming from the president is believed to be one that gave birth to 
Boko Haram, and it accompanied by unambiguous questions, like who emerge 
victorious in the elections, and who lost in the exercise, and who were the elements 
used during the politicking? It is essential to critically outline the factor of who gets 
what to situate or illuminate the characteristics of northern Nigerian politics. However, 
as observed from the above analysis that politics and religion are interconnected, 
looking at the struggle to define a society’s values, either through consensus or 
adoption, again, from this perspective we could see that the hardline voices of Boko 
Haram are political figures not for the purpose of controlling people and territory 
where the occupy, but also because they want to redefine what it means to operate and 
in an island where they feel they can institutionalize Islamic law.  Boko Haram wanted 
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to appropriate the Islamic literature (Quran and Hadith) and the teaching and 
understanding of the early scholars of Islamic theology of the northern Nigeria.412 Boko 
Haram’s vehement refusal and recognition of Nigeria’s constitution and national 
symbol, fixation of politics indicates at the early stage that they plan to remake the 
symbolic landscape of Nigeria and its close neighbor.413  
Admittedly, the group’s modus operandi remains huge concern to authority largely 
because of incessant killings and kidnappings in the northwestern region of the 
country. Some analysts believe Boko Haram has transmogrified to something else, 
although, still perpetrate their notoriety in the northeast region. The groups’ financial 
sources, recruitment strategies remain impervious to the authority.  
3.8 IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICES OF BOKO HARAM 
 
In 2011 Boko Haram acts exacerbated in high propensity raising questions about their 
capacity and strength. The question that comes to mind again about this development 
is what kinds of ties do Boko Haram established with the other terrorist groups; and 
were these groups really influences Boko Haram and its hardline voices? Boko Haram 
early struggle was peaceful as indicated in the preceding piece. Although, official 
report surfaced later from the authority that the group had a limited contact with al-
Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.414 Before it became full-blown terrorist group in 
2009, the government of Borno state under the leadership of Ali Sheriff stated that the 
erstwhile leader of the movement Muhammad Yusuf had received financial 
inducement from Bin Laden with the view to launch a devastating war in Nigeria.415 
But such fund according to the state authority stopped coming in, on the suspicion that 
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Yusuf was considered unreliable.416The said funds usually channeled through 
Muhammad Ali who was believed to be one of the vicious disciples of Yusuf who met 
Bin Laden in Sudan around 1992 to 1996.417According to international Crisis Group 
the disbursement of the funds to Muhammad Yusuf transpired around 2002, and this 
claim corresponds with the Borno state government assertion.418The disbursement of 
the funds between Muhammad Yusuf and his disciples’ stern trouble resulting in the 
fractionalization of the group. The leader of the factional group Abu Usamatul Ansary 
confirmed receipt of the fund from top echelon of al-Qaeda to Muhammad Yusuf via 
Muhammad Ali in the late 1990s to early 2000s.419 Ansary claimed that Muhammad 
Yusuf did not channel the funds to it primary purpose (jihad), instead he absconded 
from jihadism. He further contends that it is highly regrettable that such huge amount 
of money went into the hands of people who were not committed to the cause of 
jihadism and vehemently opposed Mujahidin.420    
Ibrahim Harun a national of Republic of Niger was another Boko Haram’s contact 
with al-Qaeda. Harun was a forefront member of al-Qaeda movement who received 
training in Afghanistan and Pakistan around 2001-2003. After his notorious training, 
he fled back to West Africa and began to establish link with Boko Haram with the view 
to coordinate an attack against Nigeria. Harun’s plan was halted stunningly, however, 
his ally was arrested by the Pakistani authority when he tried to communicate with al-
Qaeda in 2004 and immediately Harun left Nigeria to Libya where he was later 
arrested in 2005.421Another Boko Haram’s contact during the reign of Yusuf with al-
Qaeda North African Affiliate was in 2006. Al Qaeda Islamic Maghreb fused with al-
Qaeda in 2006 and adopted the name al-Qaeda in 2007. Boko Haram continue to draw 
inspirations from their activities and operations. 
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Furthermore, the Boko Haram commanders joined by some jihadists covenanted their 
support and allegiance to Muhammad Yusuf.422 Abu Zayd one of the hardline voices 
of GSPC conveyed a letter from Shekau to AQIM’s chief Amir, Abd al-Malik-
Droukdel after Boko Haram’s first attack against the authority in 2009. Thereafter, 
three top members of Boko Haram Abu Muhammad Amir al-Masir, Khalid al-
Barnawi, and Abu Rihana were sent by Shekau to meet with Abu Zayd to harmonize 
the evil acts of Boko Haram and AQIM. Amongst the request put forth, was consistent 
communications between the two movements via different platforms, weapons; funds, 
intercessor who shall be stationed in Niger Republic as well as providing training for 
two hundred jihadists and massive recruitment into the movement.423 The content of 
Abu Zayd’s letter has indicated that hitherto to the first acts of Boko Haram in 2009, 
AQIM has long known the existence of the former. In the letter Zayd acknowledged 
the potent role of Muhammad Yusuf and Muhammad Ali in shaping and providing 
the leadership require of any jihadist movement. Although, Zayd has not clearly stated 
whether he interfaced with the duos like the three mentioned who received training 
with his battalion.424 Despite the plea of Boko Haram to Zayd to assist them with funds 
and logistics, there are no substantial proof to demonstrate that AQIM played any role 
in masterminding Boko Haram’s acts of 2009.  
Additionally, the pivotal role of Muhammad Yusuf leadership of Boko Haram, makes 
him to be regarded as martyr amongst the leaders and adherents of the Islamist groups 
in Africa especially AQIM. This has been confirmed by the group’s condolence 
message after the event of August 2009 where they described Yusuf as martyr.425After 
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the death of Yusuf, a well-established link started between Boko Haram and AQIM. 
Abu Zayd in an explicit statement contend in his letter to Droukdel, from now 
henceforth regular communication between the two groups will commence and 
intermediary will be positioned in Niger to make jihad easier for us.426He further 
confirmed to Boko Haram leadership the nature of training their members will receive 
from his battalion.427With his prerogative powers, Droukdel considered and approved 
the initial request of Boko Haram seeking funding and training for its members, but 
warned that jihad should not be waged against the Nigerian state immediately until 
after studying the atmosphere.428Droukdel came out publicly in February 2010 to 
declare that we are ready to train your sons (abna’ikum) on how to deal with weapons 
and how to help you however we can, whether with men, weapons, supplies or 
equipment, to enable you defend our people in Nigeria.429Afterward his public 
announcement was followed by training of the Boko Haram members in 2010, and 
two hundred thousand Euros (200,000) was released to the movement in July 
2010.430This declaration succinctly laid an inedible foundation for Boko Haram 
resurgence, and from there henceforth its key members began to threaten authority 
with fiercer battle. These members boasted that the group will do all it takes to free 
their incarcerated members who were jailed following the first attack in Maiduguri and 
will proceed to receive training from their allied AQIM.431 One curious question that 
comes to mind is that, did the training received by the members of the movement had 
any impact on their oddity and trajectory? Because the nature of attacks the group 
engaged in doing around 2010-2011 was score settling and assassinations. When it 
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authority and public, Shekau informed Droukdel and Abu Zayd their plan to change 
their mode of attacks to guerilla warfare432    
However, at the twilight of 2011 to early 2012 various kidnappings and assassinations 
occurred in which Boko Haram and AQIM were said to have played a varying role in 
planning the acts. AQIM’s kidnappings of the expatriates in Niamey Niger Republic 
2011 through the help of the former and latter intermediary based in Niger,433 marked a 
watershed of kidnappings in Nigeria. Series of kidnappings by the groups followed 
afterwards; the kidnappings of European engineers in Birnin kebbi, northwest Nigeria, 
and the abduction of their German counterpart in Kano. In confirming their notoriety 
to the world, AQIM released a video of the abducted German national in 2012, 
demanding the release of al-Qaeda member who was arrested while he was soliciting 
funds to the group in Germany. The content of the video did not mention the 
involvement of Boko Haram in the kidnapping saga despite taking place in 
Kano.434Many questions have been asked about the identity of the kidnappers on 
whether they are terrorist or another group taking undue advantage of the terrorist acts. 
The combined efforts of Nigerian security operatives and its counterparts of French 
and Germany yielded no result in their rescue mission as all the abducted people died 
in the hands of the kidnappers, and no ransom was demanded from the Nigerian 
government nor the countries of their nationalities.435Assuming the two terrorist groups 
involved in the kidnapping saga, the early result of the acts achieved nothing despite 
AQIM’s using the tactics for so long in kidnapping Europeans in the Sahel region that 
fetched them million dollars in ransoms.436This trend was viciously adopted by almost 
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433 ‘Une oiste nigeriane dans l’enquete sur la mort des deux otages francais enleves au Niger’ RFI, 
14 November 2011, available http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20111113-une-piste-nigeriane-enquete-mort-
deux-otages-francais-enleves-niger, accessed 19 April 2019. 
434 Both the video and the statement are available at http://jihadology.net/2012/03/23/al-andalus-
media-presents-a-new-statement-and-video-message-from-al-qaidah-in-the-islamic-maghrib-to-the-
german-government-if-they-release-umm-sayf-allah-al-an%B9%A3ari-then-we-will-re/., accessed 
19 April 2019. 
435 See Andrew Walker, ‘What is Boko Haram.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 308 
(June 2012), 10-11, available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf, accessed 20 
March 2019. 
436 Wolfram Lacher and Guido Steinberg, ‘Spreading Local roots: AQIM and its Offshoots in the 
Sahara’, in by Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber, Jihadism in Africa: Local Causes, Regional 
Expansion, International Alliances (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2015 70, http://www.swp-
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all criminal element groups in Nigeria today, travelling by road transportation in 
Nigeria has become a nightmare as a result of the kidnapping and other insecurity 
elements.  
Furthermore, when the group’s financial capacity began to condense, full-fledged 
kidnappings became their lifeline. From 2013-2014, many people were kidnapped, and 
ransom paid especially in some remote corners of northern Cameroon where they 
share boarder with northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram’s bombings of UN Building and 
Police Force Headquarters in 2011 confirmed its link to AQIM. Because the brazen 
assault on these gigantic buildings requires well planning and skills, where in the view 
of many observers the former lacked the capacity to carry out the assault along. One 
cannot rule out that AQIM’s involvement, because the latter group have done similar 
assault on the UN Building in Algiers Algeria in 2007.437 Although neither the AQIM 
nor Boko Haram issue statement of any involvement.438 
 
The existing relationship between the two movements became frosty because Shekau 
turned out to be irrepressible exerting his supreme power over Boko Haram. Shekau 
demonstrated this by sending a diffusive message to AQIM’s leadership appreciating 
their assistance to Boko Haram and further posits that “we see no difference between 
our group and your group and between our jihad and your jihad”439 but remained my 
own man. It can be viewed that from this letter that Shekau was uninterested to 
comment on Abuja bombings. Shekau’s interest in waging war in the northeastern 
region seem not to have gone well with some of the hardline voices of his group as well 
 
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2015_RP05_sbg_web.pdf, accessed 6 
March 2019.  
437 Ansary’s message from Nigeria, does not mean the Abuja bombings, nor are mentioned in a 
significance piece of AQIM internal correspondence from 2012 where one subject being debated 
was whether the organization had succeeded or failed. Had AQIM masterminded the bombings, 
one might have expected the leadership to raise them as an example of its success. See Letter 
from AQIM Shura Council to the Shura Council of the Veiled Men Battalion, 3 October 2012, 
available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international_pdfs/al-qaida-belmoktar-letter-
english.pdf, accessed 22 March 2019. 
438 Ibid.  
439 Letter from Abubakar Shekau to Abd al-Hamid Abu Zayd, 7 October 2010, reproduced in Nasa’ih 
wa-Tawjihat Shar’iyya, 8.  
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as AQIM leadership, mainly because majority of the casualties were Muslim brethren. 
The disagreement between Shekau and some of his lieutenants seem to have 
deteriorated which led them reporting him to the leadership of AQIM.  
They accused him of expropriating money from people especially Muslim civilians and 
practicing (takfir) (declaring some Muslims as apostates) for not believing in his 
movement. Indeed, Shekau also alienated some frontline members of his movement 
for not agreeing in his leadership skills, and these members described Shekau’s 
arrogance as defiance and excess (al-inhiraf wal-ghuluww).440The members further asserts 
that Skekau insisted that no member of the movement should question his authority, 
anyone posed a challenge to him faced expulsion or threat to his life. This ongoing 
tension between Shekau and his lieutenants necessitated the intervention of AQIM 
leadership notably Abu Zayd and Droukdel, but tension remain unresolved, and that 
led to factionalization of the group.441       
In winter 2011, a faction of Boko Haram was formed rejecting the style of Shekau’s 
leadership. The movement, Ansar al Muslimin fi Bilad al Sudan (the Defenders of 
Muslims in the Land of the Blacks). This group was formed primarily to checkmate 
Shekau and to reduce the number of Muslim casualties from the acts of Boko Haram 
and vowed not to apply takfir (accusation of unbelief) “unless there is proof and unless 
all the conditions of such case are existent.”442 The group categorically held that after 
getting approval from the Algerian brothers in the Sahara, referring to AQIM, we 
decided to make it known to the world that we aim to declare jihad against Western 
interest and the Nigerian government who we believe do not act according to the laid 
down rules of Allah and the prophet. This development shows that Shekau’s 
relationship with the leadership of AQIM has not been resolved. Reports indicate that 
after the formation of Ansar in early 2012, its members and AQIM conspicuously 
 
440 Letter from Abu Muhammad al-Hawsawi et al., reproduced in Nasa’ih wa-Tawjihat Shari’iyya, 12 
441 Ibid. 
442 English Translation of the character of jama’at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan, (2013), 
available at http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/jamc481_at-ane1b9a3c481r-al-muslimc4abn-
fi-bilc481d-al-sc5abcdc481n-e28009cthe-character-of-jamc481_at-ane1b9a3c481r-al-muslimc4abn-
fi-bilc481d-al-sc5abdc481ne2809d.pdf, accessed 8 March 2019. 
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controlled northern Mali about 2012-2013.443The statement also claimed that fliers of 
Ansar al-Muslimin were found in a compound belonging to one of the top 
commanders of AQIM Mokhtar Bel-mokhtar in Gao, Mali.444 When thoroughly 
examining this development, one meets a series of questions that do not give positive 
answers or clear the doubt on why members of Boko Haram received training in Mali 
despite Shekau’s loggerheads with AQIM's leadership. Another question again, was 
there reconciliation between AQIM leadership and Shekau for his members to have 
gone to Mali to be trained by AQIM?   
However, in a related development, we noticed a significant watershed of Boko 
Haram’s activities following its romance with ISIS in 2014. The former observed the 
notorious acts of the latter, and hence found some important catalyst and source of 
motivation which the Boko Haram adopts for control of territory. Previously the 
strength and capacity of Boko Haram does not fit-in in capturing a small territorial 
cubicle nor was a village, all it does at embryonic stage, hit and run attacks. But 
considering how ISIS had succeeded in controlling some areas such as Tikrit, Mosul 
and other Sunni territories impelled Boko Haram to adopt such style.445In August 2014 
Boko Haram released a video in which it declared the establishment of Islamic state 
with headquarters in Gwoza local government of Borno state.446This development 
coincided with the ISIL declaration few months before Boko Haram’s own. Observers 
believe it was indicative that ISIL had influenced Boko Haram to shift from its initial 
tactics of hit and run to occupation and control of territory.447 Such strategy yielded 
positive outcome for the movement. This is largely because they were able to occupy 
and control large territories in Borno, Adamawa, Yobe States, and some parts of 
northern Cameroon.  
 
443 Andrew Hinshaw, ‘Timbuktu Training Site Shows Terrorist Reach’ Wall Street Journal, 1 
February 2013, available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100011424127887323926104578278030474477210, accessed 12 
March, 2019. 
444 Jade Hameon, ‘Au Mali, dans la maison du jihadiste Mokhtar Belmokhtar’,  L’Express, 9 
Febrauary 2013, available at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/exclusif-au-mali-dans-
la-maison-du-dijihadiste-mokhtar-belmokthar_1218712.html,  accessed 1 April 2019. 
445 S Simon and AN Akil, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas (C Hurst & Co., 2016) 
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Admittedly, Boko Haram’s acts became interesting to the leadership of ISIL especially 
when the group abducted 278 schoolgirls in Chibok. One of the top commanders of 
ISIL, al-Baghdadi commended the group knowing that the latter group had done 
similar notoriety of kidnapping Yazidi women. Some strategies adopted by Boko 
Haram from ISIL such as media propaganda, confirmed the overwhelming influence 
of the latter on the former.448 It used social media such as twitter to propagate its 
teachings and activities. Since the launching of the twitter handle, their acts have been 
awash in social media platforms. When carefully examined, the media production, the 
videos and choreography of the jihadist anthems that symbolizes jihadism, replicate 
ISIL’s campaigns.449Another strategy adopted by Boko Haram from ISIL, was using of 
different languages in their emerging video messages including English, Arabic, Hausa, 
and French amongst others.   
There was a point that the Boko Haram adopted the name Wilayat West Africa, Islamic 
State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The romance between the groups raised concern 
not only for Nigerian government and its neighbors but including the UN Security 
Council.    
3.9 INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION OF BOKO HARAM  
 
Any state that is politically independent takes its relationship with all member states of 
the United Nations in high regard, mainly because it determines the quality of respect 
that state earns from fellow state and other critical stakeholders at the international 
level. For a state to gain respect amongst the comity of nations, such state most shows 
the core values it holds domestically, especially towards the effective management of 
its citizen’s interest and its contribution to the international peace and security.450 
Nigeria is known for all this, especially its regional role of ensuring peace and stability. 
But unfortunately, the acts of Boko Haram have dented Nigeria’s image 
internationally.      
 
448 Ibid. 35 
449 Ibid.  
450 See Kehinde, in Adefuye, A., Nigeria: Boko Haram and Alamieyesaigha- Effect on Nigeria- U. S. 




The acts of the dreaded Boko Haram have seriously affected Nigeria’s external 
relationship expressly after the U.S, UK and Canada blacklisted the group as one of 
the deadliest terrorist organizations in the world. The implication is that most nations 
have advised their citizens not to travel to Nigeria under any circumstance, particularly 
the northeast region and Abuja where the acts of Boko Haram was fashionable in 
propensity. Such warnings came after two European citizens of Britain and Italy 
lineage (Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara) were abducted and killed by Boko 
Haram.451 The emergence of Boko Haram, and its categorization as an international 
terrorist organization has not only dented the image of Nigeria, but Nigeria is now in 
the class of the countries that have a high prevalence of terrorism in the world 
alongside countries such as Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and this is 
largely because of the unprecedented notorious acts of the terrorists. The problem 
created by Boko Haram implies that Nigeria’s desire to maintain its initial position as a 
giant of Africa and a global player is now dented because it hosts one of the deadliest 
terrorist organizations that ever existed on earth.     
 
However, the implications are too numerous to point out. However, one that is 
commonly regarded as infuriating is Nigeria’s citizens’ negative image at international 
airports in some countries, the security, and other unwarranted checks they go through 
before being allowed to board the flight.452 Recall during a state visit to Ghana in 2016, 
the then US president Obama has openly said to the gathering crowd that, African 
countries should emulate Ghana’s style of governance. Many Nigerians were not 
pleased by that statement as in the first instance; he chooses to visit Ghana instead of 
Nigeria, knowing the latter’s capacity wise and its laudable role in developing peace 
and stability in the continent.  The abduction of the Chibok and Dapchi schoolgirls has 
also spotted Nigeria as a quasi-state because it failed to provide the security of life and 
property to its citizens, as a result, portrayed it negatively at the international level. 
Bariledum observed that the implications of Boko Haram acts on Nigeria's external 
 
451 See The Guardian Newspaper online, Chris McManus Killed by Kidnappers minutes after 
Rescue Mission Beagn, Available at http://www.theguradian.com, accessed 11 October 2018.  
452 Ibid at 89.  
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image are too tremendous as some small countries in the continent are competing 
favorably with Nigeria because of the terrorism issue. For instance, when the position 
of African Development Bank presidency became vacant on two occasions, Nigeria 
indicated interest to occupy but lost to Morocco and Rwanda.453  
 
Furthermore, the high-handedness and arbitrary abuse of people's rights, including that 
of the terrorists by the security forces, has also affected Nigeria's external image. In 
several instances, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have vehemently 
condemned the Nigerian security forces handling of the Northeast’s security situation, 
which is against the provisions of all international and regional human rights 
instruments. Furthermore, Nigeria is regarded as a state that violates the provisions of 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which mandates states to respect human 
rights when combating terrorism. In a similar vein, the military institution that is 
supposed to defend the country from external aggression has demonstrated a lack of 
capacity to do that because the terrorists have shown that they are more equipped and 
have the wherewithal than the former.454 The CNN news of January 15, 2015, has 
corroborated the above assertion. However, the Nigerian government has refuted that 
claim. Such media reportage emanating from CNN has negatively impacted the image 
of the government. Also corroborating the news, Layinan Princeton455 has opined that 
the Nigerian government needs to demonstrate its capacity as a giant of Africa by 
contending Boko Haram, or it risks becoming a hotbed of international terrorism like 
Afghanistan.  
 
3.10 CONCLUSION  
 
From this chapter, Boko Haram is a deadly terrorist group. The development of radical 
Islamic ideologies was intended to form the basis of Muslims' relationship with persons 
 
453 Kia Bariledum, ‘Ethnic Terrorism as a Political Tactic in Nigeria: Implications for Nigeria’s 
External Relations’ (2013) 15(1) Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Studies 325-336. 
454 See CNN News, ‘Nigerian Military ill-Equipped in Fight with Boko Haram’, Available at 
http://www.cnn.com>africa, accessed 19 October 2018. 
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from other religions. However, some groups' dictates and interrelation, thereby finding 
themselves rejected even among adherents of Islamic religion, resulted in ill feelings 
that have been translated into terrorism. Within such an environment, the Boko 
Haram terrorists’ group has emerged and is currently causing severe havoc in Nigeria 
and other neighbouring countries of Chad and Cameroun. The spate of insecurity in 
Nigeria has affected it in all spheres of human endeavours. The perennial hostilities of 
violence leading to bombings of a place of worship, schools, and government 
establishment remains a massive task for authority to address. Therefore, it can be 
distilled from the chapter that the Boko Haram group's activities tantamount to 
violations of human rights. The next chapter will examine these rights vis-à-vis the 
Nigerian government's activities to employ the country's law and policies as counter-




                                           CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0 BOKO HARAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy stipulates that “the promotion 
and protection of human rights for all and the rule of law is essential to all components 
of the Strategy, recognizing that effective counter-terrorism measures and the 
promotion of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually 
reinforcing.”456 There is no gainsaying the fact that terrorism ostensibly presents a 
serious, and real impact on human rights, with damaging and catastrophic 
consequences which affects negatively the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and 
other important human rights. As stated by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights that respect for human rights and the rule of law must be the 
bedrock of the global fight against terrorism.457 This requires the Nigerian government 
to develop a domestic counter-terrorism strategies directed at preventing the activities 
of terrorism, initiate the prosecution of culprits perpetrating the criminal activities, and 
protecting and promoting the rule of law as well as human rights. Nigeria’s counter-
terrorism measures must be aimed at addressing those conditions that births the spread 
of terrorism, as well as the violations of human rights, the absence of the rule of law. In 
other words, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism measures must condemn the violations of 
human rights as well as protect the rights of the victims of human rights violations.458 
 
Human rights can be defined as universal values with an enshrined legal guarantee 
having the objective of protecting individuals as well as groups against the actions and 
infractions committed by agents of the State which meddles with fundamental 
 
456 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and 
Counter-terrorism’, Fact Sheet No.32, (United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy/ General Assembly 
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freedoms, human dignity as well as entitlements.459 The totality of human rights 
encompasses the respecting, protecting, fulfilment of civil, cultural, political, social, 
economic rights etc. The universalized nature of human rights is indicative that all 
human beings participate in the enjoyment of the right. International human rights law 
can be found in customary international law as well as in aspects of core international 
human rights treaties. The core universally-oriented human rights instruments consist 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its 
Optional Protocol, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two Optional Protocol, the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol, the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol as well as the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. In addition to these international human rights instruments, there is 
also the existence of numerous regional treaties dealing with the protection of 
fundamental freedoms and human rights.  
 
States have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the provisions and enforcement 
of human rights. This requires States to take steps to prevent any interference to the 
enjoyment of human rights. States have the responsibility of ensuring that steps are 
taken to ensure that there is no interference by others to the enjoyment of these human 
rights. It is incumbent upon States to introduce appropriate measures such as 
legislative, judicial, educational as well as administrative measures to ensure that the 
legal obligations provided in these human rights instruments are fulfilled. There is also 
an onus placed upon States by human rights to ensure that adequate and efficient 
antidotes are made available where violations have occurred. The fulfilment as well as 
the enforcement of human rights obligations by States parties are assessed by bodies 
 
459 Ibid at p.3  
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established to monitor whether a State complies with its obligations or not, and to 
ensure that individuals exercise their right of complaint to international bodies 
concerning the violations of their rights. There is need to ensure accountability when 
States take measures to counter the activities of terrorism. This is to ensure that there is 
the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism. Terrorism 
exerts a great deal of impacts on human rights and the smooth governance of a 
country. At the same time, measures taken by States to counter terrorism also exerts 
enormous impacts on the rights of individuals to the enjoyment of their human rights. 
Bearing in mind that terrorism has a deleterious and real impacts on the enjoyment of 
human rights, the measures adopted by States to counter terrorism should be 
commensurate and proportional to the crime committed. States should adopt effective 
measures to counter terrorism, and this should not be draconian. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that “effective counter-terrorism 
measures and the protection of human rights are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing objectives which must be pursued together as part of States’ duty to protect 
individuals within their jurisdiction.”460 
 
The Security Council moved briskly to strengthen the legal framework for the 
enforcement of counter-terrorism measures by establishing a monitoring body, the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, with the task of supervising the implementation of 
counter-terrorism measures by States. The need to ensure compliance with counter-
terrorism measures informed the establishment of United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism. The UN Special Rapporteur “affirms the centrality of fair trial to 
the successful prosecution of terrorist acts; the necessity of maintaining the integrity of 
civilian trials for offences of terrorism; the balance that inheres in rules of evidence or 
procedure in national legal systems to the overall protection of fair trials; and the 
importance of distinct spheres of competence for military and civilian authorities in the 
 
460 Ibid at p.19 
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discharge and operation of the criminal law.”461 Moreover, the Special Rapporteur 
“recognizes the significance of fair and human rights compliant trials, the need for 
professionalism and protection of key actors engaged in the prosecution of acts of 
terrorism, and the necessary prosecution of acts that constitute serious violations of 
international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law.”462 
 
The Human Rights Watch in its Report of July 18, 2018 noted that Nigeria’s 
prosecution of suspected Boko Haram members was marred by serious legal 
shortcomings, and the failure of the authorities to prioritize the prosecution of those 
most responsible for the group’s atrocities.463 According to Anietie Ewang, Nigeria’s 
researcher at Human Rights Watch submitted that “Nigeria needs to pursue justice for 
those responsible for Boko Haram’s atrocities and end the prolonged detention of 
thousands of suspects.”464 He went on to report that “however, to achieve justice and 
deter extremist attacks, the Nigerian government’s overall strategy and trial procedures 
need to conform with constitutional safeguards and international standards.” 
 
 
Right from the previous century, human rights have received much attention 
internationally. Ban Ki-moon, a former UN Secretary-General, once said this about 
human rights; “No person should go hungry, lack shelter or clean water and sanitation, 
face social and economic exclusion or live without access to basic health services and 
education. These are human rights and form the foundations for a decent life”.465 
Nothing could better describe human rights than as the foundations of basic and 
enjoyable human living. There are different instruments that have accounted for the 
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need to promote human rights. These documents remain a major testimony for the 
propagation of human rights. Some of the documents are binding by their nature, 
taking the forms of a treaty, while some are primarily soft laws. While some of these 
nonbinding instruments are expressed in a normative form, one can view them as 
having the force of law because they are well articulated as customary international 
law. Human rights law and in particular the rights that are affected during insurgencies 
and in the attempt of the government to quell terrorism are well recognised in treaties 
and as customary international law. Remarkably, the rights contained in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) are very important rights that should be taken 
into account when curbing the menace of terrorism. The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) also seeks to protect the African man's rights in the 
several States of the African continent. In Nigeria, the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999 specifically makes provision for the protection of her 
citizens' rights. These rights are well provided in Chapter II (Fundamental objectives 
and directive principles of State policy) and Chapter IV (Fundamental Rights) of the 
Constitution. Section 13 of the Constitution, which begins chapter II, expressly states 
that: 
It shall be the duty and responsibility of all organs of government, and 
of all authorities and persons, exercising legislative, executive or 
judicial powers, to conform to, observe and apply the provisisons of 
this Chapter of this Constitution.466 
 
Considering the number of Laws seeking to protect the rights of every human on the 
international, continental, and national levels, it is safe to say that human rights is of 
utmost importance to government authorities all over the world and any act that 
derogates those rights are frowned upon. Unfortunately, terrorism, through the deadly 
Boko Haram group has launched a massive attack on majority of the basic and 
fundamental rights of Nigerians, especially Nigerian’s resident in the northern region. 
The infringed rights, because of these acts of terrorism, include the right to life, the 
right to own property, the right against inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to 
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religion, the right to reside in any part of the country as anyone pleases and the right to 
education amongst several others. 
 
4.1 RIGHTS IMPLICATED IN TERRORISM  
 
3.1.1 Right to Life 
 
Right to life is internationally recognised and all sovereign nations are required to take 
necessary steps in ensuring that no man is denied this right except as may be justified 
in international law or the constitution of the land. Section 33(1) of the Nigerian 
Constitution recognizes the right to life as a cardinal human right. It stipulates that: 
‘every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life, 
save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offense of which he 
has been found guilty in Nigeria’. There are certain human rights that are considered 
basic such as the right to life, which no circumstance can justify their derogation. In 
fact, the right to life is the foundation of all other human rights; it is the root from 
which all other rights spring from. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948 expressly enshrines the right to life, stating that ‘Everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and security of persons.467 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 1981 under article 4 acknowledged the same right, also stating that ‘Human 
beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the 
integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right’.468 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides in article 6 
thus ‘Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’.469 
 
 
467 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
468 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 
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Both the Criminal Code Act,470 applicable to the Southern States of Nigeria and the 
Penal Code Act,471 applicable to Northern States of Nigeria, prohibits unlawful killings. 
The Penal Code which is the operative law in the areas affected by Boko Haram 
terrorists defines the offence thus: 
Whoever causes death: 
(a) By doing an act with the intention of causing death or such 
bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or 
(b) By doing an act with the knowledge that he is likely by such 
act to cause death; or 
(c) By doing a rash or negligent act, commits the offence of 
culpable homicide472 
 
With the advent of terrorism in Nigeria, the average Nigerian northerner, particularly 
in the Northeast Region live in the constant fear that his right to life may be taken 
away at any point in time, no matter where he may be, in his home, in the market, on 
a journey, in his farmland or place of work. The fear is constantly there and has 
resulted in the steady migration of many residents to other regions of the country 
considered safe. 
  
 At the Thirtieth Session of the Human Rights Council, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights gave a report on the ‘Violations and abuses 
committed by Boko Haram and the impact on human rights in the countries affected’. 
In his report, he stated that there has been decadence in the enjoyment of the 
fundamental rights of northern Nigerians because of the Boko Haram activities. He 
expressly stated that: 
 
In Nigeria, Boko Haram intentionally killed and maimed civilians in 
attacks throughout the State of Borno and in parts of the States of 
Adamawa and Yobe. Many witnesses reported that Boko Haram shot 
 
470 Criminal Code Act 1916 CAP C38 LFN 2004, s. 315 
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civilians that tried to escape during attacks in Askira Uba, Baga, 
Bama, Damasak, Gombi, Gwoza, Kwajafa, Madagali, Maiduguri, 
Michika and Mubi. The killings were often preceded by death threats 
or an invitation from Boko Haram “inviting” men and boys to join 
them in “the work of Allah”. Those who refused to join were killed, 
and their bodies often left to rot in the streets, in wells or riverbeds.473  
 
Further in his report, the commissioner stated that: 
 
The increasing recourse of Boko Haram to suicide bomb attacks on 
soft targets, such as markets, has led to more deaths in the first half of 
2015 than in the latter half of 2014. Between May and July 2015, 
these attacks resulted in more than 800 deaths in Nigeria alone. On 11 
July, in N’Djamena, Chad, a man disguised as a woman detonated a 
bomb in a marketplace, killing 15 civilians. In July 2015, in Maroua, 
Cameroon, in two separate incidents, girls were used for the first time 
to detonate bombs, one in a market and another in a residential area, 
killing some 20 people.474  
 
The menace of the Boko Haram group has adversely affected many with thousands 
having been deprived of their right to life. On April 14, 2014, on a usually busy 
Monday morning, many Nigerians were shocked to the bones when a bomb blast 
rocked the Nyanya bus park at Abuja, the Nation’s capital, at a time when many were 
on their way to their places of work and the park was crowded and bustling with its 
usual activities. The blast resulted in secondary exposions as fuel tanks of about 40 
vehicles at the Bus park caught fire and increased the carnage. Over 70 people lost their 
lives with over 100 having various degrees of injuries. At the time, this attack was 
 
473 Human Rights Council, Violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on 
human rights in the countries affected (Human Rights Council 2015) para 22 
474 Ibid para 28 
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considered the deadliest in the country.475 In the same year, 27 villagers were killed in 
two separate attacks in the North-East region with Boko Haram claiming responsibility 
for the attacks.476 On 16th June 2019, a Sunday night that was promising to hold a lot of 
fun, while many were assembled at a football viewing center in a market at Konduga, 
Borno State, three suicide bombers detonated their bombs, killing 30 and injuring 
another 42.477 Just very recently, in one of the most heinous attacks on civilians in the 
year 2020, 110 farmers were slaughtered while working on their rice farms in a village 
in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State.478 The attack which took place on Saturday, 
28th November 2020, has been tagged the Zabarmari massacre. 
 
In an effort to curb the activities of Boko Haram, the members of the Nigerian Armed 
forces have been deployed to weak security areas of the country to battle the 
insurgents. However, almost every week, there are reports of ambushes and attacks on 
the military barracks and their convoys, resulting in the loss of lives of many brave 
soldiers. In November 2018, over 100 soldiers were killed in a single attack on a 
military barrack in Metele, Borno State.479 In another attack in March 2020, Boko 
Haram members set up an ambush on a convoy of Nigerian military men, killing 70 of 
them while they travelled near Gorgi village in Borno State.480 These attacks have not 
been limited to ordinary working class Nigerians and military men as even the convoy 
of the executive governor of Borno state, Governor Babagana Umara Zulum was 
 
475 Freedom C. Onuoha, ‘Boko Haram and Nyanya Bomb Blast’ (Aljazeera, 29 April 2014) 
<https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/04/20144299643486571.html> accessed 30 
November 2020 
476 ‘Nigerian violence: ‘Boko Haram’ kill 27 in Village Attacks’ (BBC, 21 May 2014) 
<www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27498598> accessed 30 November 2020 
477 Ismail Alfa, Ruth Maclean, ‘Bomb attack on busy market kills 30 people in north-east Nigeria’ 
(The Guardian, 17 June 2019), https://amp-theguardian-
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attack-konduga-suicide,  accessed 30th November 2020 
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Guardian, 29 November 2020) www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/29/Nigeria-attack-boko-
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jihadist-ambush-military-sources/articleshow/74792149.cms, accessed 30 November 2020 
123 
 
attacked two times within a space of 3 months (July to September 2020). Many lost 
their lives in both attacks with the governor barely escaping death by the whiskers.481 
 
With the increasing record of attacks on citizens of Nigeria, it seems only natural that 
the ancient proverb of ‘he who lives by the sword dies by the sword’ should apply in 
the treatment of the Boko Haram insurgents. It could be argued that the Boko Haram 
insurgents have a right to life too and so should not be killed in any attempt to counter 
their attacks. However, there is a principle commonly used in Law that states that for 
every rule, there is an exception. The exception to the right to enjoy life is provided for 
in section 33(2) of the Nigerian Constitution. The section states that: 
 
A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in 
contravention of this section, if he dies as a result of the use, to such 
extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such 
force as is reasonably necessary –  
(a) for the defense of any person from unlawful violence or for the 
defense of property; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a 
person lawfully detained; or 
(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny.482 
 
It, therefore, follows that those involved in acts of terrorism like the Boko Haram sect 
can be deprived of their own rights to life if they continue to infringe on the right to life 
of others. However, the deprivation of their own rights is hinged on the provisions of 
the subsection 2 as stated above. Either or all of the three conditions must be present 
before anyone can cut off the right to life of an insurgent. The first condition is that it 
must be done in self-defense of a person’s life or property; the second is that it must be 
a measure taken to effect a lawful arrest or ensure that an attempted escape by a 
 
481  ‘Nigeria: Casualties reported following attack on governor’s convoy in Borno state’ (Garda, 26 
September 2020) www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/383451/nigeria-casualties-reported-
following-attack-on-governors-convoy-in-borno-state-september-25, accessed 30th November 2020 
482 Nigerian Constitution. 
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lawfully detained person is aborted; the third and final condition provided for is that it 
must be a step taken only for the lawful purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection, or 
mutiny. In addition, section 33(1) that establishes the right to life of every Nigerian 
also provides an exception. As provided in the section, everyone has a right to life 
except ‘in the execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offense of 
which he has been found guilty in Nigeria’. While section 33(2) provides three 
conditions for which a person may lose his right to life immediately, he commits a 
specified act, section 33(1) stipulates that a person may lose such right after being 
properly tried in a court of proper jurisdiction. In the absence of any of these 
exceptions, any act done by anyone, whether civilian or military, to deprive a terrorist 
of his right to life is an extrajudicial killing and is punishable under the relevant laws of 
Nigeria. 
 
Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that: 
 
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence 
of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in 
accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of 
the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be 
carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent 
court.483 
 
A crime against life is the most serious offence known to humanity; it becomes worse 
when it affects children and women, especially pregnant women. Thus, following from 
the provisions of article 6(2) of the ICCPR, the death penalty is a worthy punishment 
for the insurgents but only if the penalty is carried out in accordance with a final 
judgment of a court of appropriate jurisdiction. However, worthy of note in the acts of 
these terrorists is that these militants forcefully conscript children into their sect. They 
 
483 ICCPR, emphasis added 
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handguns over to them and teach them to use it in destroying lives of people. 
Sometimes, young boys and girls are strapped with Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED), instructed on how to detonate them, and lured into public places to wreak 
havoc on lives and properties around the area. In the 16th of June 2019 incident, which 
resulted in the death of 30, a fourth suicide bomber, a young girl, was caught by 
security operatives while still struggling to detonate her device484. In a situation like 
this, the stand in law worldwide is that no one under the age of 18 should be punished 
with the death penalty. The ICCPR provides that ‘Sentence of death shall not be 
imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be 
carried out on pregnant women’.485 The Penal Code of Nigeria does not even consider 
any criminal act as an offence if it is done by a child less than seven years old or by a 
child who is above seven years but not yet twelve years of age provided that he has not 
“attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequence of 
that act”.486 With the death penalty still in force in Nigeria, terrorists are most likely to 
be punished by death, however, only if the necessary conditions have been observed 
and of course it must exclude children who have not attained the age of maturity as 
well as pregnant women. 
 
The Police Force Order on the use of firearms487 seeks to expound the circumstances 
that would lead to the use of firearms. Section 3 outlines five circumstances under 
which a Police officer is allowed to use his firearms. These circumstances include self-
defense, dispersing or preventing rioters from committing an offence, arresting, or 
preventing the escape of an already arrested person. However, section 6 provides that 
in the case where a riot needs to be suppressed, the leaders should be singled out and 
the firearms should be targeted at their knees and not over their heads. Sections 3(e) 
and 9 empower a Police Officer to shoot at a fleeing person who is trying to evade 
arrest ‘provided the offence is such that the accused may be punished with death or 
 
484 Ibid n. 13 
485 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 6(5) 
486 Penal code, s. 50 
487 Police Force Order 237: Rules for Guidance in use of Firearms by the Police 2019 
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imprisonment for 7 years or more’.488 The Police officer must first issue a warning to 
the fleeing person ‘that unless he stops and surrenders he will fire upon him.’489 
Abimbola Ojomo,490 a former deputy Inspector General of Police, vehemently 
condemned this provision that provides such an empowerment of the use of lethal 
force which does not align with the general provisions of international human rights 
law. To her, since the Nigerian legislation defined in clear terms that once someone 
evades arrest, such a person when arrested will serve a jail sentence of 7 years, the use 
of firearms in trying to arrest such an offender is too grave a step.491 
 
This indicates that the security forces that are saddled with the responsibility of halting 
the activities of Boko Haram do not have sufficient legal documents on rules of 
engagement that guide their modus operandi or regulate their conduct. Where they do 
have such a document, much reliance is not placed on it as the security forces act on 
impulse. This gives them the opportunity to rationalize the extra-judicial killings 
against Boko Haram members wherein they rely on the provisions of sections 33 (2) 
and 45 of the Constitution. 
 
3.1.2 Right to Dignity of the Human Person  
 
The act of terrorism can truncate or affect the right to dignity of persons owing to the 
level of inhuman and degrading treatments that may be received by persons in 
captivity of terrorists or persons who have been attacked. Generally, dignity of a 
person includes any and every quality such a person possesses that is worthy of 
honour, respect and value. The breach of this right includes any act that tends to cause 
shame to the victim. Such an act ranges from slavery to rape, from inhuman treatment 
to a homeless state, from poor standard of living to forced marriages. The list goes on. 
 
488 Ibid s. 3(e) 
489 Ibid s. 9 
490 Abimbola Ojomo ‘Historical Reflections on Internal Control Systems in the Nigeria Police Force, 





There is no strictly defined limit to acts that can infringe on a person's right to dignity. 
If such an act makes the victim feel less equal than other humans, he has been deprived 
of his right to dignity. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Nigerian Constitution all recognize this right as one of a human being's basic 
rights.  
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provision on human dignity is 
that: 
 
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity 
inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. 
All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, 
slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or de grading punishment and 
treatment shall be prohibited.492 
 
This provision is very similar to the first article of the UDHR, which stipulates that ‘All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood’.493 The supreme legislation guiding legal operations in Nigeria also states 
that ‘Every individual is entitled to respect his person’s dignity.494 These laws that 
establish a person's right to human dignity have outlined certain treatments that can 
degrade a person and consequently breach his right to human dignity. The Nigerian 
Constitution, under section 34(1), in defining what could qualify as a breach of human 
dignity outlined that ‘(a) no person shall be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment;  (b) no person shall be held in slavery or servitude, and (c) no person shall 
be required to perform forced of compulsory labor.’495 Under the Nigerian 
Constitution, an infringement on human dignity includes inhuman treatment, slavery, 
 
492 ACHPR 1981, Art. 5 
493 UDHR 1948, Art. 1 
494 Nigerian Constitution 1999, s. 30 
495 Ibid s. 34(1)(a)-(c) 
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and compulsory labour. These degrading qualities are quite similar to what obtains in 
the ACHPR,496 the UDHR497 and the ICCPR.498 Almost on a weekly basis, sometimes, 
multiple times a week, there are reports of Boko Haram attacks on villages in the 
North-East and the North-West regions. Apart from many losing their lives, many of 
the survivors also lose their rights to dignity. Many of the survivors, mostly women, 
and children, are kidnapped and taken to unknown locations. Some of the women 
(including young girls) are then sold and forced to work as slaves;499 some others are 
forcefully married off to Boko Haram commanders for procreation, and the other 
women have the responsibility of cooking and performing cleaning duties in the 
terrorists’ hideouts while the male children are conscripted to join them in their jihadist 
fight. Many others who manage to escape death and kidnap must travel miles to 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps where they live no better than refugees in 
their own country. As at the end of 2019, there were almost 3 million Internally 
Displaced Persons scattered in IDP camps across the northern region.500 At the IDP 
camps, with thousands of people cramped into each of the ill-equipped facilities, there 
are less than enough supplies to cater for all. These people, who once lived what they 
considered comfortable lives, now must live as less privileged people. The lens with 
which they view the world then sees others living outside the camp as more equal to 
life better than they would ever be. 
 
Article 25 of the UDHR provides that: 
 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing, and medical care and necessary social services, and the right 
 
496 ACHPR 1981, Art. 5 
497 Art. 1 stipulates equality in dignity and rights; Art. 4 is a provision against slavery and the slave 
trade; Art. 5 is a provision against torture and cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment 
498 Art. 7 is against torture, cruel and inhuman treatment; Art. 8 states the prohibition of slavery and 
slave trade 
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to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control.   
 
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) 1967 has a similar provision. These instruments make provision for some of 
the most vital needs of a man. In elementary school, every child in Nigeria is taught 
that there are three basic needs: food (which includes water), clothing, and 
shelter/housing. The average Nigerian child grows up to know that without these 
needs, a man cannot survive. These basic needs are what these internally displaced 
persons must struggle for daily. Charity organizations provide medical care and other 
necessities, but they are not enough to go round the thousands of those in each camp 
who long for a good meal. The UN reported that ‘an increasing number of women and 
girls in newly accessible areas of Borno State have resorted to high-risk coping 
strategies like transactional sex in exchange for money or food in order to feed their 
families.’501 In an IDP camp in Bauchi, some children had to resort to eating Onion 
leaves to quell the pangs of hunger.502 At the 2 designated camps managed by the 
Nigerian government at Adamawa State in the North East, IDPs protested the 
shortage of food supply, stating that they ate only once a day.503 In November 2020, 
about 7200 were left without a shelter to lay their heads after a fire incident destroyed 
about 1200 tents in an IDP camp in Borno.504 
 
The standard of living in a major part of Northern Nigeria, especially the villages, has 
always been unreasonably low, and it has now been worsened by the atrocities 
 
501 ‘Women in displacement camps in Nigeria resort to transactional sex for survival’ (UN News, 
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committed by Boko Haram with the raiding of farmlands and the destruction of means 
of livelihood. Everyone has the right to a comfortable means of livelihood to support 
the standard of living he desires to have. Article 23 of the UDHR provides that 
‘Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.’ Article 15 of the 
ACHPR and Article 7 of the ICESCR also support favorable conditions of work. It is 
next to impossible for the average man in these terrorist-ravaged communities to think 
of sourcing for a job of his choice. He is usually left with the option of farming, fishing 
and menial jobs and he does not even have the total liberty of enjoying the proceeds 
with his family. There are reports of farmers who have to pay levies to Boko Haram 
before they can get the authorization to work on their farms or fish in the rivers.505 In 
2018, it was reported that livestock farmers were taxed N2500 and N1500 for cows and 
smaller animals respectively.506 
 
In war-torn and terrorist-ravaged areas all over the world, women are usually the worst 
affected. Even though many women are spared from death unlike their husbands, 
brothers and fathers, they have to face a different level of harassment and inhuman 
treatment. Women have always been seen as sex tools by wagers of war. In Boko 
Haram attacks, they are forcefully taken away from their families to Boko Haram 
hideouts. Unlike other armed conflicts cases around the world, the terrorists desist 
from sexually assaulting the women until they marry them according to Islamic rites. 
The Commanders have the liberty to choose whichever of the women they please and 
sometimes the younger insurgents are given the women in marriage when they are 
thought to be of the age to get married and begin procreation. Survivors who have 
either escaped or been rescued have reported that they are forcefully married to the 
insurgents and raped repeatedly, until they become pregnant after taken to the camps. 
On Monday, 14th April 2014, while Nigerians were still reeling from the last shock, 
 
505 Ahmad Salkida, ‘How Boko Haram sustain operations through international Trade in smoked 
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Boko Haram attacked a Girls Secondary school in Chibok, Borno State, and 
kidnapped 276 girls who were preparing for their exams. A few escaped captivities, 
while it took the Nigerian government 3 years to negotiate the release of about a 
hundred of them. A few of the girls shared their experience of forced marriages and 
childbirth while in the forest hideouts of the terrorists.507 This clearly negates the 
provision of the UDHR, which states that ‘Marriage shall be entered into only with the 
free and full consent of the intending spouses’508 Apart from the fact that young girls 
are married without their consent, they are usually married off as minors contrary to 
Human rights laws that provides that they should be of full age.509 Even after their 
escape from the captivity of the terrorists, many of these girls, some of them with 
babies, face stigma from their communities. One such survivor was called ‘Boko 
Haram wife’ and ‘wife of a killer’ while her son was referred to as ‘Boko Haram 
baby’.510 
 
The activities of Boko Haram have series of reports and testimonies confirming that 
the people have been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. The United 
Nations Human Rights Commissioner in his annual report of 2015 stated that ‘Since 
2009, Boko Haram has subjected women and girls to widespread and severe forms of 
abuse, including sexual slavery, sexual violence, forced marriages, forced 
pregnancies’.511 His report also stated that ‘a Nigerian refugee woman in the Niger was 
abducted in Damasak, State of Borno, on 28 November 2014, and raped by 40 men’.512 
‘Many are unwilling to return to their communities, fearing that they will bring 
dishonour to their families and be rejected by their communities’513 - this is one 
statement that clearly represents what the Human rights laws advocating for human 
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dignity are fighting against. No one should go through so much inhuman treatment 
that he feels ashamed to return to his family for an act that he was a victim of. The 
ACHPR states that ‘The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society’514 and the 
ICCPR provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation’.515 Everyone has the right to belong to a family and share in the 
warmth and love provided by his family members and any circumstance that deprives 
him of this right is a breach of his fundamental human rights. 
 
Despite the clear provisions of these human rights instruments, Nigeria's security forces 
violate the rights of the already shaken people of the communities ravaged by Boko 
Haram terrorism. In that regard, a series of complaints have been forwarded to the 
elected representatives of such communities on the gross violation of their rights to 
dignity.516 All this attest to a violation of the right to personal dignity, which Nigeria 
has codified under section 34 of the constitution.517 Even suspected terrorists still have 
a right to dignity and should not be deprived of it. However, there are usually instances 
where they are subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment due to severe torture 
meted out on them, as well as brutal and extreme measures adopted when taking them 
into custody. No human should be arbitrarily arrested or detained.518 Everyone is 
entitled to his liberty and should not be deprived of this right on the discretion or 
impulse of another. The ACHPR states under article 6 that ‘Every individual shall 
have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of 
his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In 
particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.’519 It is essential that in trying 
to curb the menace of terrorism, the members of the sect should be disarmed and taken 
into custody however that should be done in consideration of their own rights. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that the terrorists have deprived others of their rights, the 
Nigerian authorities have to keep their emotions in check when taking them into 
custody. There are reports of the captured insurgents been assaulted and killed by the 
Nigerian armed forces while in their custody.520 
 
Many of these insurgents are misinformed and fed with lies of heavenly rewards by the 
Boko Haram commanders. Technically, they are also victims who have been robbed of 
their childhood and innocence and lived rugged lives, most times, before they became 
teenagers. One of the escapee Boko Haram ‘brides’ forcefully married while in 
captivity has this to say of her terrorist ‘husband’ – ‘He told me joining Boko Haram 
meant a direct route to heaven, so anybody living with them in the forest would surely 
go to paradise’521 When a person grows up on such a theory, he fights for the cause of 
terrorism believing that he is doing the right thing. In recent times, there has been a 
high record of repentant Boko Haram members turning in their arms and going 
through rehabilitation courses created by the government. Afterwards, they are 
allowed to return to the society, but this move has been strongly criticized by Nigerians 
who believe that it a decoy by the Boko Haram terrorists to gain more access to the 
other parts of the Country that they have not yet captured. With the insufficient 
amount of funds been approved to take care of the Armed forces risking their lives to 
battle these insurgents, it seems like a slap on their faces to rerelease them into the 
society in a ceremonious gathering where food and drinks are served, clothes and 
sandals are bought for the repentant terrorists, and government officials are present. 
While terrorists also have the right to liberty, it is crucial that they are incarcerated, 
taking through psychological classes, and monitored to ensure that they have been 
purged of the insurgency mindset they grew up with. 
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4.1.3 Right to Property 
 
Property of persons can be adversely affected in the course of attacks or even when 
attempts are made to counterinsurgency. Article 17 of the UDHR and Article 14 of the 
ACHPR recognizes this right as key to human rights.522 In a similar vein, section 43 of 
the Nigerian constitution vests in every Nigerian the right to own immovable property 
in any part of the country while Section 44 (1) declares that: 
 
No moveable property or any interest in an immovable property shall 
be taken possession of compulsorily and no right over or interest in 
any such property shall be acquired compulsorily in any part of 
Nigeria except in the manner and for the purposes prescribed by a 
law523  
 
This is one of the rights that Nigerians affected by Boko Haram attacks have been 
deprived of. Both moveable and immovable properties have been forcefully taken from 
their legitimate owners who surrender them without struggle or risk death. The UN 
Human Rights Commissioner reported that: 
 
Entire villages, such as Lassa, in State of Borno, Nigeria, were burned 
down during attacks in December 2014. The extent of such 
destruction was recounted by numerous witnesses who had escaped 
and returned after attacks. Many described how Boko Haram fighters 
had appropriated and resided in their homes and stole their 
possessions and food.524 
 
In Cameroon, it was also reported that ‘some 322 houses had been set on fire by the 
insurgents in villages in the far north region and estimated that 1,922 cattle had been 
 
522 GA resolution 2200A (XXI) 16 December 1966 available at http: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx> (Accessed on 27, May 2018) 
523 Nigerian Constitution 1999, s. 44(1) 
524 Human Rights Council, Violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on 
human rights in the countries affected (2015) para 51 
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stolen’.525 The government is also not left out from these acts of thefts as some of the 
military vehicles and weapons are stolen by the insurgents during attacks on army 
convoys and barracks. On 14 June 2019, Boko Haram attacked a military base, killed 
several soldiers, and stole military weapons.526 In another attack on a military base in 
Jakana, Borno State, ISWAP, a breakaway faction of Boko Haram stole four 
machineguns fitted trucks after killing 14 soldiers.527 
 
Apart from theft and dispossession of properties, another instance where the property 
rights are violated is Nigerians' inability to acquire properties in the terrorist-afflicted 
region. Section 43 of the Nigerian Constitution empowers any Nigerian to acquire 
properties whosoever he pleases within the country. A Nigerian willing to invest in 
properties in the Northeast region has to think twice before making a move because he 
may fall victim of kidnapping by the sect whenever he goes to inspect his investment or 
if he succeeds in buying the property, he may eventually lose it to the attacks in the 
region. 
 
4.1.4 Right to Education  
 
The right to education, be it primary, secondary, or tertiary; has been adversely 
affected due to terrorist operations. The meaning of Boko Haram is ‘Western 
Education is forbidden’. Boko Haram believes that corruption and everything wrong in 
the government springs from the colonization impact of the western world. Their belief 
is that western education is contrary to the teachings of Islam and so in their fight for 
the propagation of the tenets of Islam, they are to destroy western education and 
discourage everyone (boys and girls) from enrolling in schools founded on the 
principles of western education. Their initial targets were Churches (primarily because 
 
525 Ibid para 52  
526 ‘Boko Haram kills ‘several’ soldiers in Nigeria base attack’ (TRT World, 14 June 2019) 
www.trtworld.com,africa/boko-haram-kills-several-soldiers-in-nigeria-base-attack-27492, accessed 
2 December 2020 
527 Agence France-Presse,  ‘Jihadists kill 14 soldiers in attack on Nigeria army base’ (The Guardian, 
17 October 2020), https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/17/jihadists-kill-14-soldiers-in-
attack-on-nigerian-army-base, accessed 2 December 2020 
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they did not practice Islam and because Christian missionaries were used to introduce 
western education to Nigerians), schools, and any organization that represented and 
encouraged the spread of western education.  The group’s acts are regarded as one of 
the deadliest that have hugely impacted child education in Nigeria as their attacks on 
educational facilities, abduction of teachers and students as well as the bombing of 
schools have resulted in an increased number of out-of-school children. 
 
Machel Graca528 contends that denying a basic child education as a result of the armed 
conflict is a violation of the child’s right under all international human rights 
instruments. To him, the attacks on schools and educational facilities deny a child an 
opportunity to be an ambassador for a positive change to humanity. Fafunwa529 also 
contends that education is the aggregate of all processes through which a child 
develops abilities, attitudes, and other forms of behaviour that are of a positive value to 
society. Education enables individuals to acquire appropriate knowledge, values, and 
skills for personal development and also contributes meaningfully to the development 
of the society. Apart from this erudite scholarly view, various international 
conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,530 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,531 the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child,532 the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights533 , and African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,534 acknowledged that education is a 
basic human right of a child.   
 
In conforming to all the international instruments that require states to make primary 
education compulsory, the Nigeria government has put in measures in that regard. For 
instance, the Universal Basic Education scheme introduced by the government saw an 
increase in the enrolment rate of children into primary schools especially in the 
 
528 See Graca, Machel Comment on Child’s Right to Education (1 November, 2018), 
https://gracamacheltrust.org>childrens-ri, accessed 2 December 2020. 
529 AB Fafunwa, History of Education in Nigeria (Routledge Publishers, 2018) 2. 
530 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948, Art. 26. 
531 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1967, Art. 13. 
532 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, Art. 28. 
533 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981, Art. 17. 
534 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990, Art. 11. 
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northeast region. However, the dastardly acts of Boko Haram have affected this 
development.535   
 
The conflict in northeast Nigeria has exposed children to trauma forcing them to leave 
their family homes in a total stage of apprehension. In such a situation they usually 
witness how people are killed with the girl child forced to become a sexual tool in the 
hands of the terrorists and other untoward behaviour. An estimated figure of out of 
school children was put at 1.7 million by UNICEF536 while at the same time teachers 
absconded from duties.537 This unfortunate development has led to the closure of many 
schools in the region whereas the students have either been caught up with the conflict 
resulting in their deaths or they have had to flee to the other part of the country as 
displaced persons.538 One of the worst acts of the terrorists that would always be a 
point of reference is that of Federal Government College Buni Yadi where 59 students 
and teachers were killed and school structures burnt down completely.539 A similar 
incidence occurred at Government Secondary School, Mamudo in Yobe State, where 
more than 42 students and their teachers were murdered and the entire structure of the 
school razed down.540  
 
Before the notorious acts of the group in 2009, the northeast region was educationally 
backward compared to the other parts of Nigeria. A survey conducted by the Nigerian 
Demographic Health Survey in 2013 indicated that the southern part of Nigeria had 
and still has the highest number of student enrolment into both primary and secondary 
 
535 BR Olurunyomi, ‘Millennium Development Goals and the Universal Primary Education in Nigeria 
( A Case Study of Ibadan North Local Government Area, Oyo State)’ [2014] International Journal for 
Asian African Studies 94-101. 
536 (2015) <www.unicef.org/media/media_86621.html> 
537 It has been reported that at Least 198 Teachers were killed by the Insurgents between 2012 and 
2014. See Annual Report of the Secretary General: Children and Armed Conflict A/69/926-
S/2015/409 (2015) 
538 Protection Sector Working Group 2015, available at 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/idp_protection_strategy_ma
rch_2015_1.pdf, 8, accessed 2 November 2018. 
539 http://www.sunnewsonline.com/new/buni-yadi-students-massacre-yobe/, accessed 2 November, 
2018. 




education levels in Nigeria, whereas the northern part recorded low enrolment.541 As 
pointed in the preceding analysis, Yobe state used to be the hotbed of vulnerable 
youths amongst the states of the northeast; the survey by NDHS has confirmed that 
report. The body has indicated that Yobe state has the worst number of out of school 
children of both primary and secondary education in the region. Following the recent 
study in Yobe state to determine the effect of insecurity on education, the study 
concluded that the devastating impact of Boko Haram has cut down the enrolment 
level of both primary and secondary schools by 12%.542 
 
Like the other two states hit by the Boko Haram acts, Borno state, the epicentre of 
terrorism, has equally received its share of its impact since the start of the conflict in 
2009. The conflict has affected basic education mainly because of the collapse of the 
school structures due to incessant attacks on schools, leading to both the students' and 
teachers' deaths. The devastating effect of this has had a huge impact on the enrolment 
of the girl child education because of the incidences of the Chibok and Dapchi girls’ 
abduction in 2014 and 2018 respectively.543 The case of Chibok abduction and the 
more recent Dapchi incidence has discouraged parents from taking their female 
children to school because of the fear of been kidnapped, an act which would 
eventually lead them to become sex slaves of the terrorists.544 It was reported by the 
UN Human Rights Commissioner that ‘The education authorities reported that 338 
schools had been damaged or destroyed between 2012 and 2014 in the States of 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe’.545 
 
In addition, the most affected by the attack are largely schools in rural centres where 
protection of schools is scarcely provided, like the schools in urban centres. Since the 
beginning of Boko Haram acts in 2009, which is regarded as a watershed for the 
uprising in the northeast part of Nigeria, the violence has led to forced displacement 
 
541 See National Population Commission and ICF International Nigeria Demographic and Health 
Survey 2013, available at http://dhsprogram.com>pubs>pdf (Accessed 3rd November 2018) 
542 Ibid at 114. 
543 Ibid. at 115 
544 Ibid.  
545 Human Rights Council, Violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on 
human rights in the countries affected (2015) para 48 
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with a huge social-economic impact on both the residents and the government. As 
pointed out, a large number of the people affected are children and women546, a class of 
victims who are more susceptible and vulnerable to sexual abuses. It is a common 
thing during armed conflicts that sexual and gender-based violence are rampant547, and 
in the northeast region of Nigeria, women who are victims of such acts are usually 
regarded and treated as outcasts by society.  
 
The impact of the conflict on the education and vocational system in the northeast is so 
tremendous, especially noting that schools in that region have been converted to either 
military camps in order to create makeshift barracks for the Nigerian Armed Forces to 
bring them closer to the attacked locations or Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 
centre which are set up to provide a palliative solution for the displaced people. In 
areas where the conflict is not prevalent, the schools become overcrowded and are 
unable to contain the displaced children owing to a scarce or limited existing resource. 
However, in 2016 the World Bank summed the cost impact of the conflict on 
education sector at $273 million, of which 53% was accounted for Borno state alone, 
while the remaining 47% were shared between Adamawa and Yobe States.548  
 
4.1.5 Right to Enjoy Culture and the Environment 
 
One other right people lose during insurgency attacks is their right to enjoy culture and 
the environment. With over 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria is one of the most 
heterogeneous countries in the world, and a sizeable number of these ethnic groups are 
located in the affected area of the Northeast. With the increasing displacement of 
people from their hometowns and villages, there is a tendency for them to lose touch 
with their culture and tradition, and if this continues, these distinct cultures will fade 
 
546 International Organization of Migration 
547 ‘Boko Haram Turns Female Captive into Terrorists’ Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/world/africa/boko-haram-suicide-bombers.html,  accessed 1 
November 2018.  
548 World Bank 2016 
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into extinction. The ACHPR549 encourages everyone to enjoy the cultural life of his 
community without hindrance. The UDHR vests the same right on everyone as well as 
the ICESCR.550 There have been incessant attacks on cultural properties and structures 
that represent the tradition of people. Boko Haram believes that anything that 
represents non-Islamic values is evil and should be destroyed. The Sukur Landscape in 
Adamawa State, one of the only two World Heritage Sites in Nigeria has been 
attacked and the Sambisa Forest Reserve in Borno has been invaded and now serves as 
the hideout of the group.551 One of the residents of the Sukur communities said, ‘they 
destroyed our heritages, most of which will never be recovered. Several generations of 
our parents were buried in those communities, and we found it difficult to leave the 
place simply because of Boko Haram insurgency’.552 This goes to show that there is an 
attachment between people and their cultures. Any attack on their cultural heritage is 
an attack on their memories and the respect they have for their ancestors. 
 
The cultural heritage, which includes the cultural property, of these terrorized 
communities is at significant risk of being destroyed. UNESCO and several scholars 
advocating for the protection of cultural property have stated that the cultural heritage 
of any people belongs to all mankind553 , and destruction of it is likened to the act of a 
madman.554 The UNESCO Convention that seeks to protect cultural property in the 
event of armed conflict provides in Article 3 that State parties should ‘prepare in time 
of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within their own territory 
against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict, by taking such measures as they 
consider appropriate’.555 Nigeria does not have any such preparation for the protection 




549 ACHPR 1981, Art. 17(2) 
550 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1967, Art. 15(1) 
551 Akeem O Bello, ‘Countering Boko Haram Insurgency: Investigating Culture Destruction Attempts 
and Culture Conservation Efforts in North-Eastern Nigeria’ (Ekiti State University) 
552 Ibid 
553 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954 
554 Jiri Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1996 (Dartmouth 
Pub. Co, 1996) 4. 
555 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, Art. 3 
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With the increase in the exposure of dead bodies, constant bombings, shootings, 
village burnings and gunshots in the Northeast, there has been an adverse effect on the 
environment. The right to enjoy a clean and peaceful environment is better explained 
in an article by the UN Environment Programme: ‘Human rights and the environment 
are intertwined; human rights cannot be enjoyed without a safe, clean and healthy 
environment’556 The atrocities committed by Boko Haram have greatly deprived many 
of their right to a clean and healthy environment as the environment has constantly 
been polluted and made unhealthy for a normal human being. 
 
4.1.6 Rights of a Child 
 
Internationally special attention has been given to the rights of children because of 
their vulnerability. Conflict of any nature has a negative effect on humanity 
irrespective of age, gender, faith, and cultural background. However, the vulnerable 
amongst these are children.557 The resultant effect of such act is that children that 
happen to be the victim of armed conflicts usually grow without parental care as the 
conflict has cut family ties making family live independent of each one. These children 
are often exposed to human rights abuses where basic amenities meant for human 
existence such as shelter, education, food, and healthcare services are lacking.558 
Children in the northeast region of Nigeria are a classic example of this narrative. The 
devastating act of Boko Haram in the northeast region has turned these children to 
engage in one act of immorality to another. For instance, those that are internally 
displaced turned into kidnappers, prostitutes, and forced suicide bombers.559  
 
 
556 UN Environment Programme, ‘What are environmental rights?’ (UNEP) 
www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/environmental-rights-and-governance/what-we-
do/advancing-environment-rights/what, accessed 3 December 2020. 
557 U Abdullahi and GTerhemba, ‘Effects of insecurity on Primary School Attendance in Damaturu 
Metropolis Yobe State, Nigeria’ (2014) Journal of Research, Education Sciences 3238. 
558 O Abdulrasheed, A Onuselogu and U Obioma, ‘Effect of Insurgency on Universal Basic 
Education in Borno State of Nigeria’ (2015)  African Journal on Educational Research 490-494. 
559 Ibid.  
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It has earlier been pointed out that children are one of the most affected groups of 
people in the insurgency. There are several laws that advocate the protection of the 
rights of a child and some of these laws entitle a child to the right to enjoy his 
childhood. The period of childhood is a foundation that determines what kind of 
individual a person grows up to be. A childhood without the fun and opportunities 
other children get to experience contributes to the degraded self-esteem an adult 
experience. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 and the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 1990 are vital instruments that 
clarify what a child is entitled to as he grows up. The right to education is one such 
entitlement and has earlier been treated above. 
 
Synonymous to childhood is play, fun and leisure. ‘The right of the child to rest and 
leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child 
and to participate freely in cultural life and the arts’560 is undisputable and should be 
protected. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child also states that a child has 
the right to play, relax and have fun activities.561 It is no news that no matter how 
much children in terrorist-torn zones try to enjoy their childhood, there is always a 
restriction. Most of these children have not had the opportunity to see half of the 
recreational parks that their counterparts in the other parts of the country have seen; 
many do not even have the leisure to play as often as they want because of safety 
reasons. The lack of this right makes a child feel less worthy than others when he gets 
the opportunity to mix with other children. A child also has the right to practice his 
religion as guided by his parents.562 In the abduction of the Dapchi schoolgirls in 2018, 
all of the girls returned to their parents with the exception of six. Five died in captivity 
and the sixth girl, Leah Sharibu, is still in captivity because of her refusal to recant her 
Christian faith and convert to Islam. This is a breach of her right to practice the 
religion her parents brought her up in. 
 
 
560 Art 12 ac on the rights and welfare of the child 1990 
561 Art. 31 crc 
562 Art 14 crc 
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Article 36 of the CRC encourages government bodies to protect a child from any 
activity that is likely to harm his development, and Article 15 of the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the child discourages the use of a child for any labour that 
may harm his physical and mental development. 
4.1.7 Right to Freedom of Thoughts, Conscience, and Religion 
 
The right to freedom of thoughts, conscience, and religion is protected under section 38 
of the Nigerian Constitution, Article 18 of the ICCPR, Article 18 of the UDHR, and 
Article 8 of the ACHPR. Boko Haram seeks to convert everyone, not just to Islam, but 
to an Islamic life that shuns the influence of the western world. That is a move to 
compel everyone to change their line of thoughts and religion. Months after the kidnap 
of the Chibok girls, Boko Haram released a video showing the girls clothed in hijab and 
reciting verses from the Quran. Some of the released girls reported that before they 
were forcefully married off to members of the sect, those who were not Muslims were 
made to convert to Islam first before the “marriage rites” were conducted. On 
Christmas day in 2011, there was a series of attacks on church services in three 
locations across the North with a death toll of about 70 people.563 Boko Haram claimed 
responsibility for the attacks as a mark of protest the Southern-Christian led 
government at the time. 
 
Amongst the northern Muslims, there have been invitations by Boko Haram to the 
young men to join them in their fight’.564 Refusal of this invitation results in the 
invasion of the communities and subsequent killings of the men who are considered 
infidels for refusing to join their cause. Article 10 of the ACHPR establishes that no 
individual can be compelled to join an association if he wishes not to. The freedom to 
join an association is totally a person’s decision and a compulsion to do so is an 
infringement of his rights. 
 
 
563 John Campbell, ‘Boko Haram Christmas Bombings’ (CFR), www.cfr.org/blog/book-haram-
christmas-bombings,  accessed 3 December 2020. 
564 Human Rights Council, Violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on 
human rights in the countries affected (2015) para 22. 
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4.1.8 Right to Freedom of Movement 
 
An inherent right of every individual is the freedom to move as he pleases provided 
that such movement does not disturb the rights of another. ‘Every citizen of Nigeria is 
entitled to move freely throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof, and no 
citizen of Nigeria shall be expelled from Nigeria or refused entry thereby or exit 
therefrom’.565 Without a doubt, there is a limit to which a Nigerian in the Northeast 
can move or reside in places he chooses. Persons in the other regions do not have the 
freedom to decide to live in the Northeast if they wanted to because of the security 
situation there. There are reports of Boko Haram setting up roadblocks566 disguised as 
men of the Nigerian Armed forces, extorting drivers, kidnapping individuals, and 
killing whosoever they wished. 
 
Article 12 of ACHPR and Article 13 of UDHR make similar provision for this right. 
Despite this provision, those in the IDP camps must do unbelievable things to enjoy 
the right to free movement. An online report stated that ‘Women and girls in the 
camps are also increasingly resorting to survival sex, most notably in relation to food 
distribution within the camps or in order to secure permission to leave the camps that 
restrict the movement of internally displaced people.’567 
 
4.1.9 Right to a Fair (and Public) Trial 
 
Right to a fair trial is recognized by both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights568 
and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights569 as fundamental to the 
 
565 Nigerian Constitution, s. 41. 
566 Bukola Adebayo, ‘Caught between roadblocks, they were sitting ducks for Boko Haram 
massacre’ (CNN, 15 February 2020), https://amp.cnn/2020/02/15/africa/nigeria-boko-haram-fire-
auno-intl/index.html, accessed 3 December 2020 
567 UN News, ‘Women in displacement camps in Nigeria resort to transactional sex for survival’ (UN 
NEWS, June 2016) https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/women-displacement-camps-nigeria-
resort-transactional-sex-survival, accessed 2 December 2020. 
568 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 10, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml, accessed on 4 May 2018. 
569 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, Article 7 and 26. 
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enjoyment of human rights. Going by the definition of these legal instruments, the 
right to a fair trial requires that: person(s) arrested for any crime, shall have their cause 
determined by independent and impartial tribunals; and such a person shall be 
informed promptly on the reason(s) for their arrest and charges against them; persons 
arrested shall be promptly brought before a judge of competent court of jurisdiction, 
and their cases tried within a reasonable time; and person(s) charged with criminal 
offense shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty by the court or tribunal of 
competent jurisdiction. The right also posits further that the person arrested shall be 
given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defense and communicate 
in confidence with the counsel of their choice; cross-examine the witnesses against 
them and obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their behalf; have free 
assistance of the interpreter if they cannot speak the language used in court and be 
guaranteed the right of appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction. 
 
Similarly, section 37 of the Nigerian constitution makes explicit provision of the right 
to a fair trial just as article 5, 6, 7 and 26 of Principles and Guidelines for a Fair Trial 
and Legal Assistance in Africa adopted under the ACHPR570. Hence, Nigeria adopted 
this mechanism on fair hearing by ensuring that there is a platform for the enforcement 
of this provision of this section of the constitution and the avoidance of its violation. 
Since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, hundreds of their members have been 
arrested by the security forces and incarcerated in various security facilities across the 
country. An attempt by Amnesty International to ascertain the exact number of those 
arrested proved abortive,571 largely because of the sensitive and complex nature of the 
security operations at the time when their acts had escalated to the amoral stage. 
Amnesty International gave a rough figure of 200 Boko Haram members572 jam-packed 
in just one of the security facilities in Maiduguri belonging to the Nigerian army and 
over 100 of them573 detained in a police station in Abuja and others scattered in 
 
570 ‘Principles and Guidelines on the rights to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa’, 
http://www.Afrimap.org/English/images/treaty/ACHPR_Principles&Guildlines_FairTrail.pdf, 
accessed 17, April 2018. 





detention centre across the country. All the treatment meted to Boko Haram members 
is a clear violation of the Principles and Guidelines for a Fair Trial and Legal 
Assistance adopted under the ACHPR as well as the Nigerian constitution.  
 
Furthermore, as observed that acts of Boko Haram breaches all human rights 
provisions, their arrest and illegal detention by the security forces without trial, is a 
clear violation of section 35 of the Nigerian constitution which provides that every 
person has a right to personal liberty. Although, some of their members that have been 
taken to court based on the crimes were denied bail because the Terrorism (Prevention) 
Act (TPA) 2011 provides no such provision in its entirety and that has not given a 
window to their legal counsels to challenge the judgment of the court. However, 
sections 340 and 341 of the Criminal Procedure Code574 (applicable to Northern 
Nigerian States) provides that for any person arrested with or without a warrant and 
charged with any offense, other than an offense punishable by death, such person shall 
be granted bail, except where his bail would prejudice the investigation of a case or 
where there is a serious risk of escaping from justice. This means that the act of 
terrorism under TPA does not fall under offenses punishable by death. Hence, a person 
arrested for the offense of terrorism is entitled to bail; however, the act of terrorism 
carries life sentence or death penalty in most climes, except where capital punishment 
no longer applies. 
 
4.1.10 Rights to Social Security 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights575 and International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights576 provide that everyone has the right to enjoy 
social security and social insurance. This is a right that should be provided by and is in 
fact the basic purpose of the government.577 Already, the social security system in 
Nigeria is in a poor state. Nigerians in need, especially the aged, can barely gain access 
 
574 Criminal Procedure Code, s. 340-341 
575 UDHR 1948, Art. 22 
576 ICESCR 1967, Art. 9 
577 Nigerian Constitution, s. 13 
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to the benefits of social security in the southern region, much less those in the North? It 
is a government responsibility that has often been overlooked and the funds created for 
such purpose are usually embezzled by officials who are rarely punished for their 
crimes against humanity. 
 
4.2 DEROGATION OF RIGHTS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 
 
Ostensibly there are times in life when a nation faces societal upheavals such as wars, 
national disasters, economic depression etc., and that might lead to taking necessary 
actions by the government. When such actions are taken, there is a tendency to restrict 
individual enjoyment of rights. A major consequence of this is that it would vaguely 
affect peace and justice regime.578 The framers of ICCPR, after carefully considering 
the hostilities of the Second World War, thought it was essential to lay and recognize 
basic human rights of individuals as a foundation of freedom and a cornerstone of 
global peace and justice579. Thus, they vigorously included in the convention’s 
instrument how States can derogate rights when confronted with a situation that would 
lead to a declaration of emergency. But on the other end, they did not envisage that 
States could find themselves in a societal cataclysm that would also lead to derogating 
the rights of individuals and the subsequent abuse of such rights by the State power; 
typically, of this narrative is Nigeria.   
 
In a contrary position, African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) 
unlike the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its 
counterparts such as European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) does not contain derogation clause. For 
instance, the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (the commission in 
the case of Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad (Commission 
National Case) declared that it is in total violation of the charter for any member state to 
 
578 Chapter 16: The Administration of Justice during States of Emergencies 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publication/training9chapter16en.pdf, accessed 1 June 2018. 
579 Ibid.  
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derogate human rights in case of emergencies.580 However, the absence of derogation 
clause from the African charter indicates that no right enshrined in the charter can be 
derogated and this is at variance with the provisions of various if not all the 
constitutions of member states.  
 
 The declaration of a state of emergency by a State is one of the most difficult moments 
for any reasonable government to have opted for, because it restricts the fundamental 
human rights of individuals. But on the other hand, if emergency powers were not 
inserted in the constitutions of sovereign States, no constitutional regime would 
function within the ambit of legal jurisprudence, and that may threaten the corporate 
existence of such States. These further asserts that the drafters of the constitutions were 
oblivious of the fact that the State may find itself in a difficult situation, and for it to 
contain such, requires derogating certain rights of citizens. The situation that will push 
a State to invoke its power of declaring a state of emergency as contained in article 4 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is when the sovereignty of 
such State is threatened581. As Rossiter observed that the State should only declare an 
emergency in any of the three situations; war, rebellion, and economic depression.582 
But on the contrary, some States invoke relevant sections of their constitutions to get at 
their opponents.583 Nasser noted that emergency is an elastic category stretching over 
political disturbances such as riots, the situation of sovereign wars, and even 
constitutional crises within the sphere of the State.584  
 
However, some States declare the emergency to consolidate their power not because 
such States faces any security threat or national disasters and, in such situation, 
 
580 Commission Nationale Des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad (2000) AHRLR 66 
(ACHPR 1995) Para 21.  
581 N Jayawickrama, The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law, Regional and International 
Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 202. 
582 H Nasser, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (University of 
Michigan Press, 2003) 18. 
583 ‘Human Rights Watch “Essential Background’ 
https://www.hrw.org.innopac.up.ac.za/wordreport99/Africazambia.html, accessed 28 May 2018. 
584 H Nasser, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law (University of 
Michigan Press, 2003)17. 
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safeguarding human rights is not of importance to them.585 For the framers of various 
international treaties and States constitutions to have made a provision for the 
derogation of rights, they must have taken into consideration the protection of human 
rights in such situations. By that, the international human rights law came up with a 
balanced system to safeguard the rights of individuals while considering the 
sovereignty of a state on the other end. In Nigeria, there are certain human rights that 
are considered basic586 such as the right to life, which no circumstance can justify their 
derogation except in the execution of a Court sentence in respect of a criminal offence 
for which an accused person has been found guilty. 
 
Watkins in his scholarly contribution to the field observed that the idea of allotting 
power to the executive branch of government about an emergency is inconsequential. 
To him, such position strengthens the administrative power of the executive arm while 
at the same time imposing limitations on them. He further rejected the notion that 
legislative scrutiny on the exercise of executive emergency powers would be an 
effective method of imposing limitations because ‘it is apparent that unrealistically to 
rely on the government controlled by the majority in the legislature to exercise effective 
supervision over the same government in its use of emergency power.’ 
 
Consequently, most States constitutions are vested with the power to declare an 
emergency which results in subsequent derogation of human rights. This is mainly 
because at some point in time, the State finds itself in an emergency which variably 
threatens its corporate existence as a sovereign entity. Therefore, measures such as 
these are necessary to safeguard the life of the nation. Although, these measures are 
hard and restricted ones that derogate basic human rights encapsulated under various 
human rights instruments and the constitutions of States.  
 
Furthermore, the history of the state of emergency in Nigeria started way back in 1998 
when the then military government imposed an emergency in Delta state in response 
 
585 Fionnuala Ni Aolain ‘The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence’ 
(1995) 19 Fordham International Law Journal 101. 
586 Ibid.  
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to the threat and violence unleashed by militants on the facilities of multinational oil 
firms.587 After that, former Nigerian Presidents Obasanjo and Jonathan declared two 
emergencies respectively. Indeed, it is natural whenever an emergency is imposed by a 
State, human rights ceases to exist pending the nullification and extermination of the 
emergency by the government or when it reaches six months from the effective date. It 
is appreciated that the effort of the officials which include the military, police and the 
prosecution should see to it that justice is attained and not derogate from the rights of 
the people who have been arrested or purportedly suspected to belong to members of 
the terrorist group of Boko Haram. Mohammed Ibrahim, the then Country Director of 
Amnesty International, in giving an illustration on why the counterinsurgency 
measures of the country be conducted in a way that the rights of suspected terrorists 
are taken into account confirmed that: 
 
Respect for human rights is not only a fundamental constitutional and 
international legal obligation, but also an intrinsic element of any 
effective counter-insurgency operation.  Insurgents seek to undermine 
the authority of the State and often operate with total disregard for 
rule of law and respect for human rights.  When a State reciprocates 
by violating human rights and the rule of law, it weakens the very 
values that form the basis of its authority.  In practical terms, when 
states make arbitrary arrests, detain suspects without trial, use torture 
and unlawfully kill, they harm the very people and values they are 
supposed to protect.588 
 
Much effort will also need to be channeled to ensure that the rights of suspects are not 
violated and for the mere fact that they have not been tried yet, they should be allowed 
 
587 Scott Dolezal, ‘Notes and Comments the Systematic Failures to Interpret article IV of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is there a public emergency in Nigeria?’ (2000) 
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588 Mohammed Ibrahim, ‘Counter-Insurgency: Is Human Rights a Distraction or sine qua non?’ 




to have fair trial and their rights should be restricted where it becomes necessary in line 
with best practices. Therefore, Ibrahim marinated further that: 
The conduct of the Nigerian military, that led to the unlawful murder, 
arbitrary arrests, mass detention and torture, were in many way gross 
violations of Nigeria’s obligations under IHL [international 
Humanitarian Law], Nigerian Constitution and other domestic legal 
safeguards. IHL comprises rules that seek to mitigate the effect of 
wars on civilians and humanity by limiting the means and methods of 
conducting military operations.  It is essentially predicated on the 
delicate equilibrium between the competing demands of military 
necessity and humanity.  The major sources of IHL to which, Nigeria 
is a State-Party, are the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, and 
customary international law.  In a no international armed conflict, 
such as the one in the north-east Nigeria, the parties to the conflict are 
bound to comply with the norms contained in Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions, Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and customary international law, which consists of rules 
that are binding on all states. Nigeria acceded to both the Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols. 
 
In essence, the fight against terrorism must recognize human rights. It must be 
coordinated within the framework of international humanitarian law without 
jeopardizing the rights of persons. 
 
4.3 CONCLUSION  
 
The violation of human rights can be seen as a central contention in the rise and 
sophistication of the Boko Haram terrorist groups' activities. The fight against Boko 
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Haram, on the other hand, carries with its possible human rights violations. Without 
much effort channeled by the government, the citizens' lives will continue to be in 
jeopardy as there will be a failure in the exercise of the responsibility to protect human 
rights. By the same token, the states' actions are essential in response to 
counterterrorism in Nigeria. The next chapter will review Nigeria's existing strategic 





                                                      CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST INSURGENCY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION BY NIGERIA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
International law on matters surrounding terrorism has been very proactive to the 
extent that many international law instruments seek to address terrorism. These 
instruments are primarily fragmented and may raise a series of international law issue 
issues in their application. Therefore, it will be unrealistic to make a critical review of 
all these instruments, given that they serve different purposes. However, this chapter 
will outline this main instrument before narrowing it down to the Security Council 
Resolution 1373, with an analysis of implementation in Nigeria. 
5.2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON COUNTER 
INSURGENCY  
 
International instruments are numerous. A perusal of the documents reveals a series of 
fragmented provisions that will need to be harnessed and applied to consider the rules 
of interpretation for them to be much meaningful. Their usage, therefore, depends in 
the context of the terrorism they seek to address. These instruments include the 
following: 
1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 
1963, requiring air commander to take reasonable measure to prevent offences 
in aircraft and also detain persons suspected to cause harm. 
 
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, checking 




3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation 1971 prevention of acts affecting the safety of persons boarded in an 
aircraft. 
 
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons 1973 
 
5. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979, checking 
against taking persons into hostage  
 
6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980, criminalizing 
the use of nuclear as a weapon of threat, theft or endangering of people 
 
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, protection against attacks on ship. 
 
8. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, 
making universal jurisdiction for prosecution of offences relating to bombing by 
terrorists. 
 
9. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
1999 check against terrorism financing and creation of liability for financiers. 
 
10. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
2005, check against the use of nuclear or attack on nuclear technologies by 
terrorists  
Asides from these, the resolution of the Security Council on terrorism has far-reaching 
consequences. The Security Council was created by the UN Charter VII provision and 
vested with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. 
Considering the height of insecurity after the Second World War, the framers of the 
UN Charter thought of the necessity to create a framework that would eradicate threats 
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of any sort to the international community. In an explicit term, the Charter empowers 
the Council to take coercive measures against any state that seem to threaten 
international peace and security. However, the charter’s Article 41 and 42 gave the 
Council non-forcible measures such as diplomatic and economic sanctions, and 
forcible measures to be carried out by armed forces under the United Nations 
command. Before 1990, the forcible measures were never enforced. After that effect, 
resolution 678 was adopted at the end of 1990 where the latter resolution allocates 
power to states to use coercive power against Iraq’s occupation of Kuwaiti territory.589 
This move seems to be the first dawn of the Security Council’s approval of forcible 
measures.  
Article 39 of the Charter gives the Security Council power to adopt two classes of 
resolutions such as recommendations and measures although, the Security Council 
resolutions usually hinged on these two classes. One of the usual recommendations is 
creating international obligations that are not compulsory to be followed, mainly 
because they are not legal sanctions. Unlike the recommendations that are not 
mandatory to be followed, measures bind upon each member state and adhere to it. 
The issue of conformity of measures by member states generated debates, especially 
since the adoption of resolution 678 over the council's broad scope. The creation of the 
two International Criminal Tribunals before adopting resolution 687 in November 
1990 was viewed differently by observers and scholars who tagged it as “novel 
interpretation of non-forcible measures under article 41”.590 Additionally, after the 
horrible event of 9/11, the council deliberated and unanimously agreed to widen its 
excessive powers by adopting a new resolution 1373. The uniqueness of the latter 
resolution is its distinct features that mandate states to create a comprehensive legal 
framework of fighting terrorism and terror-related crimes and international cooperation 
amongst members.   
 
589 Moore. J, “Crisis in the Gulf” Enforcing the Rule of Law, (New York, London and Rome: Oceana, 
1992), p. 14 




5.3 COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 1373  
 
The acts of international terrorism savagely and notoriously perpetrated by Al-Qaeda 
and its allied necessitated the adoption and creation of resolution 1373 in fall 2001, 
specifically after the September 11 event. As indicated in the text, the features of 
resolution 1373 are distinct from all the UNSC resolutions mainly because of the 
frequent acts of terrorism and the need to combat terrorist acts avowedly. Apart from 
the international obligation shouldered on member states to enact a legal framework, it 
should equally have created an institutional context to ensure its strict compliance.  
The resolution has in total nine articles and preambles. The preambles explicitly 
indicate that resolution 1373 is a continuation and confirmation of the preceding 
Resolution of the Council such as resolution 1269 (1999)591 and 1368 (2001)592. The 
Council unequivocally condemned the event of September 11 and vowed to prevent 
such dastardly acts in any part of the globe.  In the light of the foregoing, the charter’s 
preamble outlined a new measure such as self-defence and concomitant use of force 
against terrorists and their collaborators. However, the Charter directs states to 
cooperate and strengthen their domestic laws to vigorously fight terrorist acts. The 
charter also encourages States to complement international cooperation by considering 
relevant procedures to combat any act of terrorism such as funding of terrorism, 
providing logistical support through the laid down laws of their states. The resolution 
further affirms the dual approach, which seeks to authorize both forcible and non-
forcible measures concurrently, that is, the use of force and international criminal law.  
Article 1 of the Resolution mandates member states to ensure strict compliance of the 
following functions. a) Stop and prevent the financing of terrorist attacks (b) from 
acknowledging that financial facilitation of terrorists by citizens as a criminal offence 
(c) to immediately cease all funding and assets of individuals or legal entities involved 
 
591 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1269. 
592 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368. 
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in terrorist acts (d) to restrain citizens or any persons and organizations from fostering 
terrorists’ access to any financial resources or economic benefits.593  
 
5.3.1 Financing of Terrorism and Related Matters 
Resolution 1373 article 1 provides that member states shall pass separate legislation of 
proscribing financing of terrorism. The Security Council has noted the efficacy of use 
money in terrorist activities and hence considers the funding of terrorism as a vital 
strategy to eliminate, as such created a joint body to superintend the fight against 
terror. The strategy adopted under this resolution occasioned the formation of the 
counterterrorism task force in 2005.594Again, under the latter resolution Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) was equally created. The FAFT is charged with 
establishing and fighting the sources of terrorist organizations and restricting money 
laundering.595As part of its annual report, FAFT submitted recommendations to the 
council, meant to know the extent of money laundering and criminalization of 
terrorism financing activities.  
Resolution 1373 categorizes all forms of financial dealings that seeks to facilitate or 
support the acts of terror as a predicate crime to money laundering. Besides, the 
resolution viewed the criminalization patterns by the objectives of the global 
conference for the control of terrorism financing.596 Identifying and suppressing the 
financing of terrorist organizations remains one of the cardinal objectives of resolution 
1373. Article 17 of the Security Council Resolutions 1373, composed of the global 
conference for the control of financing of terrorism, empowers member states of the 
UN to freeze assets and funds that presumably are owned by the terrorist groups and 
their financiers.597 In tandem with international law, the Security Council has 
restrained financial institutions from hosting and transacting any financial dealings 
 
593 UNSC Resolution 1373, Article 1 
594 United Nations: Tackling the Financing of Terrorism. CTITF Working Group Report, New York 
CTITF, (2009)  
595 FATF, FATF 40 Recommendations. Financial Action Task Force, 2003 
596 United Nations, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financial of Terrorism. New 
York United Nations. (1999) 
597 Security Council Resolution Article 17 
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with any group or entity whose ownership could not be determined.  It is on that basis 
the resolution employed FAFT’s guidelines and procedure for financial services.  Some 
coordinating institutions such as the Financial Intelligence Unit that are saddled with 
the responsibility of collating, analyzing, and publishing fraudulent financing activities 
seem to have demonstrated their capacity by limiting terrorist acts ultimately.598   
Terrorist organizations and their affiliates employed different methods and tactics in 
moving funds across the board; hence the Security Council Resolution 1373 mandates 
all states under the UN's umbrella to develop a strategy on how these methods would 
be suppressed avowedly.  On the issue of NGO’s, the resolution requires member 
states to thoroughly supervise and regulate the activities of non-profitable 
organizations operating within their shores. This means that states should put in a legal 
framework of supervising, regulating including their financial activities to avoid 
turning them as recruitment and supporting fronts for terrorist.599     
Hitherto to the event of 9/11, the international legal instruments of criminalizing 
funding of terrorism were few.  The absence of comprehensive measures against the 
financing of terrorism before the 9//11 event paved the way for the perpetrators to 
actualize their mission vigorously. Afterwards, the international community and 
international financial institutions began to put measures to counter their funding. The 
Financial Action Task Force, saddled with advising, guiding, and formulating best 
practices against money laundering, began to lay a unified platform for illicit financial 
dealings. Soon after the 9/11 event, FATF conveyed an Extraordinary Session 
precisely October 31, 2001, issued guidelines for financial institutions to cooperate 
with relevant authorities to provide information about the terrorist organizations' 
financial dealings.600 The United Nations responded not only to terrorism financing but 
all aspects that would destabilize international peace and security hence ratified the 
Convention against Financing and Suppression of Terrorism in November 2001.  
 
598 Vortmeyer. M, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, (2004) 
599 FAFT IX Special Recommendations VIII 
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The United Nations General Assembly referred and adopted Security Council 
Resolution 1373 with a strong warning to member states to enthusiastically implement 
it, reference was directed to the financing of terrorism.601 However, violent extremist 
organizations, whether small or full-blown terrorist groups, cannot survive their 
struggle in as much their ability to finance their operations are countered at the 
embryonic level.602  It is essential to view how the event of the September 11 
supervened critically. The usual trend of moving funds across the board suffered a 
setback since the event of September 11 that marked a turning point for the fight 
against the horrendous acts of terror in the globe. One of the strategies employed by 
the UNSC was to launch a devastating campaign against the sources of funding of the 
terrorists. Soon after the Council’s meeting, President Bush posits that: 
“We will direct every resource at our disposal to ensure we win the fight against the terrorists, 
employ every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, 
every financial influence. We shall block all means of the terrorist's sources of getting funds, turn 
them against each other, rout them out of their safe places, and bring them to justice.”603 
The above statement indicates that each member state of the UN must safeguard its 
territory from the antagonistic acts of the terrorists and their sponsors. Against this 
background, most countries have come up with often and swift measures to counter 
the movement of funds within their shores and increased coercive capacity to deal with 
the acts of terrorism robustly. Coercive measures adopted by most states in dealing 
with terrorism, especially in the developing world like Nigeria, only increased the 
fiercer nature of the war. Indeed, the financial control strategy is the most potent 
component of fighting terrorism.604 Although pessimistically believed to be a weak 
element as the terrorists deploy strategies in checkmating the method. This strategy can 
only affect states bound to have a vibrant regulated financial institution such as the 
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United States and their western allies.605 In the case of Boko Haram, such a mechanism 
remains ineffective mainly because of weak and besmirched institutions.606 It is 
believed that imposing such measures has a significant impact in the fight against 
terrorism, especially when the provision of financial resources to groups using terrorist 
groups and supporting organizations of high-value commodities such as diamond and 
gold merchants, credit card fraud, drug smugglers and other petty crimes have close 
ties with terrorist outlets.607The discovery of these funders has systematically revealed 
the collaboration of some silent non-governmental organizations and donor agencies, 
leading to the total seizure of their possessions and cessation in states fighting 
terrorism. For instance, at the height of Boko Haram acts, the Nigerian government 
closed down a multi-million-dollar departmental store (Amigo) in Abuja, on suspicion 
that the store provides logistics to Boko Haram group. 
Similarly, three business owners in Abuja were banned from associating with all 
American residents in Nigeria following such action.608 The US department of treasury 
contends that the trio has a link with the Hezbollah group in which, Executive Order 
133224 was issued against them and their properties seized.609 This part of the thesis 
investigates whether the policymakers' actions to regulate financial transactions are in 
tandem with the objectives of countering the acts of Boko Haram or not.  
In some states enhancing financial rules has helped counter the evil acts of the 
terrorists, especially after 9/11, mainly because financial institutions facilitate the 
movement of funds that allows the terrorist organizations to perpetrate their heinous 
acts. The electronic flow of funds is so competitive amongst commercial sectors, given 
that everyone takes advantage to display long acquired ideas. Accordingly, Biersteker 
and Eckert610 outlined five core hypothesis adopted by the regulatory response to 
countering sources of funding of terrorists; the first hypothesis surveys that all terrorists 
groups that perpetrate evil acts are the same irrespective of the environment they 
 
605 Ibid. 
606 Ibid.  
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amusement-park, accessed 30th June, 2019. 
609 Ibid.  
610 Ibid at 79. 
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operate.611 However, it is presumed that all the controlling measures applied to one 
group should be uniform across the board, looking at the provisions of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which mandate States to collaborate with 
each other in the fight against terrorism. They further contend that the strategies 
employed by the international community against the IRA, ETA whose cause was 
more of agitation for self-determination, contrast with almost all the terrorist 
organizations that pose a threat to the international peace and security. Secondly, it is 
generally believed that terrorist organizations use formal sector financial institutions to 
move funds in complicit with high-value commodities merchants such as diamonds 
and gold traders.612 For instance, Dr. Stephen Davis who stood as an intermediary 
between the federal government and Boko Haram on the release of the Chibok girls 
opined that the group uses the Nigerian Central Bank to traffic money to various 
countries of interest.613 
Similarly, before the September 11 event, facts have surfaced that a large amount of 
money amounting to $300,000 was transferred into the United States through formal 
sector financial institutions to fund Al-Qaeda’s operation.614 Since the September 11 
episode, legal sector, financial institutions have become wary of their business 
dealings, especially with high-value merchants who act as agents to these terrorist 
organizations, hence regulatory measures were introduced in the banking system.615 
The international banking system introduced Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunications ‘SWIFT’ effortlessly to monitor and facilitate the 
movement of funds globally. This technique possessed a high level of security and 
confidentiality despite the enormous stream of traffic it handles. In some instances, 
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615 World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Comprehensive Reference Guide to Anti-
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SWIFT organization facilitate certain intelligence to certain law enforcement agencies 
on an ad hoc level to enable such agencies to track suspicious financial transactions. In 
this case, EU and U.S law enforcement agencies were afforded a certain degree of 
exchange after September 11, which was expedited by the European Central Bank.616 
Although, such arrangement was suddenly aborted when New York Times Magazine 
in 2006 leaked the information.  
Thus, following the aborted arrangement between the EU-US and SWIFT in 2006, a 
temporary arrangement was entered, allowing SWIFT to disclose requested financial 
information to the United State security agencies pending the European Union 
parliamentary consideration and ratification. The motion for ratification was put 
before the EU parliament, but stiffed opposition to the proposal was resisted among the 
parliamentarians,617 causing a rift between the EU Justice Home Office Affairs and the 
EU Security Commission. The JHA contends such plan was a breach of the right to 
privacy of the European subjects and suggested that if the United States deems to 
obtain intelligence from the EU, there are procedures to follow or can reach out to a 
member state on an ensured bilateral basis. Correspondingly, when the situation 
became tensed, the Justice Home Office Affairs questioned whether such arrangement 
was a proper mechanism of obtaining intelligence from SWIFT database and warned 
of taking risk to grant such request.618   
The EU Security Committee dismissed the claim of the Home Office Affairs and 
referred it to how three incidences of terrorist acts were suppressed and prevented from 
further attack as a result of prompt action of the EU-US intelligence exchange on 
information concerning financing of terrorism. Despite the convincing argument by the 
Security Committee, the matter was rejected conscientiously by the parliament.619   
 
616 Ridley ‘Central Banks and their role against Financing of Terrorism in the post 2001 period’ 
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Nonetheless, with the introduction of specific rules by the banking sectors across the 
board, terrorist organizations and other illicit ventures have resorted to underground 
informal sector transactions such as currency exchange, assets purchased, and false 
loans. This system was adopted by Boko Haram and their sponsors in Nigeria. Thirdly, 
just like the formal financial institutions, the informal commercial systems can also be 
regulated. Concerned has been expressed in various quotas regarding the operations of 
some Non-governmental Organizations in the United States and England which calls 
for imposing of some thorough scrutiny by the authority before allowing to operate. 
The trend of these activities has been observed by some concerned citizens in the 
northeastern Nigeria specifically the operation of some NGOs has raised suspicion that 
they are conniving with some frontline leaders of Boko Haram.   
The fourth hypothesis suggests that some states employed a hawala system in their 
informal value transfer system that open window for some to fund the acts of 
terrorism. Before September 11, Al-Qaeda used this platform and moved funds into the 
United States, given that informal financial sector record-keeping is challenging to 
monitor.620 
The fifth one assumed that there is a working relationship between illicit ventures and 
terrorism. The terrorist organization adopts any means of sourcing funds to finance 
their acts and resort to all manner of crimes like drug trafficking and smuggling.621 
Depicting from the difficulties incorporated in the international financial institutions' 
legal obligations to reveal information to the law enforcement agencies became 
essential because it helps in halting both financings of terrorist activities and money 
laundering.622 After a series of international conventions notably, the United Nations 
and the AU Resolutions, most member states and financial institutions were obliged to 
implement such money laundry and anti-terrorist financing measures.   
Consequently, since the adoption of the various international and regional conventions 
regarding the fight and financing of terrorism, international financial institutions 
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suffered many punitive injuries largely emanating as a result of the new tactic employ 
by the terrorist in their financial dealings. Progressively, as the international 
community and private actors engage in finding a means of suppressing terrorist acts, 
so are the terrorist organizations adopt new tactics in their modus operandi. The 
exploitation of non-government/charity organizations poses a huge challenge to law 
enforcement institutions as the countermeasures to checkmate such remains 
unsuccessful as Gunbaratna posits; “al-Qaeda set great store by establishing infiltrating and 
trying to gain control of many Islamic organizations, whether it is registered by government 
agency engaged in socio-economic, educational or welfare projects.”623 
Similarly, Williams Phil commented on the efforts of international law enforcement 
agencies and the supervising financial institutions for their efforts in fighting terrorism 
through blocking financial sources of the terrorists; he then contends that “Second, anti-
terrorist forces have been able to deal adequately with Islamic charities.”624 
A terrorist incident that occurred in Jerusalem in August 2003 was established to have 
had a link with a charity organization belonging to key leaders of Hamas, the 
perpetrators of the act. Hanavi, a district in Jerusalem witnessed a horrendous act of 
terrorism where a bomber denoted devices composed of ball bearings weighing 5 kg of 
explosives, killing 22 people, mostly children, and women and wounding 118 in that 
single act.625 Legal action was instituted against the bank by some victims of the event 
seeking compensation because the bank carried out financial services to terrorists 
through an account held in the name of international charity in which the terrorist act 
was perfected. The bank in question, “National Westminster Bank” had for ten years 
operated an account for ‘Interpol’ an Islamic charity organization claiming to be 
funding Islamic activity, but on the contrary, financing terrorist activities.626    
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The appellant averred that the bank knew that the account belonged to the Hamaz 
terrorist group and ignored the danger the group posed to the international community 
went ahead transacting banking business with them. Ostensibly, the US state 
department designated ‘Interpol’ link to Hamaz and in an unambiguous term: 
“Interpol, headquarters in the UK, has been a principal charity utilized to hide the flow of money 
to Hamaz. Report indicates it is the conduit through which money flows to Hamaz from other 
charities, e.g. the Al Aqsa Foundation (designated under EO 13224 on May 29th) and oversees the 
activities of other charities. Reports further indicate that Interpal is the fundraising coordinator of 
Hamaz. This role is of the type that includes, instructing how funds should be transferred…”627 
The Bank in trying to maintain its reputation after the proscription of the latter group 
by the US State Department, claimed that within the UK where the account was 
domiciled no such characterization by the UK authorities. Though, the Israeli 
government in 1998 designated Hamaz as a terrorist organization, but the bank further 
contends that the communique was published in Hebrew and only applicable to the 
Israeli financial institutions. From all these conundrums it is clear that the United 
States was trying to block any loophole or the safe haven of hiding funds for the 
terrorist organizations and their collaborators, and again, at the same time, trying to 
comply with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 which mandates all 
member States of the UN to take swift measures against any member state that fails to 
penalize it financial institution dealing with the terrorist organizations.  
Generally, many believe that committing an act of terror does not cost much, given the 
event of September 11. Evidence surfaced from the 9/11 Commission Monograph on 
terrorism financing that Al-Qaeda perpetrated the event of September with just less 
than a million dollars, specifically $400,000-500,000, and around $300,000 successfully 
transferred to the hijacker bank accounts domiciled in the United States.628Other 
sources contend that the Bali bombings in 2002 cost just around $20,000-$35,000, 
emanating from $130,000 from al-Qaeda’s account to Jemaah Islamiyah, a renowned 
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terrorist organization in Indonesia.629The bombing in Istanbul in 2003 cost far less than 
$40,000, according to sources.630The bombing of the U.S embassy in Nairobi, Kenya in 
1998 cost about $50,000.631 While the World Trade Centre bombing in 1993 cost 
$18,000.632 All these acts of terror were funded from the proceeds of illicit ventures 
such as credit card fraud and endowment from apologetics of the rejectionist groups. 
For instance, al-Qaeda sent one of its members to solicit for a donation from their 
adherents in Germany to effectively champion the cause of the organization.633 
Terrorists have different methods of sourcing funds. The criminals that perpetrated the 
Madrid event in 2004 disguised and pretended to be selling Zamzam holy water from 
Mecca, as has been reported. In such an act, it was believed that around $60,000 was 
committed to perfecting that incident.634 Likewise, the London subway bombing in 
2005 cost the perpetrators $15,000; this according to Home Office officials, the funds 
emanated from defaulted bank loans, bounced cheques, and overdraft, among 
others.635 
However, because of the small number of resources involved in organizing and 
perfecting terrorist acts, commentators contend that funding, freezing, and seizing 
assets belonging to conspirators should be critical in its entirety.636 Given the derisory 
resources involved in committing the acts of terror, it would be difficult for the 
decision-makers to criminalize or halt terrorist financing. It was evident that one of the 
 
629 First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to 
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basic requirements laid by the UNSC in the resolution 1373 is for states to identify and 
block the financial income of the terrorists, but this alone cannot offer a solution or 
prevent future terrorism. The reality again is that, for the terrorist organizations to 
perfect their operations they need to be well organized in terms of broader 
infrastructures that would cover logistics, recruitment, training their members, media 
propaganda e.t.c, and that entails enormous resources especially if they want the 
impact to be more devastating. This concept disclosed by one of the perpetrators of the 
1993 World Trade Centre event Ramzi Yousef,637 who admitted that lack of enough 
funds by his group resulted in having a less impact on the act. 
On the other hand, despite the mega resources involved in carrying out the evil acts, 
the identified infrastructures remain essential as Damian Bugg, puts in 2003: “al Qaeda 
spends about 10% of its income on operational costs. The other 90% goes on the cost of 
administering and maintaining the organization, including the cost of operating training camps 
and maintain an international network of cells. So-called “sleepers” must also cost significant 
sums to establish and maintain.”638    
As previously illustrated, the terrorist organizations employ different approaches for 
sourcing, trafficking, and storing their operational funds. It is, therefore, important to 
systematically distinguish these methods of financing terrorism. Just like al Qaeda, 
Boko Haram group destabilizes the relative peace and security that the Nigerian state 
enjoys before their emergence and subsequent transmigrating to the full-blown terrorist 
organization. Their actions are purely an act that ensues and committed within the 
Nigerian territory before it descends to other part of African states. Their modus 
operandi made some commentators believe that their acts are related to the Jacobin 
 
637 See M Rudner, ‘Using Financial Intelligence Against the Funding of Terrorism’ (2006) 19 
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anarchist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.639 In spite of the 
similarities, the former’s actions appear to be more deadly than the latter, mainly 
because Boko Haram’s acts transcended to other territories whereas, Jacobin was an 
act of terror emanated and committed largely by the state actors. The only terrorist 
organization save to Boko Haram in terms of capacity was al Qaeda because it 
operates globally and had a worldwide network. The Council of Foreign Relations 
Task Force on Terrorist Financing commented that “al Qaeda was notably and 
deliberately decentralized, compartmentalized, flexible and diverse in all of its 
operations, including its financial operations.”640 
 
Conversely, the method of storing funds by the terrorist organizations differs; it is a 
known fact that keeping cash at their disposal remains dominant practice in the lexicon 
of the terrorists. Some organizations such as al Qaeda rely solemnly on hiding their 
funds with their family members, close associates, which would be difficult to trace. It 
is against this backdrop that Nicholas Fielding Sunday times journalist posits that it is 
crucial to rationally focus on the family network of the terrorists whenever fighting 
terrorism and blocking the sources of their funding.641Some observers, such as Douglas 
Farah accentuated the pivotal role of high-value commodities merchants like the 
diamond and gold traders who have been used to move funds for the terrorists given 
the fact that they can no longer keep funds with any financial institution. For instance, 
the United States has frozen and confiscated assets belonging to al Qaeda after US 
embassy bombing in Nairobi, 1998, such has given the terrorist networks to adopt 
using these merchants as a haven to store funds.642  
 
639 D. Rumsfeld, Memo to General Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, etc., 16 October 2003, available at 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/rumsfeld-d20031016sdmemo.htm> (Accessed 
19th February 2019)  
640 DC Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’ in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M 
Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Georgetown University Press, 
2004) 16. 
641 N Fielding, ‘How al Qaeda Utilises Family Networks?’ Presentation at Watson Institute, 
Workshop on the Financial and Transnational Dynamics of Terrorism, Providence, RI, 24-25 




Since the evolution of the terrorist Boko Haram group, copious scribbles about their 
emergence, trajectory, and structure have received considerable attention from 
academic, policymaker’s, security experts, among others, but its financial sources have 
been scarcely acknowledged.  Lately, divergent views regarding their funding began to 
filter within the Nigerian security architecture and the international community. For 
instance, ZAMUN 2015 Model643 United National Conference Security Council study 
guide during its visit to Nigeria, contends that Boko Haram is the only terrorist group 
whose funding sources remain challenging to trace mainly because of the difficulty in 
knowing the people that make up the organization.644The assertion of ZAMUN has 
been disputed by the followers of the event who opined that the group has different 
sources of funding and does not depend on one cause. Yan St-Pierre analyses Boko 
Haram sources of funding and concluded that the groups sourced their money from 
within Nigeria and other African states who have been ravaged by the acts of terror 
like Nigeria.645Some commentators shared Yan’s view and believed that the Nigerian 
authority's negligence to halt the deeds of the group at the primary stage creates 
difficulty to trace their sources of funding within the Nigerian territory. However, in 
2014 when the group's actions became challenging to contend, the then US assistant 
secretary for African affairs Thomas Greenfield surmised that the group depends 
mostly on criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, and others 
to fund their deeds.646Similarly, the United States government asserts that Boko Haram 
employed the use of a networked system of couriers to transport cash to their 
respective outlets within Nigeria and its neighboring states.  
Viewing from this prism, it is pertinent to stress the sources of Boko Haram funds. In 
its early emergence specifically, 2002, the frontline leaders of the group such as 
Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Lawal came up with the idea of assisting their 
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adherents through small scale business enterprise in Borno and Yobe states only.647 
After that, they set up a microfinance system and encourage members to come up with 
business proposals; in that regard, some opted for selling of used cars and motorcycles 
in the Maiduguri metropolis. The scope of the microfinance system expanded to other 
trades, including agriculture, and all the proceeds from such are earmarked for funding 
Boko Haram activities.648 Unknown to the authority, Yusuf set up microfinance with 
the ulterior motive to source funds for the group to challenge the sovereignty of Nigeria 
by launching a devastating attack in the northeastern part of the country. In 2016 the 
Nigerian authority suppressed substantial acts and sources of funding of the group, but 
Shekau re-introduced the same system of microfinancing with the same motive to 
boost the activities of the group, although this time around, they considered recruiting 
vulnerable youth into the organization. The question that this raise is where is the 
security architecture of the Nigerian state that such gibberish would be allowed to 
arise? According to the International aid organization Mercy Corps,649 the group issues 
soft loans to its followers stretching from 10,000 Naira to 1 million Naira around 2016-
2017.650  
Consequently, as elucidated above that Boko Haram fund their activities from different 
sources this includes among others imposing 100 Naira daily membership to its 
followers.651This routine exercise has been ongoing until the death of Mohammed 
Yusuf in 2009.652 However, Boko Haram receive both financial and material 
contribution from external sources, especially from their fellow terrorist organizations 
such as Al-Qaeda and its affiliate Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).653 Both 
the Nigerian and United States governments declared that the group received a 
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monetary contribution from the duo to help in enhancing their struggle against the 
Nigerian government and its neighbours.654Although, the United States officials 
declared the amount of financial assistance received by Boko Haram from their allies 
was insignificant in comparison to the mayhem unleashed in Nigeria and the other 
states.655It has been alleged that Boko Haram intertwined with top politicians across 
Nigeria and presumed that these politicians contributed immensely in funding the 
group. For instance, Buji Foi, the late commissioner of religious affairs of Borno state, 
was believed to be sponsoring the group before he was killed extra-judicially by the 
security operatives in 2009.656  
Equally, a bank robbery was employed by Boko Haram as another means of funding 
their evil acts, especially about “2010 to 2013” when their actions exacerbated in high 
propensity. Admittedly, the group’s spokesman confessed to the security operative 
after his arrest that the monies derived from bank robberies was usually shared 
amongst the top commanders and families of their members killed in the 
struggle.657According to the Nigerian intelligence agencies, Boko Haram robbed banks 
in the tune of $6m658 within three years of their criminal struggle. After the imposition 
of the state of emergency by the federal government in 2013, the incidences of bank 
robberies declined substantially, and as such, the group resorted to broad daylight 
extortion as a means of funding. Boko Haram adopted a method of sending 
threatening messages via mobile phones to local businesspeople and politicians 
demanding money or face the consequences of their actions.659In recent times, 
kidnapping in Nigeria became a lucrative business not only for Boko Haram as a 
terrorist group, but criminals, armed robbers, and miscreants have adopted it as a 
means of acquiring money instantaneously. In this business venture, the Islamist Boko 
Haram earned millions of dollars from the families of their victims, institutions, and 
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foreign governments. For instance, in February 2013, the entire family of a French 
national was kidnapped in Cameroon and the total sum of $3.14m paid for their 
release. 
Similarly, a wife of the Cameroonian deputy prime minister was also kidnapped660 
huge sum of money was paid for her release. A former minister of petroleum was also 
captured in Nigeria661and an astonishing amount was paid to get him out from Boko 
Haram den. The group has succeeded in using the kidnapping method to generate 
money in enhancing their acts. The group’s single kidnapping that created concern 
globally was the abduction of the Chibok Schoolgirls in 2014. This separate kidnapping 
brought Boko Haram into the spotlight and confirmed that their notoriety is not 
something that the international community should ignore. Although, discussed in the 
preceding chapter, the nature of the abduction, but was not explicit about the ramson 
paid on the girls. At the inception of the Buhari administration efforts were made to 
release the Chibok girls unconditionally, but the group resisted and demanded 
negotiation with the Nigerian authority.662 Amongst the demand put forth was the 
release of arrested hardline commanders of the group in exchange for the schoolgirls, 
and a tremendous amount of money even though Nigerian authority refuted that no 
money was given to the group.663  
In addition to kidnapping and other sources of funds, the group also adopted illicit 
trafficking of arms and ammunition. The evidence appeared after the arrest of the 
Chadian trafficker that worked in conjunction with the hardline commanders of the 
group, and cash in the region of $15,000664 was found in his possession realized from 
the sale of weapons. In their quest to suppress Boko Haram acts, the Cameroonian 
security operatives discovered some travel documents in the terrorist camp, which 
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confirmed their ties with Libya and Qatar.665 The commanding general of U.S Special 
Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), General Bolduc666 believed that the loaded 
arms/ammunitions belonging to ISIS that departed Libya headed to the various Boko 
Haram territories in the Sahel region. However, two members of Boko Haram were 
intercepted by the security operatives carrying heavy arms and ammunition and cash 
of 8 million CFA franc along Burkina-Faso and Niger’s border.667 Another agent of 
Boko Haram arrested, and during interrogation admitted that the group concluded its 
grand plan to use females as agents to certain traffic materials such as arms and 
ammunition and cash to various areas of operation.668 The idea of using females as 
agents viewed from the religious tenets, especially the vulnerable regions happens to be 
a Muslim-dominated territory, where women are not allowed to have contact with 
men that are not their spouses.  
In furtherance to the trafficking of Boko Haram venture, there is no proof that the 
group engages in drug trafficking, though, U.S Drug Enforcement Agency and Inter-
University Centre for Terrorism Studies in 2012 believes the group involved in 
trafficking cocaine and other hard drugs.669 The latter agency claimed that some 
leading drug cartels in Latin America fund the activities of the Boko Haram and other 
emerging violent organizations in Nigeria.670 Lauretta Napoleon, an expert in the field 
of terrorism financing, shared a similar view with the Inter-University Centre for 
Terrorism that because of the strict measures encapsulated in the Patriot Act 2001 by 
the United States, trafficking drugs from Latin-America to Europe remains difficult 
and hence, became necessary for the cartel to establish a link with the terrorist groups 
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around the globe.671 During the United Nations Ministerial conference on the Influence 
of Drugs on Global Security and Sustainable Development, the former UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon contends that; Boko Haram’s modus operandi suggests that 
they are involved in drug trafficking within the Sahel region.672From the above 
assertion, we can see that the comprehensive network Boko Haram established with 
other terrorist groups and drug cartels across the board suggest that any impish 
behavior accredited to them has substance.  
There were series of speculations about the sources of their funds, mostly from private 
actors and the international community. Recall the visit of the U.S congressman to 
Nigeria in 2015 Darell Issa, who opines that there is the possibility that Boko Haram 
receives money to fund their evil acts from the hands of people that engage in crude oil 
theft in the south-south region of Nigeria.673 There is a possibility to believe this claim 
mainly because the authority's attention moved towards bringing peace in the 
northeast's troubled areas. The congressman's statement raised an alarm in which the 
Nigerian government constituted a committee to unravel the veracity of his 
claim.674Similar thoughts emanated from Dr. Stephen Davis, who negotiated the 
release of the abducted Chibok Schoolgirls where he claimed that the group had agents 
within the Nigerian Central Bank helping them to traffic money to various countries of 
interest notably, Egypt where the group gets essential materials for its operation such 
as arms and military uniforms.675 However, the apex bank refuted the allegation. From 
the above standpoint, we could deduce that Boko Haram funded the group's activities 
substantially from the proceeds of ransom from kidnapping, bank robberies, extortion, 
and illicit trafficking, among others.   
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5.3.2 Suppressing Terrorism and Recruitment 
 
Article 2 of the Security Council Resolution 1373 provides that the member states shall 
take swift measures to deny the terrorists the chance of unleashing further attacks on 
humanity. The Council's position is clear for States to restrict the terrorist 
organizations access to any form of services that may give them a chance to perpetrate 
their evil acts.676   
 The peculiar nature of the terrorist’s recruitment and operationalization remains a 
source of concern to the UN Security Council. The Council, therefore, under its 
obligation of resolution 1373, passed another resolution 2214 targeting to halting 
terrorist recruitment.677 It can be seen from the Council’s resolution how they 
criminalized terrorist recruitment in making it difficult for the terrorist organizations 
employing new members. The resolution also sets up an apparatus within the UN's 
umbrella to track foreign mercenaries' movement presumed to collaborate with the 
terrorist organizations.   
5.3.3 Eliminating the Supply of Weapons and Ammunitions 
Resolution 1373 provided that the Security Council shall use its power by ensuring that 
the activities of manufacturers of firearms are thoroughly regulated in order to deny 
terrorist access to firearms. The resolution further posits that all member states shall 
enact legislation against illegal possessions of arms and ammunition within their 
domains, and equally alludes that the Council shall henceforth appoint specific arms 
companies that would sell to members’ States which require such.678 In furtherance to 
this, the United Nations proposed the formation of a particular unit that would be 
saddled with the assessment of weapons dealing. The Resolution further provides that 
states shall equally incorporate within the said laws, how individuals shall obtain 
license and authorization of possessing arms, as well as knowing the destinations of 
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designated arms. The Resolution mandates states to extremely superintend how 
weapons are imported and exported out of their domains. This resolute position taken 
by the Council once fully enforced by member states would condense weaponry access 
to the terrorist organizations, which would adversely affect their evil operations. 
However, once there are serious commitments by States and other branches of 
international organizations, such as regional organizations, to put in necessary 
measures against illegal trafficking, the tons of wars and the impact supervening across 
the world would have been averted or minimized.  
5.3.4 Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorist Acts    
 
The acts of terrorism have largely developed especially in the late 19th century to date, 
as such states applies different tactics and strategies in suppressing the acts. The 
adoption and use of carrot and stick measures against the terrorist have not been 
yielding any positive result. The paradigm shift from such trite method to swift and 
tough measures were seen after the devastating action of Al-Qaeda in September 11, 
2001 when the latter organization attacked some buildings in New York, Pennsylvania 
and Virginia killing many people. The United State authority was compelled to adopt a 
proactive and often violent measures rather than reactive one. The effect of the former 
measures pushed the US army to embark on the horizontal confrontation between the 
Taliban organizations and its allies in the Middle East, resulting in the collapse of 
Saddam Hussein’s three decades of authoritarianism. The Resolution tasked the 
Council to create an international intelligence agency to vigorously coordinate and 
disseminate information regarding the terrorist organizations' activities.  
5.3.5 Special Criminal Protocols and Safeguards 
 
Unlike the emphasis outlined by the Resolution 1373 to prevent terrorist activities, the 
latter resolution does not mandate states to create special investigative and prosecution 
procedures. Instead, it provided for use of exceptional investigative approaches which 
refers to methods employed by law enforcement in investigating the acts of terror. The 
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adoption of such measures was discouraged by the United Nations on the ground that 
it infringes some basic rights of individuals. The Resolution outlines foundations that 
seek to facilitate the creation of witness protection protocols. Report of the UNODC 
states, that witness protection helps in achieving substantial success in many of the 
criminal investigations and subsequent prosecutions of the culprits.679 For instance, in 
Nigeria such law has seriously helped in suppressing the acts of Boko Haram when 
their acts became difficult to contain in 2015. The local youths known as “Civilian 
JTF” have been providing intelligence to security operatives about the activities of 
Boko Haram.  
5.3.6 International Legal Collaboration and Extradition  
 
The Security Council 1373 article 3 directs member states to assiduously implement all 
its international legal instruments relating to fight against terrorism, such as 
conventions, protocols and treaties among others. These agreements could be in form 
of bilateral, multilateral, regional and sub-regional commitments. The central focal 
point of these agreements is international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.  
Resolution 1373 proposed certain ingredients for providing shield to a terrorist within 
their jurisdictions. It proposes the application of universal jurisdiction against a 
terrorist that commits an act in certain country or be extradited to face persecution in a 
state where the crime was committed. In a similar vein, it criminalized activities that 
seek to proliferate terrorist acts against member states.680 
5.3.7 Joint Legal Assistance 
In the area of international Legal Cooperation between States, there should be a 
coordinated synergizing amongst the law enforcement agencies of member states, and 
this cooperation shall be avowedly pivotal. For instance, joint legal aid by member 
states would increasingly help in execution of searches and seizures by the assistance of 
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fellow state, just like Multilateral Joint Task Force between neighbouring countries to 
Nigeria, fighting against Boko Haram, such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. This 
window would also help States to share certain information among them leading to 
obtaining convincing evidence against the suspect.  
5.3.8 Information Sharing  
Just like the emphasis in all articles, the latter article direct states to enhance their 
cooperation in information sharing regarding the activities of the terrorists, such as any 
movement embarked by the terrorists as well as their actions. Although, states are not 
compelled to consider such actions according to the resolution 1373, but it encourages 
them to do so.681  
As indicated above that the latter resolution has not obliged states to exchange 
intelligence, it is again urging members to intensify and accelerate the sharing of 
operational information. On that premise, most member states obliged and created a 
coordinating unit within their national security architectures known as “National 
Counterterrorism Committee”.682 The article further promotes the establishment of 
internationally recognized body such as Interpol to help in the fight against terror and 
its related crimes.  
5.3.9 Bilateral and Multilateral Agreement 
Various sections of article 3 provided for a viable platform through which member 
states can sign a pact among themselves that would help suppress terrorism and other 
criminal activities. For instance, at the height of Boko Haram war in Nigeria, the latter 
entered into agreement with its neighbouring states in 2015. Such alliance has helped 
in suppressing the act of Boko Haram substantially.683  
5.3.10 Measures in Seeking Asylum and Refugees 
Resolution 1373 article 3 section F forces member states to ensure that they uphold 
their international human rights obligations because an asylum or refugee status 
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cannot be granted to individual seekers unless such obligations are fulfilled.684The 
exquisiteness of human rights law does not discriminate against the individual's right, 
whether a terrorist or not and because of this, some terrorists disguise themselves and 
claim asylum in other states. However, section G of the article asserts that human 
rights protection does not deter extraditions once satisfied that a person is a terrorist or 
affiliated to terrorist activities.  
5.3.11 Other Relevant Provisions 
Regarding article 4 of Resolution 1373, interference can occur when carefully viewed 
from the legal prescription of the article. The Resolution clearly explained that the 
relationship between international law and other crimes can be carried out at a larger 
scale in international context.685However, it looks as if the framers of the resolution are 
preoccupied with the nexus between international law and other crimes which 
supervene at the international level, for instance, money laundering, drug trafficking, 
illegal movement of chemical, illegal arms-trafficking and transnational organized 
crime, among others.  
However, the subsequent articles of resolution 1373, such as article 5, provide that 
practices, methods, and acts of terrorism violate the basic principles and purpose of the 
United Nations' existence.686 It has been noted that individuals involved in evil acts of 
terror and its related offence have staunchly encroached into the affairs of the United 
Nations; such interference affects the smooth running of the United Nations. Article 6 
is framed in line with rule 28, which provides laid down guidelines for creating the 
Security Council Committee.687The latter committee provides for requisite oversight 
during enactment of Resolution 1373. Similarly, although, in contrast to the preceding 
articles, article 7 instructs the Security Council to delegate functions to the Council 
members within the first one month of existence. The UN scribe offers legal counsel to 
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the delegation process. The commitment of the Security Council for declaring 
implementations of all aspect is found in article 8 of the Resolution. 688  
The very fundamental question that ought to have been posed to the analysts is why 
the drafters of the Resolution 1373 preoccupied themselves with the link between 
terrorism and other related crimes such as the ones mentioned above? Experts may 
assert that success and execution ability of terrorist acts largely hinge on other crimes 
fashionable in the society which may be the resultant effect. As such, the treatment of 
other global crimes seems to have been projected to reduce the chances of terrorist 
acts.689 The revision of the core legal provisions of Resolution 1373 became necessary 
to be chiefly discussed. First and foremost, the critical ingredients inferred from the 
legal principles of the resolution 1373 is the question of thematic areas that has been 
laid as a result of the adoption of the resolution.690 A critical examination of such areas 
indicates that it is possible to differentiate the following thematic areas: I) active and 
effectual methods of international and national counter-terrorism ii) effective and 
efficient means of international cooperation among states in the field of counter-
terrorism iii) effective and efficient ways of implementing the latter Resolution in 
practice and iv) effective and efficient means of enforcing and observing the 
implementation of SC Resolution 1373.691 The key areas of the resolution rest on 
specific legal provisions. The first sets of laws surrounded those regulatory 
prescriptions that articulate required actions against financing of terrorism.692 The 
second sets of laws embrace those legal statements that has to do with fight against 
terrorism and terrorism-related offences. The last sets of laws ordered a composite of 
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standard counterterrorism measures that are called upon by the states to bring them to 
life.693  
The best way of intensifying knowledge with regards to workings of all the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions Notably, Resolution 1373 in dealing with the 
issue of counterterrorism is to tacitly view the causes and circumstances that led to the 
adoption of the resolution. However, one can allude to the fact that the unfortunate 
event of September 11 might be the aim for adoption of the latter resolution, but 
conversely the prevailing tension, social perplexity hovering around the globe could 
also be among the factors. It is essential to note that any resolution to be adopted by 
the Security Council usually go through process of negotiation which thereafter would 
pave the way for enactment.   
To this end, it is important to scarcely infer little knowledge about the processes and 
steps engaged by actors that designed the Security Council Resolution 1373.694 It is 
worthy to note that all the Security Council Resolutions designed and adopted by the 
council have a standard laid down procedures for negotiation and drafting that is 
custom to the council. But, because of horrifying acts of September 11, the Security 
Council took a swift decision and expedited the adoption of resolution 1373. The 
dreadful nature of the September event pushed the Security Council to exemplify the 
laid down procedure of negotiation and drafting that is accustomed to the council.695  
Viewing from this prism, it is important to acknowledge that all standing resolutions of 
the security council including resolution 1368, none imposed counter-terrorism 
obligations and responsibilities to member states. Additionally, hitherto the 9/11 
event, all the preceding resolutions adopts a pattern that is, the forthcoming resolution 
would build on the previous one and affirmed its contents.  But in the case of 
resolution 1373 which succeeds resolution 1368 is not so, despite the latter resolution 
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incorporating certain features such as the prevention and suppression of international 
terrorism, which the former equally possessed.    
However, resolution 1373 unlike 1368 seems to be more progressive and coherent in its 
contents compared to the latter resolution that failed to direct states to enact a legal 
framework in their territories to deal with the scourge of terrorism. Also, the 
unambiguous nature of resolution 1373 and its broad contents regarding the definition 
of terrorism makes it different from the latter resolution that again failed to discuss the 
definition of terrorism.   
5.4 THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION 
This segment of the thesis had discussed in the preceding text, the process that led to 
the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 1373. Therefore, it is essential to 
briefly outline the legal consummation of the latter resolution in relation to its ultimate 
practice. International legal luminaries such as how Rosalyn Higgins query’s the 
position of legal status of Security Council Resolutions and overall application of its 
decision on member states. Higgins contends that the concept of terrorism has no legal 
significance because it describes terrorists’ actions, and therefore, it is inconsequential 
finding an acceptable meaning to the term. She also opines that the concept has not 
been regarded as a subfield of discipline under the mainstream international law. She 
however, asserts that it is the responsibility of states to explore any existing instrument 
under international law to address the crime of terrorism in their states. To effectuate 
the position of the international legal status of the resolution 1373, it is significant to 
scarcely analyze the obligatory legal status of the former as an international legal 
instrument. Many scholars of international legal jurisprudence took divergent views on 
the legality of the Resolution 1373. Scholars such as Rosand posits that contesting the 
legal status of latter’s resolution is superfluous. He based his argument on a ground 
that resolution 1373 was primarily adopted in order to lay certain obligations for 
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member states of the UN to fervently fight all sorts of terror and its related crime at a 
global level.696  
To this end, Resolution 1373 does not claim authority in executing certain counter-
terrorist obligations. Instead, it lays new counter-terrorist requirements that was not in 
practice at the international level. Hitherto to the adoption of Resolution 1373, all 
international conventions relating to the fight against terrorism only emphasized 
member states that ratified them.   In demonstrating the binding nature of the 
Resolution 1373 it is essentially necessary to re-examine the factors that revealed the 
mandatory status of the Resolution 1373 ‘chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter’.697 The obvious fact remains that, the adoption of Resolution 1373 under 
Charter VII of the UN Security Council is worth mentioning mainly because it is not 
the only Charter that vehemently regulates the standing functions of the Security 
Council.  However, United Nations Charter VI similarly empowers Security Council 
to investigate disputes that seems to threaten international peace and stability by 
ensuring its resolution within the scope of international law. While the former charter, 
has extended the powers of the Security Council by allowing it to apply maximum 
force if a state declined to take its international responsibility of cooperation in dealing 
with the acts of terrorism.698 It can be noted that the adoption of resolution 1373 under 
Charter VII and its underlying principles makes it obligatory and hence binding on the 
entire member states of the United Nations.   
Additionally, the SC Resolution 1373 encompassed other significant elements that 
makes it distinct with other resolutions of the Security Council, such as the Counter-
Terrorism Committee CTC. The general function of the CTC is to essentially 
superintend and ensuring the full implementation of the Security Council Resolution 
1373. By virtue of CTC responsibility, the resolution is, however becoming mandatory 
upon all member states not only to be Security Council members that constitute the 
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membership of the committee.699  Despite its distinct power, Resolution1373 heavily 
relies on and obligates member states of the UN to refer their counter-terrorism 
legislation according to the guiding principles and norms of international law. The 
resolution derives its powers from principles and therefore, cannot contradict itself. 
 To better understand the obligatory nature of Resolution 1373, delving into the 
principles of international law is important, because one of the essential ingredients 
contained in the resolution is international cooperation and assistance in the fight 
against international terrorism. Many scholars believed that the encapsulated principles 
under international cooperation relating to criminal matters should be categorized into 
general principles and special principles.700 Some of the advocates of this assertion 
Vermeulen et al. posits that the general principles of cooperation contained in 
international law has nexus with the cooperation prescribed under Resolution 1373. 
This is because there has been some level of cooperation between states in the field of 
international criminal law.701This thesis has however, viewed the need to interpret the 
general principles of international cooperation dictated by Resolution 1373 because the 
latter Resolution demonstrates it international legal position by designating the 
trajectory nature of the future of policy options in the mainstream jurisprudence of 
international counterterrorism.   
Drawing from the viewpoint of Vermeulen et al., the general principles of cooperation 
adopted under Resolution 1373 in fostering international cooperation should be 
discerned into the following spheres;  I) The principle of increased cooperation for the 
purpose of complete implementation of the appropriate international treaties in the 
fight against terrorism; II) the principle of international cooperation for the purpose of 
taking extra measures to prevent  and combat the occurrences of terrorist acts in the 
domain of the states; III) the principle of intense cooperation on judicial and 
administrative issues in order to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; VI) the 
principle of direct cooperation through the enactment of various form of treaties that 
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would be directed at the prevention and suppression of terrorist acts, vis a vis taking 
grave actions against the perpetrators of terrorist act; V) the principle of increased 
cooperation augmented cooperation and complete implementation of the pertinent 
international protocols and conventions relating to terrorism and the UNSC 
Resolutions 1269 and 1368.702  
It should be noted that the enshrined general principles of international cooperation are 
good steps in a right direction. However, it is appropriate to incorporate the general 
principles of cooperation outlined by Vermeulen et al. which member states seems to 
utilize in the area of cooperation. These principles are; a) horizontalization and 
decentral communication in conjunction with decentral decision making; b) double 
criminality; c) increased stringency in cooperation, which involved consultations and 
discussions relating subsisting issues, consent, grounds, for refusal, capacity, deadlines 
among others; measures for corrections including trust-building measures, flanking 
measures, minimum standards and practical application of “lexmitior” principle.703 As 
stated previously the valence and unambiguity of the four principles outlined by 
Vermeulen are relevant in the area of cooperation especially when dealing with the 
issue of international insecurity.  
 
5.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN 
NIGERIA 
 
In Nigeria, all international treaties and resolutions have no effect in domestic law in 
the absence of legislation transforming or incorporating them into rules of the domestic 
legal order apart from human rights treaties.704 However, in the case of UN Security 
Council resolution, 1373 is contrary, mainly because of the development that 
necessitated the adoption of the resolution. The resolution is binding on all member 
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states of the UN. Similarly, unlike the latter, AU Resolution 88 on the fight against 
terrorism and protection of human rights has no effect in the Nigerian domestic law, 
until is it affirmed by the National Assembly. In respect to that, an international 
organizations department was established in the ministry of foreign affairs to 
specifically coordinate Nigeria’s engagement with the United Nations and other 
international organizations. The department is divided into three, but the one 
responsible in dealing with the UN resolutions is “First United Nations Division.” 
This division work in collaboration with other governmental agencies and committees 
and relate the activities of the first, fourth and sixth committees of UNGA and the 
Security Council Resolutions to the Office of the National Security Adviser to the 
President and the attorney general of the federation for full implementation. The 
division is also tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that Nigeria abides by the 
mandate of the resolution 1373 such as cooperation between states as well as Counter-
Terrorism Committee.705  
However, as observed that finding a consensual definition of the concept by the 
international community and academic is not necessary on the one hand, but on the 
other, it is important because of the flagrant abuse by the security forces while 
countering the crime of terrorism. Once the concept is clearly and acceptably defined, 
then the security forces will strictly confine themselves to the rules of engagement. On 
the other end, instead both the former and latter should devise a working mechanism 
that would systematically prevent the occurrence or respond to terrorist acts across the 
globe. This suggestion may look impossible to achieve because of the inequality that 
deepens the marginalization of other member states of the UN. Recall the then UN 
Secretary-General Annan created a powerful committee within the ambit of the UN, 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (High-Level Panel)706, in 
response to growing dispute between states. The committee proposed “a new vision of 
collective security of the 21st century”, the contents of the report was so plausible as it 
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recommended for strengthening of the United Nations to be able to address future 
threats of any sort;707 they also include a proposed definition of terrorism as well as 
international strategy for countering terrorism708. Certain elements encapsulated in the 
report noteworthy of mentioning that was recommended to the UN are; reverse the 
causes or facilitators of terrorism, promoting social and political rights, the rule of law 
and democratic reform, address major political grievances, reduce poverty and 
unemployment, and stop state collapse; counter-terrorism and intolerance through 
education and fostering public debate. It further enshrined better instruments for global 
counter-terrorism cooperation within a legal framework that is respectful of civil 
liberties and human rights, which is key to this area amongst the recommendations.709  
In a related development Kofi Annan asserts that; “Terrorist acts constitute a grave 
violation of human rights. Our response to terrorism as well as effort to thwart it and 
prevent it should uphold the human rights that terrorists aim to destroy. Human rights, 
fundamental freedom, and the rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat 
terrorism-not privileges to be sacrificed at a time of tension710.”In a similar vein, the 
former UN Human Rights Commissioner Arbour contends that “A commitment to 
uphold respect of human rights and the rule of law will be one key of success in 
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countering terrorism, and it should not be an impediment blocking our ways.711”The 
views of the two former UN czars indicates that human rights should be used 
affirmatively when countering acts of terrorism to avoid having double jeopardy from 
both sides. Thus, this is where the issue of the definitional concept of terrorism should 
be avowedly important to determine what role international human rights law plays.   
5.6 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT 
 
A new approach for Nigeria’s counterterrorism was launched on March 23, 2014,712 by 
the Office of the National Security Adviser to the President, who coordinates and 
supervises the government's law enforcement agencies. Presaged responsibilities of all 
government institutions, non-governmental organizations were clearly defined in the 
manuscript on how to wage war against terrorism and its elements in Nigeria. The 
comprehensive strategy titled “Nigeria’s National Counter-Terrorism Strategy” was 
developed by the NSA’s office, security experts, civil organizations, international 
partners as well as academics, among others.713 The ONSA has no constitutional 
executive functions but instead plays an advisory role. Commentators and observers 
queried the arrangement and concluded that such moves hinder the successful fight 
against Boko Haram because ONSA seeks approval from higher authority before 
transmitting such approval to the hierarchy of security operatives in the field714 which 
according to security experts hinders smooth running of Nigeria’s security architecture. 
The experts involved in framing the legal strategy used other states terrorism 
experience as a unit of analysis to come up with the manuscript; and also considers the 
peculiarity nature of the roots cause of Boko Haram and other social vices confronting 
Nigeria.  This approach includes the establishment of a Counterterrorism Centre under 
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the strict supervision of the NSA and to some extent, the Attorney General of the 
Federation. The Counter-Terrorism Committee has two units, the Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Branch (JMAB) and the Behavioral Analysis and Strategic Communication 
division (BASCU), CTC as a general department, designed a vigorous and all-inclusive 
National Counterterrorism Strategy NACTEST, which in tandem partner with an 
international security expert. Some of the clauses captured in the approach indicate 
that any terrorist apprehended by the authority will undergo thorough rehabilitation 
before integrated back to society.715 It further contains, among others, the need to 
provide gainful employment to the integrated members, provision of the infrastructural 
development to the entire region.   
As indicated by the then NSA, that the establishment of the Behavioural Analysis and 
Strategic Communication division, is to develop a harmonious and comprehensive 
programme with the view of ensuring speedy implementation of National 
Counterterrorism Strategy. The first assignment of the division was embarking on a 
study trip to countries such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Algeria, and Australia to 
vigorously examine how these states effectively developed counterterrorism strategies 
and suppressing domestic terrorism to a certain degree.716 Although, study indicated 
acts of terror can hardly be stamped out instantly. The division later met again with the 
officials of these countries in Nigeria and Australia where the United Kingdom, 
Europeans Union officials, and civil organizations joined in the talks.717 Similarly, the 
Economic intelligence unit whose responsibility is to see the effectiveness and quantum 
economic interpolation of the programme proposed the identification of the need for 
an economic initiative in the region. Economic Intelligence also studied and examined 
how states that have a high prevalence of terrorism able to create employment, reduce 
the level of poverty as well as developed their basic infrastructure to a certain degree.   
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5.6.1 The Nigerian Military and Counterterrorism 
Like all the counterterrorism measures, the goal is to halt or suppress all acts of terror 
in the land; addressing the structural, geographical, and operational susceptibilities of 
the terrorists remains critical to all governments. In this regard, we have seen how the 
Nigerian government, civil society organizations, and international organizations 
partner with Nigeria to adopt a global best practice in confronting Boko Haram 
menace and other insecurity ‘soft approach’718. This widely employed approach by 
many states facing security problems is perceived as a development strategy,719 not a 
traditional military approach; hence, this thesis adopts the approach. The coercive 
military approach in dealing with extremism is not only central to the Nigerian 
government but synonymous in almost all states.  
There is a notion that a military approach in suppressing Boko Haram acts is 
responsible for the group becoming violent in their struggle.720 Hoffman opined that the 
limitations and disadvantages of engaging the military in the fight against terrorism are 
however numerous.721 The impact of military incursion on innocent civilians is so 
disconcerting primarily when they aimed to strike terrorist’s operations. Apart from the 
victims of the violence, loss of infrastructure, and hardship people experience will 
prefer to remain under the siege of the terrorists. For instance, at the height of Boko 
Haram insurgency, victims encountered serious adversity that resulted in venting their 
resentment on the military and began to sympathize and support the terrorists.722 In my 
interaction with some victims of the carnage in Yola, Adamawa State, they opined that 
the level of hardship and suffering they are going through is better for the carnage to 
continue since it cannot prevent them from seeking the means of livelihood. They 
further claimed that some countries such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and 
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Pakistan have been experiencing unending acts of terror within their domains but still 
living in relative peace and advancing their businesses. These sets of people believe in a 
theological provision that says, “no soul shall depart this world except as described and 
ordained by God.”  
However, the coercive counter-terrorism approach in dealing with Boko Haram cannot 
stop the scourge of extremism; for instance, int August 2019 there has been an open 
battle between the security forces and the group in remote areas of Borno state where 
eight soldiers have been killed723 . However, success was recorded in the last four years 
especially in reducing their advances. One of the great successes of the aggressive 
approach in suppressing Boko Haram violence is re-claiming the niche under their 
control and ensuring the protection of the people in the affected community.  
In considering the previous, it is essential to interrogate the difference between 
insurgency and counterterrorism. Theoretically, the former is a problem that the latter 
seeks to manage. Since the time of Jacobin in the nineteenth century, insurgency 
becomes an old fashion because terrorists employed as a tactic in their struggle. In 
Nigeria, the nature of insecurity hovering around for a very long time makes it 
necessary to adopt a coercive method to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, 
given the fact that the insurgents apply guerilla strategies in their modus operandi. The 
use of Improvise Explosives Devices (IED), raids, ambushes, assassinations, and 
sabotage were the main strategies employed in their acts.724 Also, the insurgents 
voraciously capitalized on the furtiveness, suppleness, deception to weaken ill-
equipped or paralyze government security forces. The insurgents try to manage the 
pulse and strength of their activities to sustain their struggle indeterminately.725 With 
such tactics, it forces the government to commit substantial amount of funds in 
suppressing their acts and elongating the fight making it necessary for the authority to 
seek negotiations with them. Although, the historical antecedence of insurgents in 
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Nigeria has shown context-driven which applies four tactics or variations to challenge 
the government security forces. 726 
However, the role military plays in suppressing or countering terrorism in Nigeria 
represents an irregular kind of warfare that entails aggressive approach beyond the 
established rules of armed conflict to attain its desired goals. The military institution 
was compelled to adopt such an approach, viewing the fact that the insurgents’ acts 
defy all established norms of armed conflict.727 It is, therefore, essential for the military 
to apply all conventional approaches in dealing with warfare, including the use of brute 
force. The insurgency in Nigeria reflects a multifaceted interaction between actions, 
structures, and belief. As Hoffman puts, that these dimensions ought to suggest the 
needed framework for examining and understanding insurgencies and fashioning 
effective counterstrategies.728  
Furthermore, the complex and unique interface between the three aspects listed above 
determines the way the insurgents operate and can determine the outcome of the 
actions.729 Accordingly, to thoroughly comprehend the nature of insurgency requires 
three-dimensional stance. Actions consist of those events, behaviors, and acts that 
describe and form the graphic tapestry of insurgencies. Organizations are the 
conditions that frame insurgencies. Some of the terms include among others; pervasive 
corruption on the part of the government, harassment, and deprivation, while beliefs 
encompass those attitudes, views, chauvinisms, ideologies, worldviews, values, social 
and individual identities that fuel insurgencies.730  
The absurd nature of the Nigerian system prevents the successful, harmonious action 
of the listed principles of counterterrorism. For instance, achieving economic 
development cannot be possible without peace and stability. Another economic factor 
that would make insurgent vibrant and effervescent to confront the government with 
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their struggle is lack of economic development whereby they would use, such as 
loophole to recruit vulnerable youths into their brawl. 
5.6.2 Presidential Committees on Terrorism  
Traditionally, the Nigerian government is known in constituting committees to do fact-
finding in any matter of significant magnitudes such as conflicts and other upheavals. 
When the government realized that military approach alone cannot solve or suppress 
Boko Haram conflict it resorted to a soft method by constituting a presidential 
committee to unravel the root causes of their struggle, as well as adopt another means 
to address the conflict. Previously, the government perceived the conflict as a political 
struggle between aggrieved politicians in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections, 
but the situation proves otherwise.731 The presidential committee was regarded as one 
of the unconventional approaches for countering Boko Haram conflict.732 The 
ingredients contained in the committee’s findings and recommendations lies mostly on 
political and development strategy. Substantial parts of the proposal are captured in the 
NACTEST document. The committee emphases much on the economic 
empowerment of the restive youths who were viciously used by politicians in the 
electioneering time as thugs. This factor was considered as the cornerstone that led to 
the emergence of Boko Haram taking arms against the state.733 The committee, among 
other things recommended the thorough investigation into the arbitrary abuse of 
human rights perpetrated by the security operatives, especially the extra-judicial killing 
of the founder of the group Mohammed Yusuf, engaging in dialogue with the critical 
interested party and compensate the victims of the carnage.734  
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Conscientiously, as usual with the Nigerian system, the voluminous document was put 
in trash discarding all the viable security solutions to deal with Boko Haram and its 
elements. The insensitive behavior of the then government in power was alluded to the 
high level of corruption and political will to take decisive action in implementing the 
recommendations. 
Similarly, the second committee charged with the same responsibility expressed their 
resentment on the failure of the government to enforce the recommendations of the 
first committee.735 ‘Galtimari Committee’736 as fondly called, raised same concern 
regarding the lack of implementations of the previous committees' work where it 
described the behavior of government as ‘potential conflict of trust between the 
government and the people saddled with such responsibility.’737 The failure of the 
government to succinctly act on such reports, it is not far from the outcome of the 2011 
general election which was characterized by severe riggings and manipulations that 
questioned the integrity of the “so-called winners.” But what needs to be known here, 
is what does the outcome of the election has to do with the implementations of the 
various committee’s work? This alludes to the fact that the leadership could not govern 
genuinely. People expressed a different opinion on this matter. Other based their 
sentiment that it was a deliberate effort by some key actors involved in fighting the 
scourge to prolong the crisis to benefit financially.738 But critically, no any government 
would deliberately sabotage its laid down measures in countering violent extremism 
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5.6.3 Soft Approach to Counterterrorism  
The term soft approach739 is often used in the lexicon of counterterrorism when 
suppressing the act of terrorism and other insecurity. The soft method, according to the 
Nigerian former National Security Adviser, the new counterterrorism strategy in 
responding to Boko Haram acts would be moored with the active public diplomacy 
where all stakeholders, especially the media, would participate in the exercise.740 The 
approach, according to him, would staunchly defeat the ideology of revulsion and 
building consensus against extremism through communication. He succinctly opined 
that the communication programme strategy focused on promoting national cohesion 
and indivisibility of the country as a state of political independence, where cardinal 
rights for worship, public safety and good governance and non-tolerance of extremism 
would not be condoned.741 According to him, the NSA’s office in conjunction with 
higher learning institutions resolved to build capacity for Muslim students union to 
serve as custodians of knowledge and intensify efforts in the fight against terrorism.   
Strategic communication goals in confronting violent extremism can only be active 
when citizens realize the importance of national cohesion, which consistently succeeds 
in the fight against violent extremism. The new approach for counterterrorism 
captured the following themes of strategic communication; terrorism is un-Islamic, 
Counterterrorism is not against Muslim, Encourage and empower Muslims to speak 
out against terrorism, the notion that counterterrorism is against non-Muslim, 
Encourage Muslim-Christian coexistence, Mass literacy and Counterterrorism is 
apolitical. 742 
Following the assent of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 by the President and later 
amended in 2013, the Nigerian government realizes the delay in enacting the 
counterterrorism law has severely affected its fight against extremism. Given the fact 
that some states have set up mechanisms reforming their counterterrorism laws and 
 
739 Office of the National Security Adviser, National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), 2016 
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processes. For instance, countries like the U. S have adopted a holistic approach in 
improving their counterterrorism laws after the event of September 11.743 The TPA 
section 1 (a) mandates the Office of the National Security Adviser to coordinate all 
matters relating to internal insecurity of the country, which includes terrorism and 
violent extremism. The section further posits that the office should formulate and 
ensure the full implementation of congruous counterterrorism strategy. Also, to build 
capacity for the operational functions of appropriate security, intelligence, law 
enforcement, and military services under the act and do such other acts or things that 
are necessary for the adequate performance of the function of the relevant security 
enforcement agencies under the act.   
However, the then NSA, contends that following the provision of the act, the 
Counterterrorism Centre whose primary responsibility is to supervise the various units, 
such as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Branch (JTAB) and the Behavioural Analysis and 
Strategic Communication was established. He asserts further that the creation of these 
units has positioned NSA’s office better as a coordinating institution-given the fact that 
it has created a considerable success in intelligence sharing amongst the security 
agencies.744 The cooperation and understanding among the security organizations 
prevented the series of attacks and have been able to locate the sanctuaries of the 
terrorists.745 Despite the delay in adopting the soft approach for counterterrorism, the 
government has viewed and acknowledged the fact that poverty could be one of the 
root causes of Boko Haram crisis hence, the strategy tends to address the issue of 
poverty, inequality, and unemployment among others. Aside from these factors, 
Nigerians and the international community questioned the political will of the 
policymakers and charged them for the need to commit themselves in developing 
human security and active development in the country. The reality is that fighting 
terrorism does not lie only in the hands of the state actors, but rather including the non-
state actors. It is therefore essential that a congruous effort employed by the Sahel 
states in fighting Boko Haram be sustained, as the group has collaborated with other 
 
743 U.S. Department of State, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 (pdf). Available at 





rejectionist organizations in the region such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 
However, under the soft approach, five streams work independent of each other.  
This approach regarded as soft because of its distinctive features that resulted in the 
development of Countering Violent Extremism746 programme encompassing the three 
tiers of government that is the federal, state, and local government. It also categorized 
as horizontal, mainly because it involved non-governmental organizations, academics, 
religious and community leaders, and traditional institutions.747 This approach 
comprises of federal establishments such as ministries, departments and agencies and 
non-governmental bodies. Under this approach, the programme is specifically designed 
to maintain the existing arrangement of both the government and nongovernmental 
institutions to further the overall targets of curtailing the tide of radicalization.748 The 
first stream under this approach is De-radicalization. DE-radicalization programme is 
designed to benefit terrorists who have been convicted and those awaiting trial. 
Besides, they would undergo rehabilitation and integration, and it similarly allows the 
released culprits opportunity to benefit from the scheme. The programme is under the 
strict watch of the Federal Ministry of Interior in conjunction with the Correctional 
Service which runs the programme in their facility. Engaging with some scheme 
requires large capacity building on the part of Correctional Service personnel, 
particularly in the areas of psychology, therapy, vocational training, sports as well as 
religious belief.749 The initiative is designed to change the psyche of the culprits 
towards entrepreneurial value, ideology, and their theological belief. While the 
programme is ongoing, the immediate family members of the beneficiaries, traditional 
and community leaders, and members of the civil society groups can access and 
participate in the training scheme. This strategy was employed to hasten the 
reintegration of the culprits back to society. In ensuring that the Correctional Service 
 
746 Office of the National Security Adviser, 2017. Policy Framework and National Action Plan for 
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facility has the necessary structure of running the programme, international 
development partners have consistently provided such.750  
Similarly, the second stream of the initiative captured as a societal approach to 
counterterrorism thinking. The third is capacity building through strategy and blame 
for the military and law enforcement. While the fourth is founded on the 
understanding of the economic factors leading to the emergence of terrorism and how 
to offer a viable and plausible solution in tackling terrorism based on the international 
and regional legal instrument.751 The governors of the affected states where the acts of 
terrorism are in high prevalence are charged to come up with concrete economic 
revitalization programme to support the rehabilitation scheme.752 The federal 
government, on its part, has assured that it will build a resilience violent extremism 
through families, traditional-community, and faith-based organizations. Also, the 
government vowed to make an inter-party collaboration for counterterrorism as 
mandated by both UNSC and AU in fighting terrorism- this will develop a monitoring 
and evaluation framework that would track implementation of each stream of the CVE 
programme. The administrative structure within which much of the counterterrorism 
strategies have been implemented, especially with specific reference to Boko Haram 
includes: 
 
- Troops have been reinforced 
- The international joint task force has taken over the provision of internal 
security (declaration of the state of emergency) 
- A curfew has been imposed 
- GSM services have been banned and restored  
- Civilian JTFs have been established 
- Roadblocks have been set up  
 
750 Ibid. 




- Invest heavily in security equipment, bomb detector units, communications and 
transport; and the Chinese CCTV system.  
 
When critically surveyed the above measures, indicates that the counterterrorism 
strategies meet international and regional legal norms of fighting terrorism. Also, the 
government has adopted and implemented the recommendations of the US General 
Accounting Office (GAO) includes the following: 
- Prevent terrorist attacks 
- Disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations 
- Respond to terrorist incidents and 
- Co-ordinate efforts to combat terrorism.  
Ensuring peace and stability remains a cardinal responsibility of every government, 
especially when is confronted with horrendous acts such as that of Boko Haram. 
Despite the appeal by some concern citizens for the group to embrace dialogue at the 
early stage, the government, on its part was also hesitant to sit with them, and that has 
vigorously broadened the crisis. Some may ponder that dialoguing with a rejectionist 
group like Boko Haram is a sign of weakness from the part of the authority, but on the 
contrary, is a commitment and sign of responsibility by any serious government.753 The 
coercive counterterrorism strategy adopted by the Nigerian authority that is, the 
aggressive approach seems not to have addressed the mayhem. As Zagga contend; 
“that, is there a military solution in dealing with someone willing to give his life for a 
course?”754Boko Haram members and their adherent have in different fora pledged to 
die for their notorious struggle. They believe that if they die while fighting for ‘jihad, 
’they die a martyr. So much belief military approach cannot kill it, but rather a political 
solution. 
The former president of the Nigerian Senate, David Mark has this to say about the 
ongoing carnage: “There is no responsible government that would sit and watches its innocent 
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citizens being killed in mass, especially in schools, places of worship and markets. This massacre 
must stop. As people of concise, we must embrace one another and listen to each other’s 
grievances. I believe that the government has taken a giant step to dialogue with Boko Haram, 
their representatives, sponsor, or sympathizers.”755  
Similarly, on the counterterrorism approach, Borno state government has on its part 
proposed to adopt a holistic approach in dealing with Boko Haram and any similar 
rejectionist group in the future. As projected, the method will encompass the socio-
economic measures with a long-term plan, among other policies. The then governor of 
the state, Shettima 756 stated that the government would compensate the victims of the 
crisis, building infrastructures, providing jobs to the vulnerable youths, improving 
health care facilities, excellent and resounding education, and revamping of Lake Chad 
Basin to boost agriculture. In Nigeria, making promises by political actors is one thing, 
and fulfilling such is another, if all government at all levels provided such amenities to 
the teeming populace, the level of insecurity in Nigeria would have been minimal in all 
ramifications. 
5.3.4 Intelligence Sharing and Border Security  
As provided in the United Nations Security Council resolution 1373, states should 
share intelligence and ensure border security; the practice in Nigeria is different from 
other states where the military holds a central role in collecting and gathering data for 
counterterrorism purposes. This trend affects the proclivity of synergy between the 
military and other security agencies, hence questioning the government's capacity in 
knowing the veracity of the collective intelligence and how the offenders would be 
punished. Generally, all the security agencies rely heavily on the Civilian JTF for 
information because of their understanding of the terrain and language and can easily 
identify any rejectionist group member.757 On the other hand, it is pertinent to know 
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that some of the information obtained from the CJTF is unreliable and unsubstantiated 
but often used by the security operatives in their operations. Some commentators such 
as Felbab-Brown contends that ‘CJTF claims are most dominant, if not the sole basis 
of raids and arrest, and yet such information is entirely erratic, unverified, and random, 
motivated purely by a desire for further financial payments or as a means of revenge 
for alleged grievances against local rivals.’758It is not wrong to say that the emergence 
and subsequent incorporation of the CJTF into a military campaign against Boko 
Haram became necessary, primarily to protect the overwhelming civilian population 
from Boko Haram one hand. While on the other hand, to prevent military arbitrary 
human rights abuses for their alleged role in sheltering the group members. The CJTF 
has mostly filled the vacuum created by the absence of the traditional leaders who are 
supposed to be playing the role of providing security and governance to civilians. In 
maintaining peace and stability in society, collective responsibility of all and sundry is 
paramount, many times people advocate for human rights but tends to ignore social 
responsibility. But social responsibility does not entail taking arms like that of CJTF. 
The fear and apprehension are that once CJTF continues taking arms, there is the 
possibility of building another violent extremism in Nigeria. Progressively, apart from 
the traditional military approach in fighting extremism, there is a viable alternative to 
succinctly counterterrorism.  
Migration remains one of the challenges confronting Nigeria to deal with the issue of 
Boko Haram decisively, and this primarily due to its size, corruption, and bad 
leadership. Nigeria is ranked 3rd after Syria and Ivory Coast in terms of illegal 
migration to Europe and other parts of the world.759 The long history of migration issue 
with the Nigerian nationals, the International Organization for Migration Nigeria, is 
presently implementing the policy framework program funded by the European 
Commission titled ‘Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria.760’ The 
IOM draw three mechanisms to fully implement the program; Migration Data, Policy, 
and Labour Migration and Diaspora Mobilization. As part of the effort to curtail 
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migration, the IOM established migration monitoring units in the critical northern 
states of Kano and Sokoto to gather intelligence about the influx of people into the 
region.761 A particular state of concern, ‘Borno’ that supposed to have a migration 
monitoring point because it bordered three states of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, 
which serves as the migratory route, has no such unit. Although, it was asserted that 
some points would be established soon to further countered illegal migration.762 This is 
regarded as a critical development in fighting border crimes. Since the launch of 
NACTEST in 2016, the IOM has been assisting the Nigeria Immigration Service with 
modern and sophisticated equipment, construction, and installation of Migration 
Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS).763 Such equipment was successfully 
installed at different locations within Nigeria notably, Abuja airport and Lagos port.764 
The facility enhanced the smooth operation of the Immigration service in helping them 
to detect a forged document and accessing the database of INTERPOL to increase 
intelligence. 
Furthermore, IOM is reinvigorating the NIS with technical paraphernalia in strategic 
points and enhancing personnel capacity to effectively discharge its functions. The 
strategy listed above strengthens the cooperation of the Nigerian government and that 
of IOM, especially regarding intelligence sharing.  However, lack of smooth 
correlation among the security agencies, notably on intelligence sharing, respect for the 
rule of law has affected the desired goal expected for countering the acts of Boko 
Haram. Besides their low capacity in terms of criminal justice and cooperation, 
processing integrated intelligence remains an enormous challenge mainly because there 
are no adequate data control centre for the security agencies.765 For instance, data 
obtained from the immigration officials, airports, seaports, police units lacked a single 
center to process the authenticity of the information. The size of the Nigerian border is 
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points which makes it challenging to gather and analyze data of migration. More so, in 
a concerted effort to fight violent extremism, cooperation among the law enforcement 
institutions should remain cardinal to counter possible threats.   
In the area of border security, relevant agencies such as immigration, custom, police, 
and the military cooperate and share intelligence. The threats of Boko Haram and 
other social vices prompted the Nigerian authority to impose some stringent measures 
at its border.767 Data collection and analysis requires a systematic, integrated review to 
avoid errors and preconception. Lack of modern equipment for the person charged 
with the responsibility to monitor migration staunchly affects their operational 
capability. Also, apart from the agencies' equipment, the government owns its part 
failed to exercise any form of control of its border, which indicates a severe and 
challenging situation to reduce the threat of cross-border crimes, such as terrorism, 
kidnapping, and other security challenges.768  
In a similar vein, some states adhered to the call of the UNSC to share operational 
information about the networks and movements of the rejectionist organizations by 
creating mutual mechanisms amongst the security agencies dealing with the scourge of 
terrorism and other vices. In this regard, Nigeria has not adhered to such because of 
the politics involved around. The resolution S/RES/2178 provides:  
All States shall prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by adequate border controls 
and control on issuances of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for 
preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.769   
5.3.5 UNDOC-CTED Partnership Project 
Like all international organizations, UNDOC primary responsibility is to provide the 
necessary support to the Nigerian government in strengthening its criminal justice 
regime and social security through advisory role and capacity building. The fusion of 
UNDOC activities and NACTEST was targeted in solidifying the Nigerian law 
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enforcement agencies in dealing with the acts of terrorism such as investigation, 
prosecution, and adjudication of cases involving the terrorists in line with the 
international human rights instruments.770 UNDOC contributed immensely in 
designing the Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and 
Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE). Also, the Terrorism Prevention Branch of 
UNDOC liaises with the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UNSC in all matters 
relating to counterterrorism.771 The former seeks to assist all member states specifically 
in the field of the legal sphere. Since the establishment of UNDOC in 1997, Nigeria 
has received all the necessary cooperation required, particularly in strengthening its 
criminal justice to deal with border crime.772 Also, UNDOC has not relented in its 
effort assisting Nigeria in enhancing the capacity of the officials of the law enforcement 
agencies in adhering to the rule of law and human rights when dealing with the cases 
of terrorism and other crimes.    
However, the cooperation between Nigeria and UNDOC has not ended despite 
substantial success in suppressing the Boko Haram acts. Following the success of the 
project in Nigeria, an additional three years was extended in continuation to develop 
the justice sector, targeting building capacity for investigators, defense attorneys, 
prosecutors, and judges.773     
 Furthermore, various civil organizations have partnered with the government to 
ensure that the authority enacts a law to regulate the activities and operation of Islamic 
religion, particularly in northern Nigeria. For instance, the Centre for Peace Initiative 
Development (CEPID) has commenced such a move by engaging some Muslim 
organizations to work out modalities in that regard.774 The plan aimed at regulating the 
way some scholars preach and propagate and interpret their understanding of the 
Quranic message. We noticed in one of Shekau videos that trended on social media 
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some years ago citing and interpreting verses from the Quran in the manner that suits 
him. Also, in a recent video released by Shekau where he misquoted some qur’anic 
verses and threatening Nigeria’s minister of Communication a renowned Islamic 
scholar, calls for such plan, because most Muslims could be deceived by the 
interpretation of the monster. Such preaching, even when society is peaceful, can incite 
violence between the adherents of the two monotheists’ religion (Muslim and 
Christian). In a similar vein, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) has 
proposed in the legislation that henceforth, any preacher to go public to expound must 
obtain a license from the authority.775 We could also see how the civil organization 
societies are supporting government counterterrorism policies and strategies through 
media sensitization, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution via dialogue, economic 
empowerment, and skill acquisition programme, as well as promoting inter-agency and 
civil-military dialogue, among others. The soft approach is people-oriented and 
humanly capable than the use of brute force by the military-it is again better than the 
piece of human rights legislation laid by the international, regional, and domestic 
instruments.  
5.3.6 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
The United States Government initiated this partnership in 2005 to strengthen and 
improve the capacity of relevant stakeholders involved in fighting terrorism in the 
African sub-region.  The membership of the agency consists of eleven states.776 This 
pact's goals are to put all the necessary preventive measures of stopping the growth of 
terrorist groups within the Trans-Sahara States. It also encourages the governments of 
the forum to develop their law enforcement agencies' capacity and concentrate on 
combating terrorism in their hotspot; instead, they put the necessary facilities to 
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discourage vulnerable youths from joining it. The forum directs members to monitor 
and counter the financing of terrorism, such as the demand of ransom by kidnappers.777  
Similarly, since the constant growth of the terrorist organizations, especially about a 
decade ago, there has been a series of submits within the entire African sub-region. In 
April 2018, Nigeria hosted the African Land Forces Summit where senior army forces 
commanders of 40 African states attended, and their counterparts from Brazil, Europe, 
and the U.S.778 The meeting discussed how to foster regional cooperation and build a 
platform for intelligence sharing to address violent extremism in Africa. 
The United States and its allies spotted Africa as a region that has the potential of 
growing terrorism mainly because of the pervasive corruption, weak economic and 
social system.779 Nigeria became a country of interest principally because of its human 
capacity and influence, especially at regional level. Thus, for that reason, the United 
States has increased its funding assistance and military training to the Nigerian 
government by a whopping sum of $11.1 billion annually.780 Such intervention made 
Nigeria foremost amongst the recipients of African Contingency Operational Training 
and Assistance ACOTA superseding the countries that have the highest impact of 
terrorism.781 Although, such intervention became necessary because of the notorious 
acts of Boko Haram which if Nigeria is left without external intervention, the 
international community will receive large volume of displaced persons. Similarly, 
another factor the makes it necessary for external assistance is its categorization of the 
group as the deadliest terrorist organizations that ever existed on earth.  Such 
classification requires all hands to be on deck in confronting acts. ACOTA supported 
the training of various security personnel from the affected states experiencing severe 
internal insecurity, with the view in responding to the act of terrorism within the ambit 
of both domestic and international legal norms. 
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5.3.7 Legislative Response and Creation of Counter-Terrorism Law 
The constitution enshrines inter alia; the executive powers of the Federation shall be 
vested in the president and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law 
made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or through vice-
president, ministers of the government of the federation or officers in the public service 
of the federation, and shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this 
constitution all laws made by National Assembly and to all matters with respect to 
which the National Assembly has, for the time being, power to make laws. This 
provision indicates that executive cannot formulate or interpret the law to the 
government, can only execute what the legislature promulgates. It may initiate an 
executive bill and send it to the legislature for deliberations and approval. In respect to 
the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) enacted in 2011, the principle of separation of 
power was fully exercised. 
Following the unprecedented acts of Boko Haram in the mid-2010, the two chambers 
of the national assembly upon receiving the proposed executive bill for 
counterterrorism, in December 2010 unanimously considered and expeditiously passed 
the bill. The bill titled ‘Terrorism Prevention Act’782 was sent to the president for 
assent, and after that it becomes effective. The constitution enshrines those legislative 
powers shall be vested in national assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a 
Senate and House of Representatives. The National Assembly shall have the power to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the federation. Therefore, it is 
based on this principle that the National Assembly enacted an act of parliament 
“Terrorism Prevention Act” in 2011 to deal with Boko Haram terrorists and other 
heinous crimes. In doing so, have taken consideration of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1373 which mandates states of the UN to enact legal mechanism 
to deal with terrorism, although done at a later stage. Immediately after the enactment 
of this Act, the national assembly transmitted the bill to the president for assent, which 
was signed and eventually became law. With this development, the principle of 
separation of power was vehemently exercised.  
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The provisions of the Act covers the following: (1) prohibition of acts of terrorism: (2) 
the procedure for proscribing terrorist organizations; (3) terrorist meetings; (4) support 
for terrorists (5) banning the provision of training for terrorist; (6) information about 
acts of terrorism (7) obstruction of terrorism investigation; (9) international terrorism 
(8) suppression of international terrorism (10) hostage taking (11) seizure of terrorist 
cash (12) terrorist funding (13) obligation to report suspicious transaction relating to 
terrorism (14) dealing in terrorist property (15) attachment of property (16) property 
tracking (17) request for foreign states (18) evidence pursuant to a request (19) form of 
request (20) extradition (21) exchange of information relating to terrorist groups and 
terrorist acts (22) issuance of warrant and search without warrant (23) intelligence 
gathering (24) detention of conveyance (25) custody of records and video recordings 
(26) prosecution of offences (27) witness protection (28) jurisdiction (29) penalties (30) 
evidence by certificate (31) refusal for application of registration and the revocation of 
charities linked to terrorist groups (32) provision of information relating to passengers 
vessels (33) aircraft and power to prevent entry and order the removal of persons (34) 
power to refuse  refugee application (35) regulation and interpretation among others. 
 
The Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and 2013 as amended criminalised all terrorism-
related offenses and laid down legal procedures for dealing with such acts.783 
Interestingly the Act vehemently recognizes the existing relationship between 
counterterrorism and the rule of law; hence, its provisions are considered substantial 
international and regional human rights instruments and the constitution. For instance, 
section 28 of the act says if someone is being suspected of having involved in any 
terrorism-related offence, cannot exceed 24 hours upon his or her arrest without being 
charged to court for trial, and such a person will be given access to a legal counsel and 
medical officer in case he or she requires medical services. 
The absence of effective counterterrorism law exacerbated the group's acts, which 
mainly resulted because of the ambivalent character of Nigeria’s leadership that failed 
to comply with the mandate of the UNSC contained in resolution 1373, and the AU 
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resolution 88 to enact a comprehensive law for counterterrorism. This has given the 
security operatives opportunity to perpetrate human rights abuses and later made 
herdsmen group to transform into a full-blown terrorist organization, although the 
government has not labeled it so. But their acts fall under the description of the TPA. If 
for instance, Nigeria had a counterterrorism law before 2011 certainly the acts of Boko 
Haram would not have reached this level and will also have prevented the 
transformation of the herdsmen group into the core terrorist group. This is because the 
counterterrorism legislation would have prevented any individual or organisation from 
carrying out a terrorist attack. For instance, a case point is the Maitatsine riot of 1980 
and the reoccurrence in some other states leading up to 1984. Despite the nonexistence 
of legislation to meet the novelty of such crime adequately and sufficiently, Nigeria 
penal code law was used in prosecuting the rioters.  Persons who were alleged to have 
participated wholly or partly in the riots which were of deadly proportion could only 
be charged with offences under the penal code which ranged from culpable homicide 
punishable with death, arson, criminal incitement, riot, insurrection, treason, unlawful 
assembly, unlawful possession of firearm, belonging to an unlawful association. These 
were inadequate for the purpose of deterrence, and indeed disproportionate considered 
against the consequence of their actions.  
However, incitement, for example has taken a new form and shape over the cause of 
the years, with technology came the avenue to recruit and promote terrorism activities, 
however, the Terrorism Act only came into force in 2011, about 5 years since the Boko 
Haram insurgency was launched. Therefore, such cyber-based terrorism, including 
financing and promotion were not adequately taken care of under the Nigerian Penal 
law.784 
 
However, the question that comes to mind is it possible to stick to the rules of 
engagement in fighting terrorism? Because in a fight against terrorism, nobody knows 
the enemy and how they look like and where they are coming from. In such a 
situation, it becomes difficult to operate within the dictates of the law.    
 
 




Therefore, Nigeria’s counterterrorism laws need to be amended to make provisions for 
civilians and community leaders' involvement in the fight against Boko Haram and 
other terrorist-related groups. History has proved that the fight against terrorism has 
ever been successful when the military assumes certain information is classified and 
cannot share with the community. The practice across the globe is that 
counterterrorism strategies and prosecution of terrorists are only possible when the 
subscribed laws for counterterrorism are open to the public. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, 
that practice is not so. The vital counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria are only 
available to security operatives, which to some certain degree is affecting the fight 
against the Boko Haram group. The reality of this issue is that such information that is 
not available for the public to know in the fight against Boko Haram does not help the 
authority because it is the responsibility of the government to protect citizens and 
hence hiding such information to the public will be seen as if the government is not 
going the needful. With the enormous resources spent fighting Boko Haram, especially 
from 2009-2015, most Nigerians will think that Boko Haram must have been defeated. 
However, unfortunately, the group keeps strategizing and unleashing mayhem on 
Nigerians and the Nigerian government. Although substantial progress has been 
recorded. It is clear to the group that the Nigerian government aims to eliminate them 
and hence they deployed an irregular warfare strategy to outmaneuver the security 
forces into an area that are well familiar with. The recent ambush and killings of more 
than 100 security operatives have demonstrated this assertion. On 19th of November 
2018, the group stormed a military base in a remote village of Metele,785 Guzamala 
local council in Borno state and killed more than 100 security operatives and carted 
away arms and military carriers. According to one of the soldiers who escape the 
attack, the operatives were unaware by the terrorists and have been alerted by their 
colleagues who were permanently stationed on top of the observation post, but because 
they had sophisticated weapons the operatives had to retreat. He further opined that, 
because of their strength, the operatives had no option other than to flee. 
 
785 See Local-Pulse.ng at “Boko Haram: Full Story of how 100 Soldiers were Killed 
https://www.pulse.ng/.../boko-haram-full-story-of-how-100-soldiers-were-killed-id9132, (Accessed 
20th November, 2018) 
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5.3.8 The Nigerian Courts and Counterterrorism  
Nigeria operates its court system based on hierarchy. Simple offences are tried in area 
courts, and magistrate courts. The courts are inferior. However, Nigeria's constitution 
recognized the following courts, High courts of the states and the Federal Capital 
Territory, the National Industrial Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. 
The high courts, federal high courts, and National Industrial Court are courts of 
coordinate jurisdiction and cannot exercise supervisory jurisdiction or entertain 
appeals over one another. Appeals from the court go to the Court of Appeal, while the 
appeals arising from the Court of Appeal decision is to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court, therefore, is the final court, and its decision is final and considered to 
be final. No further appeals can be made on the decision.  
The constitution enshrines that; the Federation's judicial powers shall be vested in the 
courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the federation. The 
judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section shall 
extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this constitution, to all inherent 
powers and sanctions of the court of law; shall extend to all matters between persons or 
between government or authority and to any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and 
proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights 
and obligation of that person. This provision vested adjudicating and interpretation of 
power to judiciary through the court of competent jurisdiction on a matter relating to 
the constitution or an act of parliament.  
In this regard, the TPA has empowers courts to prosecute any terrorism offense, and 
some courts in Nigeria have convicted some Boko Haram terrorists under the TPA. It 
is reported that the pace of trial and conviction of Boko Haram members have been 
relatively slow in Nigeria. In July 2018, a Federal High Court expediently convicted 
some Boko Haram members, which Amnesty International describes as ‘good progress 
for the justice sector.’786  
 
786 Premium Time online Newspaper, ‘Amnesty International  Commends Nigeria’ Trial of Boko 




The authorities' most legal responses centred mainly on the gross violation of the rights 
of the victims of the carnage perpetrated by the security operatives. Although, the 
terrorists as well, an alleged violation of their rights to a free and fair trial. Unarguably 
some judges in Nigeria recognise and refer their decisions to the international and 
regional human rights instruments. Hitherto to the emergence of the group's notorious 
acts, some human rights cases were decided based on the international human rights 
law provisions. For instance, in the case of Abacha v Fawehinmi787 where the latter 
sought relief on the ground that his fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution of 
Nigeria 1979 were infringed by the members of the State Security Services. The Court 
of Appeal, in deciding the case, averred that Nigeria is a member of the AU and 
consented to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Therefore the status of 
the charter is superior to that of ordinary national legislation and hence upheld the 
decision of the Federal High Court.788  
In a similar vein, meeting with the obligation of international human rights provisions, 
the Nigerian government has commenced the Boko Haram suspects' prosecutions in 
different courts of law across the country. The Attorney General of Nigeria recently 
ordered the speedy prosecution of the suspects in different detention centers. 
According to AGF’s Office, more than 1169789 suspects have been sent to courts for 
trial, and about 1000 of such have been successfully prosecuted. The office said those 
with the prima facie cases would be treated with leniency while those that do not have 
will be discharged and undergo the process of de-radicalization. About 82 of the 
suspects have benefitted from the government window to plead guilty to get light 
sentences.790  
 
787 Viljoen, Frans, ‘Application of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights by Domestic 
Courts in Africa (1999) 43(1)  Journal of the African Law 1-17.  
788 Ibid. 
789 See News 24 ‘More than 1500 Boko Haram Suspects to go on Trial in Nigeria’ available 
https://www.timeslive.co.za/.../2018-09-17-due-process-concerns-over-boko-haram-tr, accessed 1 




Additionally, the court has ordered the release of 475791 suspects because of a lack of 
convincing evidence against them. The suspects were arrested based on the 
information received by the security operatives that shielded Boko Haram members 
from being arrested and offered material assistance to the group. While delivering his 
judgment, the judge averred that the suspects’ rights were violated by the security 
operatives, which contravenes the Nigerian constitution and international human 
rights instruments, including the UNSC Resolution 1373.792 However, he directed that 
they should be taken to rehabilitation centers before being released to their families. 
Sadly, amongst the released persons was a woman arrested at the height of the group's 
notorious acts in 2014 because of her affiliation with Boko Haram husband and a 
nursing mother of three months baby. The latter was arrested in Sambisa Forest after 
being married off to Boko Haram member. In the Federal High Court in Abuja, Justice 
Nyako793 ordered the release of two group members who were arrested since 2012 
without any cogent reasons. Thus, such kind of cases before the courts are too 
numerous to mention and the reason why they are getting the attention lately is that of 
the pressure from the international and domestic human rights activists.    
However, in one of the cases involving human rights violation against the Nigerian 
army instituted by one Bukar Kamsalem,794 who claimed that the acts of the 
respondent without any legal justification raiding his office and shooting sporadically 
at the building, and when he stepped out unhurt, the security operatives shot him 
without showing any provocation and resistance or contempt to the operatives.795 
Through his counsel, the applicant insisted that the unlawful act was a gross violation 
of his fundamental rights, subjecting him to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
in contrast to the provisions of the Nigerian constitution section 34, 35 as well as 
ACHPR. The applicant sought amongst others that the respondent should tender an 
apology to be published in 3 national newspapers and also to pay him a compensation 
 
791 ‘Niger Trial: 475 Boko Haram Suspects Freed for Lack of Evidence’, https://.com/475-boko-
haram-suspects-freed-for-lack-of-evidence, accessed 1December, 2018. 
792 Ibid. 
793 Ibid.  




of (N500, 000,000)796 as general damages for the unlawful, arbitrary and 
unconstitutional raid, shooting, destruction, psychological trauma, humiliation, pain, 
and severe injury sustained resulting to amputation of one of his legs.    
Thus, the presiding judge ruled that the respondent has violated the applicant’s rights 
provided under Nigeria's constitution and other international human rights instruments 
to which Nigeria is a party to. The judge instructed that the respondent shall pay the 
applicant the sum of (N150, 000,000)797 as damages. He further warned the respondent 
that he should stick to the rule of engagement while countering the acts of Boko 
Haram and other criminal groups.798 He referred to the UNSC Resolution 1373 which 
provides that human rights and fundamental freedom must be protected when fighting 
terrorism. From this judgment to some extent, international human instruments have 
been referred to.   
5.3.8 Overall Approach and Attitude of the Nigerian Government  
The overall approach to address terrorism in Nigeria leaves serious cases of human 
rights violation either from terrorist or law enforcement agencies. The approach of 
Nigeria has generally been questioned. For example, in quite a lot of instances, the 
government has been actively involved in negotiating the release of Boko Haram 
victims especially when schoolgirls were concerned. The Chibok girls release 3 years 
after their kidnap and the Dapchi girls return 5 weeks after they were abducted from 
school involved negotiations and exchange of arrested Boko Haram members in place 
of the girls. Negotiation with a group of terrorists who have threatened the security of 
the nation is a statement of the government’s inability to tackle and defeat the 
terrorists. Neumann said that ‘Negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their 
methods…’799 A democratic government should not be involved in negotiations with a 
terror group because it undermines its authority and ability to effectively secure the 
lives and properties of the citizens who voted it in. However, many democratic 
 
796 Ibid.  
797 Ibid.  
798 Ibid.  
799 PR Neumann, 'Negotiating with Terrorists’ <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-01-
01/negotiating-terrorists?amp> accessed 3 December 2020 
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governments have resorted to employing mediators to try to broker peace between the 
government and the terrorists. One Democratic country that has vowed never to 
negotiate with terrorists no matter how severe the situation is the United States of 
America; some others are Columbia, Turkey and Spain. At a time, a former Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, vowed never to get involved with 
such negotiations.800 These countries record a minute number of terror attacks 
compared to the countries that are constantly in peace talks with terror groups. The 
position of the government in dealing with Boko Haram either strengthens them or 
weakens them depending on what the government stance is. 
 
Another approach the Nigerian government has adopted is Amnesty for repentant 
Boko Haram members. At a time in Nigeria, the Oil-rich States were ravaged by Niger 
delta militants, who consistently attacked oil companies, blamed for been responsible 
for the pollution of farmlands and water bodies in the States. A former President of 
Nigeria, the late Umaru Musa Yar’adua, introduced amnesty as a move to convince 
the militants to surrender their arms in exchange for money and government pardon.801 
It was a move that worked, and the region enjoyed peace again. It could be argued that 
the militants were making attacks to make their grievances known to the government 
because since the discovery of oil in the region, farmers and fishermen suffered a huge 
loss as a result of the pollution from the oil; the growth of the nation’s wealth was at 
the expense of the Niger Delta people with a lot of their rights, especially the social, 
economic and environmental rights, been breached. The situation is quite different 
with terrorists. There is a deliberate attempt to deprive people of their rights because of 
their difference in thoughts, conscience, and religion. In the past couple of years, there 
have been links between a faction of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of Iran and 
Syria (ISIS). Considering this and the other atrocities of Boko Haram, should there be 
amnesty talks at all between the government and terrorists? The situation right now is 
 
800 H Toros, ‘‘We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!’: Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts, 
Security Dialogue’ (2008)  39(4) Security Dialogue 407 
801 Xan Rice, ‘Nigeria begins Amnesty for Niger Delta Militants’, The Guardian, 6 Aug 2009, 




that about 2000 repentant terrorists have been rehabilitated back into the society.802 
Whether this move will create a lasting solution is something that many doubt. 
 
This terrorist group have been actively wreaking havoc in the north, purchasing 
weapons more sophisticated that the Nigerian military and sustaining their little 
community in the forest. They have some people funding their cause financially, but 
the government has been unable to trace these sponsors. In November 2020, the 
United Arab Emirates convicted six Nigerians for facilitating the funding of Boko 
Haram between 2015 and 2016.803 This is the first of such conviction that has been 
recorded, howbeit not by the Nigerian government.   
5.4 CONCLUSION  
Following the review of international instruments on counterterrorism and the Security 
Council Resolution, the various counter-terrorism strategies employed by the Nigerian 
authority in suppressing the acts of terrorist Boko Haram and other criminal elements 
terrorizing the land has been for about a decade. It also observed that the strategy 
requires speedy modification where statutory role should be allocated to the Office of 
the National Security Adviser to hasten the counter-terrorism mechanism's 
implementation. This is essential given the fact that the security forces in the battlefield 
take directives from the military hierarchy, not the NSA that coordinate and supervise 
the security architecture, such gap affects the fight against terrorism, specifically in the 






802 F Soyombo, ‘Before we grant amnesty to Boko Haram’ (The Cable, 24 February 2020) 
<www.thecable.ng/before-we-grant-amnesty-to-boko-haram/amp,  accessed 3 December 2020. 
803 ‘UAE and Boko Haram funders’ (Vanguard, 16 November 2020), 
www.vanguardngr.com/2020/11/uae-and-boko-haram-fnders/amp/,  accessed 3 December 2020. 
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                                                CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Terrorism in Nigeria has gained international prominence, and the activities of Boko 
Haram became is now considered as a matter of urgent national importance requiring 
the need to develop strategies and laws to address the rise in terrorists’ operations that 
has bedeviled the country, leading to the abuse of human rights that are guaranteed 
under the Nigerian law, regional and international instruments. This study is 
essentially based on human rights in the fight against the terrorist group of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. Thus, the human rights questions in the fight against Boko haram 
are intended to be tested along the counter-terrorism approach employed by Nigerians 
to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Guided by the law in social 
contexts methods, the UN Security Council Resolution and other relevant 
international law instruments on counter-terrorism, the Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2011 and 2013, and the provisions Constitution of Nigeria, as well as various 
international law instruments on human rights, were analyzed, taking into account 
facts and data from reports from NGOs, institutions within the UN systems, 
governmental documents and opinion expressed by scholars from different fields to 
assess human rights issues arising from insurgency and the response of the government 
through different strategies to counter-terrorism in Nigeria. Further guided by the 
policy-oriented approach to international law, it appreciates that while the 
international law instruments such as the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, and 
the various human rights instruments have set the rules for Nigeria, the 
implementation of the rules must take into account the dynamic situation of Nigeria as 
well as the political and social context of the country. To this end, the research findings 




6.2 MAIN FINDINGS  
 
The study set out the following research questions: Firstly, what are the factors that led 
to the emergence of terrorism by Boko Haram in Nigeria? The purpose of this question 
is to determine the factors that have necessitated the growth of Boko Haram as a 
terrorist group in Nigeria. Appreciating the facts leading to the emergence of Boko 
Haram is equally important in situating the context for the implementation of 
international law against the fight against terrorism and address the menace of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. Secondly, the next question is to what extent the Nigerian counter-
terrorism strategies conform to the promotion and protection of human rights 
guaranteed in the Nigerian Constitution and other human rights instruments, or has 
Nigeria been able to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 
in the actualization of human rights? It is appreciated that in response to the fight 
against Boko Haram in Nigeria, some developments were in place in the form of legal 
and policy responses. Failure to act by the government means failure to protect human 
rights, likewise, acting in the fight against terrorism so that the rights of the citizens are 
violated, or even the rights of suspects are considered to run foul on international 
human rights standards. Fourthly, how best can the Nigerian counter-terrorism 
strategies be effectively implemented to support human rights protection? This section 
seeks to proffer policy recommendations for addressing terrorism in Nigeria, drawing 
from the study. The essence of the findings will be to put forward the country's 
approach to address terrorism and human rights violation in Nigeria. The findings are 
stated in the respective headings as follows. 
 
6.2.1 Factors Leading to the Emergence of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria 
The study devoted some space to discuss the emergence of Boko Haram and its links to 
other groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda at the international level. It also analyses the 
various workings of Boko Haram’s fundamentalist ideology, and how it situated them 
in Islamic jurisprudence, and examined the philosophy doctrine and practice) their 
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understanding and interpretations of the Quranic text and the waging of jihad.  This 
study revealed the classical Islamic law, Islamism, and the ideology and practices of 
the terrorist group's emergence that eventually influenced Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, and 
ISIS, among other groups. It also explained how Boko Haram established ties with 
other violent terrorist groups at the international level, which arguably threatens 
international peace and security. For example, Qutb's radical ideology was believed to 
have shaped the philosophy of the terrorists on the role of Islam in a secular society 
like Nigeria and other states. Therefore, this study demonstrated that there is a need to 
embark on proper de-radicalisation of the group and reorientation in the strategy of 
counterterrorism. The reality is that the group desires to impose Islamic law in Nigeria, 
which shows an exact ideological issue. Such belief or ideology cannot just be 
eliminated or killed by the use of brute force because the more you kill, the stronger the 
group emerges. For instance, no one ever thought that after the death of Mohammed 
Yusuf, the group will become this notorious and posed a national and international 
threat to Nigeria and the international community. Therefore, for Nigeria to 
successfully defeat Boko Haram, the counter-terrorism strategy requires general 
modification to incorporate counter-ideology and sharing of intelligence between the 
security operatives and the general public. 
Since September 11, the unprecedented acts of terrorism across the board remain a 
considerable challenge to national governments and the international community, 
which consistently calls for collaborative efforts between the states, private actors, and 
the international community to counter it. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram group's trends 
have created an unfathomable concern not only to the Nigerian authority but the entire 
African sub-region. 
6.2.2 Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in Conformity with 
Human Rights 
The preceding chapter four have analyzed the methods of counter-terrorism strategies 
employed by the Nigerian authority in suppressing Boko Haram acts. The aim of this 
research is to draw on the Nigerian counter-terrorism strategy and examine its 
conformity to the international legal instruments and human rights. In doing so, the 
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thesis analyses the general and legal strategy of Nigeria’s counterterrorism. The thesis 
found that the Nigerian government has developed legal and administrative measures 
in dealing with Boko Haram acts and other subsisting conflicts hovering around the 
African region and the international community. The research discussed the domestic 
measures engaged by the government in developing the existing mechanism for 
counterterrorism. The measures adopted by the Nigerian government at the embryonic 
stage in tackling the menace were characterized mainly by coercive measures, which 
arguably worsen the group's act.  
 
The guide offered by the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 1373, adopted 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter on Human Rights and as examined 
in this study, is considered a crucial instrument in counterterrorism that should foster 
human rights realization. Recall that the Resolution provided for the binding 
obligation on states to actively avert their minds to the reality of international concerns 
bothering on achieving peace and security amid acts of terrorism.  
The thesis acknowledged the existential historical fact that on September 11, 2001, the 
United States of America experienced one of the worst terrorist attacks ever known in 
history. This thesis is not disputing this historical fact but acknowledges it. The attack 
known as 9/11 was a coordinated attack by the Al-Qaeda terror group led by Osama 
Bin Laden. An official figure of about 3000 people lost their lives, and thousands more 
were injured. Following this attack, many States began to strengthen their anti-
terrorism laws, and those who did not already have enacted their laws. The United 
Nations was not left behind as the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 
sponsored by the U.S. on September 28, 2001. This Resolution was adopted for the 
primary purpose of tightening the ropes around the finances of terrorists and calling for 
the cooperation of all other states in the fight against terrorism. One major lifeline that 
terrorists survive on is the financial support and sponsorship from individuals and 
corporations. Following the adoption of Resolution 1373, all States are enjoined to 
take active steps in hindering the flow of funds to any cause which the States know are 
connected to terrorist acts. These active steps include the freezing of connected 
accounts to terrorist funding, criminalizing the sponsorship of terrorist acts, and 
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prohibiting any State National from directly or indirectly providing any financial 
service or help to terrorists.804 
The Resolution also enjoins States to restrict the free flow of movement and residence 
of terrorists within their territories and monitor any suspicious acts that are terror-
related and inform other States of whatever intelligence gained on such acts. One 
significant lapse the U.S. later discovered that made the attack a success was their 
national security agencies' failure to share the intelligence gained with other agencies. 
While the CIA got intelligence reports from other States, they failed to transmit the 
same to the FBI and other agencies that could have actively stopped the planned 
attacks. The sharing of intelligence reports with other States will help all States 
concerned to tighten their security measures working with the specific details gotten 
from intelligence reports.805 
The Resolution also recommends that all States monitor all international crimes (drug 
trafficking, money-laundering, arms trafficking, etc.) and note any possible connections 
with terror groups as they could be ways through which the terrorists operate. The 
cooperation of all States in the fight against terrorism is one measure that this 
Resolution strives to establish. 
Implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 is the passage of the 
Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA) 2011 of Nigeria, which is is a law that is targeted to 
counter terrorism in the country. The TPA outlines certain factors which must be 
present before an act can be classified as terrorism. Some of these factors are: that the 
act is intended to compel the government or an international body to do or desist from 
doing an act; that the act is capable of intimidating or frightening a population; that the 
act is capable of causing severe damage to the country or an international body; that 
the act involves an attack on the life and property of a person or the government, 
amongst others. The Terrorism (Prevention) Act was careful in outlining details to be 
 
804 Resolution 1 
805 Resolutions 2 and 3 
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considered when defining the acts of terrorism, stating that a civil protest, not intended 
to cause harm, is not an act of terrorism.806 
The Act also prescribes a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment for anyone 
found guilty of supporting acts of terrorism through any means; however, if such act 
results in death, the death penalty would be the appropriate sentence.807 Also in the act 
are provisions that criminalize the obstruction of a terrorism investigation,808 financing 
terrorism,809 harboring terrorists,810 and training terrorists.811 So, anyone who 
knowingly gets involved in acts of terrorism, howbeit indirectly, is guilty of a crime 
and will be punished accordingly. 
In line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the TPA also makes provisions 
for measures to stop the free flow of funds to terrorists.812 Also, as encouraged by 
resolution 1373, there are provisions for international cooperation, intelligence 
sharing,813 and extradition should the need arise.814 The Act also makes it possible to 
refuse the entry of any suspected terrorist into the country815 and to refuse the 
application of a refugee if there are suspicions that he has links to terrorists’ acts.816 The 
Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 as an amendment to the 2011 Act and 
does not repeal the latter. It further strengthens the Terrorism (Prevention) Act against 
terrorism and all sorts of financial supports towards its cause. 
Currently, the Correctional facilities in Nigeria are not well equipped to handle the 
detention of persons convicted of non-terrorist crimes, much more those convicted of 
or been tried on charges of terrorism. There have been several calls by individuals and 
non-Governmental organizations for the government to introduce a complete overhaul 
of the system. Correctional centers are meant to be holding cells where the character 
 
806 Terrorism (Prevention) Act (TPA) 2011, s. 1 
807 Ibid s. 4 
808 Ibid s. 8 
809 Ibid s. 10 
810 Ibid s. 5 
811 Ibid s. 6 
812 Ibid ss.12,13,14 
813 Ibid s. 23 
814 Ibid ss. 18,19 
815 Ibid s. 37 
816 Ibid s. 38 
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and morals of convicts are transformed and reformed to make them better persons; if 
the system is unfit for them to grow into positive characters, it is poisonous and will 
contribute to a further breakdown in their individual character.  
A further lapse in the buildup of the Nigerian correctional center system is the fact that 
there are many more people awaiting trial than those who have already concluded 
their trials and been convicted. The danger in this is that when persons who are 
suspected of their involvement in terrorism get detained in the same correctional 
centers as other people, the risk of raising more followers for the cause increases. There 
is a need to create a separate detention center for these suspects and to ensure that their 
trials are conducted speedily. The failure to accomplish speedy trials may result in the 
popular saying, ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’. 
The Nigerian government has also considered amnesty as a move to get the terrorists 
to surrender. It worked when it was applied to solve the menace created by the Niger-
Delta militants, but many have condemned it as an unfair move considering the 
numerous lives that have been lost, including the losses that the government has 
recorded economically. Perhaps, if the terror group in Nigeria were ordinary citizens 
just making their grievances known, amnesty would have been a good idea, but 
members of the Boko Haram terror group have been brought up on the teachings and 
theories of terrorism at their young age. It is almost impossible to flush out the ideas 
that have been incorporated into a person from childhood. 
Often, the Nigerian Armed Forces are attacked either on a journey or at the barracks. 
It is expected that the movement of men of the Armed forces in terror-torn areas are 
kept as military secrets; however, the terrorists manage to gain information about their 
movement and seize the opportunity to attack. Military men who speak on the 
condition of anonymity have revealed that military intelligence reports are leaked to 
terrorists by insiders. This is a situation the government needs to work on correcting. If 
the military intelligence reports are susceptible to leakage, the security situation in the 
country has been undermined. While it is true that effective counterinsurgency requires 
extra-ordinary measures, there are also reports of the Nigerian Military detaining 
alleged Boko Haram members in overcrowded Military bases, and some are subjected 
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to inhuman and degrading treatments. These suspects are kept in detention for long 
periods without trial. When the trial is finally commenced, the suspects are not 
afforded adequate defence and are mostly not provided with interpreters during trials. 
The use of Civilian Vigilante has also led to widespread reports of abuse. People are 
sometimes indiscriminately apprehended and detained under the allegation of being 
Boko Haram members. Also, family members of suspected Boko Haram fighters are 
arrested in some cases. In the fight against insurgency, State of Emergency are declared 
and while it is allowed by law that in such instances, they may be a derogation from 
the enforcement of some of these rights, however, the enforcement of some of these 
emergency laws are taken to the extreme and cannot be justified in some instances. 
Cases have also been reported of some rogue Military Personnel subjecting females to 
various gender-related violence. Also, the Military Personnel captured by the 
insurgents are not afforded any dignity to their person. They are humiliated and 
subjected to degrading treatments before been summarily executed. The properties of 
the villagers are also set ablaze, stolen, forcefully converted to use by the insurgents 
and the places of worship are not spared. 
There have been speculations that many Nigerian officials are fuelling the terrorists’ 
attacks and are working against any move by the government to counter-terrorism 
attacks. Corruption on the part of government officials in the diversion of funds meant 
to purchase arms has contributed to the delay in the government's fight against 
terrorism. One famous case which has come to be known as the Dasukigate case is the 
misappropriation of 2.1 billion U.S. dollars meant for the fight against Boko Haram by 
a former National Security Adviser. Just recently, Major General Hakeem Otiki had to 
face a Court Martial and was dismissed on charges of theft of funds from the 
Military.817 The corruption of government and security officials need to be curbed if the 
fight against terrorism will be successful. 
Lack of synergy among the security agencies exacerbated terrorism in Nigeria, paving 
the way for some criminal elements to solidify their acts, which transmogrified to 
 
817Kanayo Umeh, ‘Court martial sacks Major-General Otiki over N400 theft’ (The Guardian, 17 June 2020) 




something that the Nigerian government could not proffer a solution to date—
enhancing all the relevant stakeholders' capacity, chiefly the military who are in the 
forefront fighting Boko Haram and its element to uphold human rights and 
fundamental freedom while countering terrorism. A comprehensive data processing 
centers should be established in all urban centers to respond to any sort of crime 
quickly. The enactment of the counter-terrorism strategy challenges the Nigerian 
government to adhere to the international best practices in suppressing violent 
extremism and task the authority to fully implement all the streams captured in the 
government’s strategies to dispel the criticism held against the government. 
6.2.3 Mainstreaming Human Rights Considerations in the Counterterrorism in Nigeria  
This thesis discusses the various measures adopted by the Nigeria government in 
combating the act of terror in consonant with the international and regional legal 
instruments. Nigeria however delayed in enacting the legal mechanism for addressing 
the crime of terrorism and other internal security threats as required by the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001. It took Nigeria about a decade before the 
Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 and later amended in 2013. In furtherance of the 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the Nigerian government 
developed the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) in 2016. The 
developments and measures so far have not translated into effective counterterrorism 
as Boko Haram terrorists' activities continue to flourish in the Northern part of the 
country.  
 
What is not in doubt is that robust legal frameworks have been put in place to protect 
these fundamental rights going by the facts that the Constitution of Nigeria provides 
for human rights and the litany of regional and international human rights instruments 
that Nigeria is a State Party. This is even more so that, they have been enshrined in the 
fountain of all laws in Nigeria which is the Constitution. However, despite the 
recognition and acceptance of these fundamental human rights, there is still 
widespread violation, neglect or abuse or abuse of these rights by State and non-State 
actors in the insurgency war going on in the North-East of Nigeria. 
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By Nigeria is a member of the United Nations, it is bound by the United Nations 
Charter. Nigeria is therefore, under obligation to implement the UN Security Council 
Resolution. Of much importance is Resolution 1373 that seeks to address terrorism. It 
is expected that in the implementation of the Resolution, Nigeria should be guided by 
the promotion of human rights. Not addressing human rights concerns in Nigeria 
means a violation of the responsibility to protect. Taking measures that do not 
guarantee the rights of suspected insurgents is also a breach of such responsibility to 
protect human rights. Nigeria as a country is a signatory to, has adopted and ratified 
several international instruments that made provision for various human rights and 
their protection such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and its 
protocols, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading  
Treatment or Punishment, Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional 
protocol, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, etc. The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) has made copious provisions in its Chapter IV 
to guarantee the civil and political rights, the same which is termed as fundamental 
rights.  
These constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights relevant to this discourse include 
the right to life as contained in Section 33 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, which is to the 
effect that, every person is entitled to a right to life and cannot be intentionally 
deprived of same except in execution of a sentence of a court in respect of a criminal 
offence for which the person has been found guilty. Provisions are also made in 
Sections 34 & 35 of the 1999 Constitution, guaranteeing the right to dignity of the 
human person and the right to personal liberty. Also, the right to Private and Family 
Life (Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution), the Right to Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience and Religion (Section 38 of the 1999 Constitution) and the right to 
Freedom of Movement (Section 41 of the 1999 Constitution) were also provided for. 
Thus, It suffices to say that more has to be done in the protection of human rights in 
Nigeria, especially from state actors involved in the counter-insurgency war. It is not a 
struggle that would be won in just one day; it a gradual process that bears in mind that 
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human beings are entitled to certain rights that must be respected and not observed in 
the breach. Policies should be put in place by the government to ensure that this 
gradual process comes to fruition and not just paying lip service to protect human 
rights.  Which is more, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is 
greatly affected because these Boko Haram, in some cases, carry out forced 
conversions. All these and many more are a deliberate attack on the fundamental rights 
of these people. Because of the insurgency, the right to education of the children is 
greatly hampered. This is even more apparent when it is considered that the mantra of 
the Boko Haram insurgents is that western education is a sin. The enjoyment of the 
human person's right, freedom of movement and personal liberty have significantly 
been affected by the insurgency war. Because of the conflict, millions of people have 
been internally displaced while some have been forced to flee their homes into 
neighbouring countries. They live in camps, informal settlements, worship and public 
buildings, mostly in squalid conditions and overcrowded. Their rights to private and 
family life as guaranteed by the Constitution is greatly affected. 
Nevertheless, for terrorism to be addressed, it is essential to ensure that necessary 
measures that take into account human rights are integrated in the fight against 
terrorism. In line with the policy-oriented approach, Nigeria’s efforts on 
counterterrorism will need to be directed from the peculiarities of Nigeria. 
Accordingly, the viable basis for the promotion of the concept of human rights within a 
given society, bearing in mind the diversities and peculiar nature of every human 
being. The fragile nature of the Nigerian states, and the fact that over the years, due to 
successive military government, there is a systemic rise in human rights abuses. 
Human rights aim to protect members of a society, and Nigeria should approach the 
fight of terrorism, taking into account the need to mainstream human rights concerns 
in the strategies put in place. 
As found in the study, radicalization and full-fledged indoctrination were central to the 
emergence of Boko Haram. The grouse of the sect has been primarily hinged on the 
illusion that the repeated maiming, killings, and destruction of properties are actions of 
revolution against western culture infiltrating the customs and norms indigenous to the 
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country Nigeria. It is therefore believed that, through the frequent killings and 
criminalities, the whole governance system in the country will gradually become 
crippled and will in turn necessitate taking a standpoint against the adoption of the 
western culture in Nigeria. De-radicalization and reorientation of the people, as well as 
persons found guilty of terrorism, will be a way forward. It was found that the grant of 
amnesty to suspected terrorists has not auger well as most of their attacks have had 
much impact on the people who may feel cheated that they did not get justice. More 
so, how the repentant terrorists are received into the Nigerian society without any form 
of punishment do not appear to even show that they have been fully de-radicalized. 
The goal should be that of adequate radicalization for the country's good after the 
terrorists have served their jail terms. 
Furthermore, the study found that granting amnesty to apprehend militants to engraft 
them into society as a strategy to fight terrorism will need to be avoided. The idea of 
amnesty for Boko Haram insurgents can be described as unconstitutional because the 
action of the massacre with attendant mass killings of innocent citizens is a heinous or 
hideous crime. A crime is an unlawful action, or an omission proscribed by the law. 
Heinous crimes such as murder, rape, arson, or burglary should be taken seriously. 
Therefore, granting individuals pardon for deliberate and misguided actions of murder 
is not a proportionate punishment as provided for by the criminal laws of the land. 
When not duly curbed, such crimes can aggravate and consequently escalate into a 
global threat to peace and security, which then becomes an international menace such 
as terrorism. At this juncture, it would not be out of place to describe the activities of 
the Boko Haram sect as a terrorist. Terrorism characterized by violent criminal 
activities and dangerous acts that threaten peace and safety. These issues bother on the 
country's development; hence, the law seeks to curb such excesses. 
It is also vital to re-examine the very essence of criminal investigation and proceedings 
ingrained within the country's criminal justice system. Under criminal investigation, 
evidence or information garnered from a crime scene are viable tools in establishing if 
a crime was committed or not. It also provides a lead in identifying and apprehending 
the perpetrator of a crime and ultimately providing the necessary information needed 
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in securing the conviction of a perpetrator in a court of law. Similarly, criminal 
proceedings are proceedings defined by the law that should promptly take its cause, 
whereby an accused person is arraigned in court to ascertain and determine guilt or 
innocence. Once due process such as criminal investigation and proceedings are 
subverted or sabotaged, it becomes a life-threatening situation to the society, 
individuals in the society, neighboring communities, and eventually the global world. 
Exceptional and expeditious trial of terrorists will help address the menace and keep 
terrorists off circulation in society. 
6.3 CONCLUSION  
 
The activities of Boko Haram, known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jiha, 
have received international attention in the international fight against terrorism and 
promoting human rights. The notoriety of Boko Haram has permeated beyond Nigeria 
and immense implications for the international fight against terrorism. Virtually no 
activity of any group and the resultant effect of the same has impacted the security 
architecture of a particular region and the general safety of the populace like the 
operations of the terrorist group of Boko Haram. The group has a vast presence in the 
North-East of Nigeria has been carrying out violent insurgency activities against the 
Nigerian State. The country has experienced a spike in this group's violence, gaining 
much momentum in their operations sophistication. 
Notably as the right to a peaceful existence, which is embedded in right life, property, 
freedom of movement, among other rights guaranteed in the Nigerian Constitution 
and other international human rights instruments. The government owes each citizen a 
duty to protect these human rights. This relates primarily to the issue of security, which 
has been truncated by the activities of Boko Haram. The killings done by the Boko 
Haram sect are a security threat to citizens of the country and by extension, to non-
citizens, who are within the shores of Nigeria, either as investors or collaborators and 
are operating under certain sectors of our economy. Many activities leading to social 
cohesion, economic development has been jeopardized due to insecurity leading. 
There are several problems that have challenged the progress of Nigeria through its 
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history giving to how the Boko Haram terrorist group emerged. The problem of 
insecurity has become most prominent in recent years. Not minding the fact that such 
problems are not peculiar to Nigeria, the country has recorded more attacks by the 
extremist sect widely known as Boko Haram. The international response under the 
framework of the United Nations and more particularly the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 has not yielded the desired results, even with the availability of the 
Constitutional provisions and promises offered by international fundamental human 
rights norms that should offer protection for Nigerians. The law on terrorism and the 
strategy of the government has been generally called to question because of the 
continuous attacks ongoing in the country. The peculiarity of the Nigeria situation 
therefore calls for the need for Nigeria to reassess its approach to the fight against 
terrorism, through the overall of the overall security architecture of the country.   
Furthermore, the quest for development in a society is oftentimes accompanied with a 
number of advancements as well as setbacks or impediments as seen with the 
emergence of Boko Haram. While considering development in a society, a major the 
impediments will need to be addressed either utilizing local measures or alternative 
efforts as has been approached in the measures to fight the growth of the insurgency in 
Nigeria. Whatever may be the adopted strategy, every nation should reassess its 
approach and possibly readjust where its approaches are not yielding the desired 
results. The factors leading to the emergence of terrorism by Boko Haram in Nigeria 
should be reassessed and brought within the context of its peculiarities. Thus, 
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and Nigerian 
counter-terrorism strategies will need to conform to the promotion and protection of 
human rights guaranteed in the Nigerian Constitution and other human rights 
instruments as it falls short of protecting the rights of the citizens because of the 
increased operations of the Boko Haram and also as a result of human rights violations 
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